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ABSTRACT
The current consensus in housing policy recognizes the importance of learning from
rather than about informal settlements. To serve this end, this dissertation presents a novel
methodology for investigating land and housing markets. The methodology consists of
investigating time-evolving relationships between attributes of the social agents who intervene on a
market (e.g. social standing, religious affiliation, gender), rules-institutions systems (formal and
informal institutions), and the macro political-economic context (e.g. price of land, demographic
growth). The method was applied to a case study that tracked three groups of actors:
developers, public agents, and homeowners, over a fifty-year period (1950-2000) in Hayy el
Sellom, a neighborhood located in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon. The case study
relied on in-depth interviews of developers, public agents, and residents, a structured survey
of homeowners, research of public archives (e.g. construction and urban regulations,
building permits, lot subdivisions), and time series analysis of aerial photographs.
The case study demonstrated that the proposed method can unpack the category of
the "informal market" by revealing a web of co-existing formal (market and public
institutions) and informal (e.g. social, geographic, political associations) institutions whose
interplay determined market characteristics (e.g. openness, flexibility, security) and resulted in
unequal opportunities for housing and capital accumulation by residents and developers,
respectively. Second, the case study unraveled dialectical actor-institution relationships in
which one's ability to intervene in the housing market depended on one's ability to tap
existing institutions that sustain exchanges and build new ones. Third, the study documented
the heavy involvement of public agencies or agents in the development of informal
regulations and the organization of illegal processes of housing production. Fourth, the case
study documented the interconnectedness of housing markets segments, showing how so-
called informal markets are directly influenced by city-wide parameters (e.g. price of land,
political stability, housing demand) and partially rely on formal market institutions such as
banks and contracts. Finally, it was found that greater involvement of formal market
institutions did not improve market conditions (e.g. transaction security) or opportunities for
capital accunmulation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
More than 25 years after the first international conference declared informal housing' a
legitimate mode of housing production and acquisition (First Habitat Intemrnational conference
held in Vancouver 1976) and John Turner emerged as the leading voice arguing that self-help
housing was a solution rather than a problem (Turner 1967, 1972), policymakers and researchers
are now acknowledging the necessity not only to learn about informal settlements but, more
importantly, to learnfimr informal settlements, or the practices of actors involved in this form of
housing production (McAuslan 2003, Bemer 2000, Fekade 2000, Kombe and Kriebich 2000).
The impetus for my thesis arose from this challenge. I began with the assumption that
there is much to be learned from the working mechanisms of informal land and housing
markets, from the practices of the social agents who organize land and housing sales or purchase
'Informal economic activities are activities that escape state taxation and/or violate some form of state regulation
(e.g. property rights, construction or zoning codes, etc.) and are hence considered "illegal". The broad category of
informal housing comprises the various types of "illegal" housing that have developed in most Third World cities,
such as squatter settlements that violate property right codes, or illegal land subdivisions and/or constructions that
violate construction, zoning, and sometimes health codes.
shelters and the strategies of public sector agents who seek to retain control, manage, limit, or
participate in these market activities. Accordingly, I conducted a time-longitudinal analysis of the
land and housing market of one informal settlement, Hayy el Sellom, located in the suburbs of
Lebanon's capital city Beirut. During the 50 years covered by this investigation (1950-2000),
Hayy el Sellom grew from an olive grove to one of the most densely inhabited neighborhoods of
the capital city. What originally began as a small scale endeavor, run by one (old-time) resident of
the area who illegally subdivided the lots of relatives and friends and sold them to rural migrants
in need, became, 50 years later, a very dynamic land and housing market that attracts developers
and clients from other sections of the city and houses around 100,000 residents.
How did this change happen? Who were the social agents behind it? What kinds of
institutions and regulatory systems (formal and informal) were .put in place in order to urbanize
this agricultural area and organize land and housing sales (e.g. insure profit for developers and
landowners and protection for buyers)? How were these mechanisms developed and how were
they transformed over time given changes in the macro-conditions of the country? What
opportunities did they create and for whom? And, what can we learn from this story as
planners? This dissertation provides many insights into these questions.
The thesis has three main axes. First, to develop a methodology that is adequate to
investigating the underlying mechanisms of informal housing markets, which, as this thesis will
show, are highly historical, rife with power relations, dynamically structured, and in many
instances, blind to economics. This method is a blend of political economy, new institutional
approaches, and Pierre Bourdieu's "institutionalist" theory. Second, it is to apply this
methodology in a case study from Beirut (Lebanon) to generate new insights about how markets
work in general, with special emphasis on "informal" housing markets and rebut widespread
assumptions about how informal markets operate (assumptions about the role of different actors
in these markets, connections and influences between formal/informal practices and
micro/macro environments). Third, this thesis sheds light on the yet unstudied mechanisms of
informal housing production in the Lebanese context.
This introduction begins by tracing the history of the informal housing debate to the
current consensus on the necessity of studying informal markets. This brief literature review
leads to the methodological investigations, looking at existing approaches to studying informal
land and housing markets and describing the method I developed in order to conduct this case
study. Finally, this chapter shows the significance of this investigation and the main sources used
in data gathering.
Following this introduction, the dissertation is structured in five chapters. Chapter 2
presents relevant background information about the case study and its context. The following
three chapters apply the developed methodology to three groups of actors who have played a
central role in. the neighborhood: developers (Chapter 3), public agencies (Chapter 4), and
homebuyers (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 brings these together to an analysis of the market, from
which the main conclusions and policy recommendations of this work are developed.
1.A THE ]NFORMAL HOUSING DEBATE
Approximately fifty years ago, the debate on housing policy settled on a consensus
backing direct public agency involvement in the production of housing (Rodwin 1987) and the
establishment of formal markets for land, credit, and construction materials (Annez and
Wheaton 1984). It was thought that this would eventually lead to the withering of existing
informal housing arrangements, as new formal ones were put in place. At the time, informal
settlements were widely described in the planning literature as "urban misery belts", "urban
sores", "creeping cancers", or "a fungus attached to and growing out of the carapace of the city"
(Juppenlatz 1970: 5). Their residents became the focus of "marginality" and "culturalist"
theorists who described them as socially and politically marginal, as "peasants in the city"
(Gutkind 1973 in Sanyal 1988:67, Juppenlatz 1970). Informal settlements were to be
permanently erased once modernization had completed its cycle in lower income countries.
Policymakers and researchers thus called for "scientific" approaches to address this housing
problem (Seymour 1976 in Agarwal 1981).
By the mid 1970s, and notably because of the failure of Third World governments to
build the needed housing stocks and the criticisms leveled by researchers such as John Turner, a
different position vis-a-vis informal housing began to be adopted (Harris 2002). Planners began
to accept the fuamous dictum put forth by John Turner that "self-help housing was the solution,
not the problem". Turner emphasized the advantages of self-help housing over state-provided
units in terms of the greater flexibility gained from a small scale, self-sufficient, and non-
hierarchical approach that allowed for dwellers' control over the production of housing,
including the ability to decide on a house that suits their economic circumstances and their social
needs (Mangin and Turner 1968, Turner and Fichter 1972). Many of these arguments were
echoed by research that used empirical data to challenge the homogenizing and stereotyping of
the urban poor put forth by "culturalist" perspectives on poverty (Lewis 1966). For example,
Perlman (1976) described social cohesion and high rates of popular participation in the
management of Brazilianfavelas and Collier (1976) described the entrepreneurial spirit of squatter
dwellers. This line of research continues to date with, for example, Perdomo and Bolivar's
(1998) documentation of existing informal systems of organization in the barriea in Caracas,
demonstrating that the reputation for crime and insecurity in these areas was unfounded.
Not everybody however accepted this approach. Neo-Marxists, for instance, saw in the
acceptance of squatter settlements another opportunity for industrialists and their allies in
government to abdicate their social housing responsibilities (Burgess 1978 and 1982). They
critiqued advocates of self-help housing for ignoring the structural conditions of domination
under which self-help housing emerged and for treating it as an individual process outside the
patterns of class struggle. For example, Harms argued "international organizations, agencies, and
governments of lower income countries discovered that self-help squatter areas were actually
producing housing (though of a variable quality) without any state aid. This lead to the present
situation where governments have been interested in self-help as a policy to avoid the
distribution of surplus value" (Harms 1982: 49). The Marxist argument extended further,
highlighting capitalist interests in the self-help process, be it in terms of increasing the amount of
unpaid labor in society, de-valorizing labor power, reducing the need for public housing subsidy,
incorporating people in the mentality of petty bourgeoisie to own/speculate with the building
stock, or appropriating the interests derived from the valorization of land and capital through
the construction industry (Harms 1982, Burgess 1978, 1982).
Marxist critiques notwithstanding, the policy paradigm shifted from eradication to
upgrading of informal settlements and policy consensus among researchers, as of the mid 1970s,
settled on the acceptance of informal settlements as permanent aspects of the cityscape.2 As a
result of this paradigm shift, policy recommendations focused on replicating some of the
positive aspects of informal settlements (such as the incremental building process, the flexibility
of construction, and the user control over the production process) through site and services
projects or to facilitate the operations of informal markets through credit provision.
2 Perhaps the dclearest form of endorsement is the 1976 UN-Habitat I summit in Vancouver that adopted Turner's
approach and encouraged lower income governments to adopt upgrading and regularization policies.
Further research consolidated this policy shift by dismantling prior assumptions about
informal settlements, such as their 'lawless status" or the "spontaneity of their processes of
production". Empirical fndings (building on the traditions of legal pluralism) described the
existence of a web of formal and informal or customary regulatory regimes in informal
settlements (Karst 1971, Santos 1977, Razzaz 1993). Over time, the study of the interaction of
these various regulatory regimes with state law gained importance, as critiques of the dualistic
perception of formal versus informal spheres unraveled the interactions between the "two"
(Sanyal 1988, Benton 1994), showing how they complement each other (Hermanson 1996),
borrow from each other (Santos 1977, Azuela de la Cueva 1987, Razzaz 1993 and 1998,
Hermanson 1996), ignore each other (Rolnik 1996), or contradict/conflict with each other
(Assaad 1996). Others also documented the premeditated, well-organized community groups
that operated in the formation and production of informal housing, challenging the description
of "spontaneity" that was first ascribed to informal settlements (De Soto 1989, Razzaz 1993,
Serageldin 1991, Ward 1982). These findings pushed the housing policy consensus further
towards acknowledging the positive potentials of informal settlements and the necessity to build
on their existing assets.
Another shift in the literature took place in the 1990s, calling for a focus of the study of
informal land and housing markets, in order to understand and improve their performance. The
shift was perhaps triggered by the chronic inability of upgrading and site and services
intervention to address the scale of the persistent housing deficit, in most if not all lower income
countries. The policy implications were clear. the public sector should disengage from any direct
participation and limit state activities to "market enabling", to use the World Bank terminology
(World Bank 1993). Instead of upgrading informal settlements, organizing sites and services
projects, or improving credit delivery, housing agencies were to empower those delivering
housing informally, such as informal developers, and improve market performance by facilitating
processes of market exchange by all means, including the disbursement of legal titles without
cumbersome bureaucratic measures. Not only would this measure improve housing conditions,
but also - perhaps more importantly- it would "unleash the power of capitalism" for a positive
impact on national development (De Soto 2000). Tenure regularization gradually occupied the
limelight of policy recommendations by international donors and became the subject of the 2002
UN-Habitat Campaign.
As researchers focused on land and housing markets, they began to unravel their
complexities. Some authors documented the wide web of actors who intervened in the
production and regulation of housing markets, including professionals Gones and Ward 1994)
and public actors (Colliers 1976, Benjamin 1996). Others looked at the effects of public policies
on the operations of these markets Gones and Ward 1994, Perl6 1994, Kironde 2000) or sought
to investigate the interactions of formal and informal housing markets (Durand-Lasserve 1990).
More recently, the social sciences' focus on institutions also triggered new research on the web
of informal institutions that sustain these markets, especially social networks (e.g. families,
tribes), and elucidated how such institutions facilitate market operations, secure transactions,
insure information flow (Razzaz 1998), or provide credit for market users (Pamuk 1996, 1998).
Based on these findings, the current consensus in land and housing markets research and
policy has evolved: "illegal systems have in the past achieved far more than any social initiative"
(Van der Linden 1994: 22). It is thought that research should focus on the operations of
informal land and housing markets, documenting the institutions that sustain them and learning
from the practices of the developers who organize them. It is specifically the operations of
informal land developers, until recently dismissed as illegal profiteers, that have now gained
importance in light of their irrefutable ability to organize land sales and improve access to
housing, whereas government policies failed to match their performance. Furthermore, having
acknowledged the close connections between formal and informal sectors, many researchers are
-now urging a better understanding of how this interlocking occurs (Bemer 2001b, McAuslan
2003).
The policy recommendations are clear: it is necessary to recognize the potentials of
informal markets and integrate them deliberately within overall housing markets (Van der
Linden 1994, Heyman and Smart 1999, Fekade 2000, Kombe and Kriebich 2000, Berner 2001b,
McAuslan 2003). Any possibility of state intervention has to be informed by the practices of
informal settlements that have achieved far more for housing the poor than formal ones. In the
words of Van der Linden, "if the government is to intervene at all, its interventions should
resemble the informal solutions much more" and a regularization scheme should propose a
model "in which legal development is, in fact, an imitation of the illegal system" (Van der Linden
1994: 22). These words are echoed by Kombe and Kriebich, who, having adopted the same
premise insisted that: "The only way out of this structural dilemma [gap between needed level of
urban governance and weakness of existing administrative systems] is to take cognizance of the
potential of socially regularized land management at the grass-roots level which has built up the
reaction to unreliable and inefficient public sector interventions in many of the so-called
informal settlements" (Kombe and Kriebich 2000: 232). Thus, agendas should be set to
reconcile informal and formal institutions and procedures of land management in developing
countries and to overcome the housing deficit by openly integrating actors, institutions, and
procedures which are being deployed in informally regulated local decision making for housing
and land supply, security of tenure, lay-out regulations, and land servicing (Kironde 2000,
Kombe and Kriebich 2000).
1.B EXISTENG METHODOLOGIES FOR STUDYING INFORMAL MARKETS
1.B.1 The Neoclassical Economics Approach
Early studies of land and housing markets (formal, informal, or combined) were
overwhelmingly rooted in the dominant paradigms of neoclassical economics (NE). Land and
housing were equated to other consumer goods and housing was perceived as a key sector of the
economy to be managed like others, given its important linkages to employment and industries
(e.g. Klassen et al 1987, Strassman 1988). Consequently, research centered on the principles of
land and housing market supply and demand, looking into the determinants of these curves that
were seen to shape prices, levels of investment, quality and quantity of available land and
housing, choices of tenure, residential mobility, and ultimately housing affordability (Burns and
Grebler 1977, Pozdena 1988, World Bank 1993). Factors advanced to explain patterns of
housing supply included the availability of resources (e.g. land, infrastructure, construction
materials) and labor, the organization of construction industries, and the level of national
economic development (Grimes 1976, Bums and Grebler 1977, Strassmann 1988). Much debate
went into the classification of forms of supply, according to categories such as public/private or
formal/informal, and several researchers advocated the recognition of informal housing in the
volume of supply, even if temporarily, in order to derive more accurately supply curves (Grimes
1976). Factors put forth to explain patterns of housing demand included demographic factors
(e.g. urbanization, household formation), income levels, and macroeconomic parameters
(Grimes 1976, Bums and Grebler 1977, Pozdena 1988). Other efforts were also made to
measure supply and demand curves by devising parameters such as residents' "willingness to
pay" or "income to housing expenditure" of "housing consumers" (Follain and Jimenez 1985).
Over time, many of the conclusions that were first developed in higher income countries
(especially the US and UK) were revised and tested in lower income countries and results
showed, for example, lower elasticity in demand and supply curves (Malpezzi and Mayo 1987)
but similar trends in relation to income changes and willingness to pay (Follain and Jimenez
1985). Supply curves were also revised to include informal supply or to introduce context-
specific factors such as " level of tenure security" or "individual behavioral attitudes" (e.g.
necessity to send remittances abroad) (Lodhi and Pasha 1991). International organizations such
as the World Bank invested heavily in developing information and measurement methods for
determining supply and demand curves in lower income countries as a basis for policy
interventions (Malpezzi and Mayo 1987).
Such studies had influential policy recommendations for governments in lower income
countries, and were often the basis for influential World Bank policies (ones and Ward 1994).
They lead policymakers and international organizations to recommend reducing public
interventions to correcting market imperfections (e.g. remove "bottlenecks"), improving
information flows (e.g. compiling land registries), or reducing discrepancies between individual
and social good (Bums and Grebler 1977). These later became the paradigms of the World
Bank's famous dictum: enabling markets to ork (World Bank 1993). However, others used the
results of NE studies to justify direct public intervention on the supply side in order to
compensate for the discrepancies between supply and demand curves. Over time, the
persistently unbridgeable gap between supply and demand in many lower income countries
encouraged their housing ministries and planning agencies to consider sites and services projects
and slum upgrading, or to lower "acceptable" construction standards that were, until then,
dismissed as inconsistent with the modernist visions of most states.
The neoclassical approach to studying the housing market has not been without its
serious critics who have come from two schools: Political Economy (PE) and, more recently,
New Institutional Economics (NIE). Both of these schools question basic assumptions
underlying neoclassical market studies, such as the possibility of perfect circulation of
information or the dismissal of transaction costs. Furthermore, both approaches have criticized
the "purely economic criteria" (ones and Ward 1994: 10) used by proponents of the neoclassical
approach, criteria that do not give sufficient attention to history, sociology, and politics as
explanatory factors in the study of housing markets.
I.B.2 The Political Economy Approach
The Political-Economy (PE) approach has privileged an understanding of land and
housing markets based on the analysis of social, political, and historical factors in these markets.
Research in this tradition has focused on processes of "housing production" and "housing
distribution" rather than supply and demand, and attempted to unravel the complex relations
that are mobilized in these processes (Rakodi 1992, Jones and Ward 1994).
Early research in this direction was lead by Neo-Marxists who sought to highlight
relations of domination in the housing sector. For example, Burgess developed a classification of
the housing stock according to its mode and form of production, and showed how these, in
turn, depended on existing class relations (e.g. dominant capitalist industrial housing/dependent
self-made petty-commodity) (Burgess 1978). Debates about the validity and usefulness of this
categorization ensued (Rakodi 1992).' Another early trend in the political economy approach
centered on the state, questioning its nature, the interests it represents, motives behind policy
decisions, or connecting forms of governance and types of public policies to the performance of
land and housing markets (Colliers 1976, Peattie 1979, Durand-Lasserve 1986, Rakodi 1992).'
More recent lines of questioning have proposed methodologies that look in details at the
range of actors and agents involved in these processes, the types of social relations that are
generated, the levels of legality and informality that can be observed, and the practices of land
subdivision, financing, regulation, or organization in these markets (Jones and Ward 1994).
Research in this trend has gradually built a rich body of literature documenting the diversity of
market agents such as lawyers, brokers, and public servants involved in the production of
illegality (Serageldin 1991, Nientied and van der Linden 1990, Benjamin 1996). It has also
allowed historicizing and contextualizing some of the current understandings of housing markets
in the social, political, and economic conditions in which they developed (Garcia and Jimenez
1994).
Not surprisingly, research based on political economy is harder to translate into policy
recommendations. Indeed, to paraphrase Jones and Ward (1994), it lacks the "elegance" of
3 It is perhaps worth mentioning another early trend in the political economy approach that centered on the
American private housing market where it criticized the treatment of housing as a commodity and sought to
correlate it with other structural problems of the Americas, such as inequality, racism, and sexism or the dynamics
of US capitalism (Bratt, Hartman, and Meyerson 1986).
4 It is actually possible to trace this analysis back to the seminal work of Polanyi who argued that the unification of
markets in Europe was the result of particular public policies rather than natural historical divergences (Polanyi
1944).
supply and demand curves. Nonetheless, studies rooted in political economy have been able to
explain market phenomena where neoclassical approaches failed. For example, Durand-
Lasserve's (1991, 1994) work in francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, which sought to unravel the
relation between economic and political structures, showed that land prices are often the result
of particular social relations and processes of distribution and politics, rather than supply and
demand only. In Chile, Sabatini (1998) showed how the liberalization and privatization of urban
land markets increased the supply of land, as expected by neo-classical economics, but also
generated more demand and higher land prices, and as a result, more spatial segregation. Policy
recommendations stemming from the political economy approach have diverged from those of
neo-classical economics in suggesting the need for more public involvement and market
regulation, i.e. policies that can control rather than manage land markets Gones and Ward 1994)
by, for example, facilitating land redistribution, curtailing land speculation, and by developing
land use and construction standards appropriate to low income urban dwellers (Durand Lasserve
1998, Sabatini 1998).
1.B.3 New Institutional Economics and Sociology
New institutional (NI) trends in market analysis (both Economics and Sociology) are
probably the most recent and currently the most acclaimed of the three approaches reviewed in
this section. Applications of institutional theories to the understanding of land and housing
markets have shifted the analysis, in line with this theoretical approach, towards the investigation
of the institutional and regulatory mechanisms that sustain these markets. Institutions are
defined in two different types: first, as organizations (such as public agencies, political parties,
family groups, social networks) that coordinate and organize public-private or private-private
networks, and second as "habits of thought" or "rules of the game" that generate repetitive
behavior without a physical organizational structure (Jenkins and Smith 2001a&b, North 1990).s
Both of these categories comprise formal and informal institutions that sustain state and socially
sanctioned rules.
s Jenkins and Smith define institutions as either "'mental modes' that underpin the very structure of society,
economics, and politics; and secondly as the 'organizational forms' that express relationships between those in, and
of relevance to, urban space" Genkins and Smith 2001: 17). The latter exist to "allow linkages within society and
between society and the state or the private sector, both vertically [...] and horizontally [...]" Genkins and Smith
2001b: 17).
According to New Institutional Economics (NIE)6, institutions emerge to reduce
transaction costs by lowering uncertainty in human interaction, helping to solve problems of
coordination, ensuring compliance, and allowing for the development of market exchanges
(North 1990, Nee and Ingram 1998). For many scholars in this tradition, institutions are
unplanned and. unintended regulations of social behavior that emerge "organically" from
individual maximizing behavior rather than active design (Williamson 1975). They are the
outcome of a process of historical convergence towards efficient economic structures that
minimize transaction costs (North 1990, Williamson 1975, 1984, World Bank 2002). Therefore,
scholars following this approach describe the emergence of norms and informal institutions as
the outcome of the inefficiency of public institutions for which they compensate or conversely
describe the development of formal norms and institutions as a response to the weakness and
failure of informal institutions and norms (e.g. weak or "bad" social networks, large social
groups) that need to be supplemented or complemented by formal ones (World Bank 2002).
NIE has been applied to investigations of informal land and housing markets,
particularly to study the institutions that facilitate and organize transactions, given poor
information and high risks in such markets. These have notably lead to research on the types of
institutions thai: regulate and organize housing markets, including informal institutions such as
social networks (familial or tribal), informal credit associations and the norms these institutions
sanction, such as reciprocity. One methodological approach within this tradition proposed to
narrow the investigation of market operations to the micro-scale or the "transaction" level and
examine the institutions that regulate every transaction (Razzaz 1996). Research in this direction
has begun to unravel a web of institutions such as social networks that compensate for the
absence of state institutions in order to "secure" market transactions and hence allow market
exchanges (e.g. reputation, reciprocity) (Razzaz 1996) or informal credit associations that
compensate for the absence of formal credit and provide the necessary liquidity, such as rotary
credit groups (Pamuk 1996, 1998). Others sought to explain the decisions taken by actors
6 The New Institutional Economics School gained visibility in the 1990s. Its major contribution is the introduction
of a theory of institutions in economics, which most notably challenges mainstream assumptions of perfect
information and zero-transaction costs until then upheld by neoclassical economists. Instead, NIE highlights the
role of market institutions that are notably used to regulate markets and reduce transaction costs (North 1990).
They have a direct influence on economic outcomes by imposing constraints on what people can do on the one
hand and motivating a set of actions on the other (North 1990). While North's work is undeniably the
groundbreaking step in this direction, others such as Williamson have developed the concept into the image of a
"governance structure", as "the institutional matrix within which transactions are negotiated and executed"
(Williamson 1984: 105).
operating in these markets, based on informed choices of the institutional environment in which
they operate (Berner 2001a) or the relative institutional capacities of the state, society, or the
market (Jenkins and Smith 2001a, 2001b).
Despite their important contributions to changing our understanding of the housing
markets, notably in shifting the analysis towards institutions in general, and informal institutions
in particular, these approaches remain vulnerable to the general criticism of NI theories. Indeed,
NI analysis remains confined to a utilitarian understanding of the relationship of actors and
social institutions. In this analysis, social institutions are activated rationally by, profit
maximizing individuals who subjugate their social networks to their economic interests.7 Thus,
the "embedded" individual who appeals to. social institutions in order to maximize his/her
individual gains seems not to be affected in his abilities to choose or his value-system by the
institutions in place (Bourdieu 2000). Neither does this theory account for how such social
institutions are formed, how they influence actors' choices, or how they determine market
opportunities. Most studies also absent a detailed actors-institutions analysis that accounts for
the ways actors actively engage in building social and political institutions or the way such
institutions can dictate the ability of actors to engage in activities (including the housing market)
(Bourdieu 2000). These critiques suggest the necessity to move away from reductive definitions
of institutions as tools for lowering transaction costs, and to account for the wider social role
that institutions play (Granovetter 1985, Bourdieu 1986, 2000). They also dictate the need to
investigate the social and political conditions in which institutions are formed.
1.C DISSERTATION APPROACH
1.C.1 Developing An Analytic Framework
Based on my fieldwork, it became dear that in order to describe and explain the
complexity of market mechanisms in Hayy el Sellom, I had to combine elements from several
approaches to studying housing markets. I had first begun my research relying on the methods
of NIE, and questioning my interviewees about the types of market securities and institutional
support on which they had relied to access housing (such as family, religious, or geographic
7 Despite their criticism of the instrumentalism of NIE, New Institutional Sociologists have also failed to
incorporate the broader political and social contexts in which such institutions are rooted, since they retain the same
instrumental (actors /institutions) analysis and do not question structures of opportunities (Bourdieu 2000).
networks). Gradually, I realized that these variables were impossible to investigate outside the
context of local histories, individual and group trajectories, and the social positioning of actors
who participated in the production of this neighborhood. I also realized that Hayy el Sellom's
housing market owed its existence and form of development to the unique social structures that
tied this neighborhood's residents together, to the political and economic changes in Lebanon,
and especially to changes in Beirut's housing market.
Gradually, my analysis began to go back in time and account for the history of the
neighborhood's development. I realized that by focusing on the stories of a number of central
actors, understanding their trajectories in the context of the macro-city developments, their
changing positions in the local social hierarchies, the types of institutions on which they relied in
conducting their transactions (e.g. selling and buying land, registering sales, etc.), and how and
when they were able to act on the market, it was possible to develop an analysis of the actors-
institutions relationship that appeared central for explaining the working mechanisms of this
housing market, as I will show throughout the dissertation. I thus gradually shifted to anchor my
work in the methodologies of political economy, from which I borrowed the micro-macro scale
connections, the importance of historicizing market analysis and connecting it to state policies,
and the actor-centered approach. I however did not lose my focus on norms and institutions,
especially social networks whose role in the production and provision of housing was essential in
the investigated housing market.
Social Neworks and Housing Networks
The role of social networks as informal institutions that facilitate housing provision is
not new in the housing literature. It was probably first noted in the early 1970s by Turner and
Fitcher who underlined the existence of such networks and their role in facilitating access to
housing, claiming that: "Neither individual families nor local enterprises capable of serving
individual needs can build ... unless they have access to network systems" (Turner 1972: 257).
Such networks, these authors argued, provided a flexible and individually adapted array of
resources for individuals attempting to access housing, in contrast to centralized and hierarchic
state agencies that could only provide rigid and inflexible housing options (Turner and Fitcher
1972). However, the growing importance of social networks in today's social sciences
(Granovetter 1985, 1993, Castells 1996, Healey 1999) has renewed researchers' interest in their
role in housing provision (Razzaz 1996, Jenkins and Smith 2001a&b, Smith 2003). Smith, for
instance, defined "housing networks" as "a group of people (actors) or institutions who
exchange resources (land, money, materials, labour) that go into the production of
housing"(Smith 2003: 85). In order to understand the types of networks under study, Smith
proposed a detailed analysis of the networks themselves, looking at the scope in which each
network operates (context); the resources to which it connects; the link it establishes, and the
actors it joins. He also suggested classifying these networks according to two types: vertical
networks that connect residents with formal agencies and horizontal networks that connect
urban dwellers to one another (Smith 2003).
These methodological notes were useful because they suggested the multiplicity of types
of social networks at work. Furthermore, incorporating actors into institutional analysis allowed
me to understand the interaction between the two. Nonetheless, the framework of NIE
remained too limiting for its inability to allow for the diversity and complexity of human
interactions that could not be summarized with materialistic profit maximizing paradigms. In
order to overcome these difficulties, the institutional analyses developed in French schools of
sociology, notably by the late philosopher-sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, provided important
insights in terms of suggesting (actor-institution) relationships that were dialectic in nature,
complex in their definition, and open to a historical understanding of social practices.
Pierre Bourdieu and the Sociology of Economic Life
To begin with, Bourdieu departed from the representation of social agents as profit
maximizing actors calculating profits in order to maximize material gains. Instead, Bourdieu
proposed a "generating principle for action", the habitus, through which social agents "produce
ideas, perceptions, and actions" that are constrained by these social agents' historical and social
positioning (Bourdieu 1980, 1994). Actions are neither a mechanical reproduction of social
conditioning (such as structural thought could suggest) nor an unpredictable free choice directed
towards a rational end. Rather, they are the results of a social agent's set of "durable
dispositions" that guide her/his activities and help her/him adjust to changing circumstances.
These "durable dispositions" are the product of a historical and social (institutional) context that
structures the way actions are undertaken but which is simultaneously structured or redefined by
these actions. Thus, habitus is the result of both individual and group experiences (and hence
histories, including formal education), in as much as group experiences are reflected in individual
experiences (without entirely determining them). It is the constantly reproduced and changed
cumulative social history and experiences of individuals (and groups) that make up their
"common sense" (Bourdieu 1980). We are therefore very far from Homo Economicus, the
atomized, calculating agent seeking to maximize his individual material benefits, which, in
Bourdieu's term, is akin to an "anthropological monster, a practitioner with the head of a
theoretician that incarnates the form, par excellence, of a scholastic fallacy" (Bourdieu 2000:
256).8
In addition, Bourdieu proposed a dynamic understanding of structured and relational
social environments, which he termed "social fields". For.Bourdieu, a social field, or champs in
French, is a sphere that groups together a set of asymmetrical relations between particular social
agents engaged in a well defined set of practices. A social field is neither a set of individuals nor a
group of practices, it is a set of differential relations that position individuals and groups vis-4-vis
each other in a given sphere, such as museum goers, homebuyers, students, and others (Mounier
2001, Bourdieu 1994 and 2000).' According to this definition, a housing market as a social field
is the collection of social relations that connect together housing producers, consumers, and
regulators as well as the variety of institutions (e.g. property rights, public agencies) in a given
place and time and an analysis of this social field would need to look at the relations that tie this
group of social agents and institutions together, along with the norms and rules that organize
their practices.
Within a social field, one's ability to intervene -in this case, in a particular housing
market- is highly dependent on his/her ability to accumulate "capital" vis-a-vis other social
agents and acquire a higher social position within the social hierarchy of the field. "Capital",
according to Bourdieu, is "accumulated labor [...] which, when appropriated on a private, ie.
exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the
form of reified or living labor" (Bourdieu 1986: 241). Such capital, Bourdieu argued, can take
many forms. In his analysis of what he termed the "social structures of the economy", Bourdieu
identified several forms of capital financial capital (directly or through banks), technological
capital (abilities, procedures, know-how), commercial capital (ability to sell, marketing), social
capital (all forms of capital that can be mobilized through social relations), and symbolic capital
B Bourdieu's critique of this economistic representation of social agents is inscribed in a long lineage of theorists,
including economists, who have condemned this model. For example, Amartya Sen (1977) has talked of "rational
fools".
9. Bourdieu has analyzed several political, scholastic, or literary crbaps such as the museum (1979), schools (1970),
the court-room (1987), and the French market for individual pavilions (2000).
(trust, reputation) (Bourdieu 2000). Their accumulation, he argued, enables a particular actor to
play an important role within an economic social field.'0
Of the various forms of capital, social capital is the most relevant to this dissertation and
thus deserves special attention. According to Bourdieu, social capital is the aggregate form of
"actual and potential resources" linked to the possession of a "durable network of [a] more or
less institutionalized relationship of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu 1986: 248).
Furthermore, social capital is not incidentally accumulated; it is rather the outcome of "infinite
effort by individuals to institutionalize their relationships and transform them into social capital"
(Bourdieu 1986: 249). Social capital empowers agents to access, through ever extending
networks of social relations, a wide array of resources that could not be otherwise marshaled
with financial or symbolic capital. More importantly, the accumulation of social capital, like
other forms of capital cited above, can alter agents' social standing vis-i-vis others in the same
social field, reposition them in its social hierarchies, and therefore improve their control over
this field and their ability to alter its rules in their favor. Thus, both social capital and the
institutional structures of the social field change over time because of social agents' strategies
within them.
Given the widespread use of the concept of social capital within American social
sciences, it is important to show how this definition of social capital differs from others with the
same name. In several ways, Bourdieu's theory comes close to the one proposed (or adapted) by
James Coleman (1987, 1990), since both researchers defined "social capital" as the combined
form of social networks and the resources they potentially or actually provide. In fact, they have
in common an (often criticized in French academia) "economic" understanding of social capital
that somewhat equates the accumulation of "social relations" to economic accumulation of
capital." However, unlike Coleman, Bourdieu rejects rational choice theory. He instead roots his
understanding of social capital in the structural limitations imposed on actors by macro and
micro-structures within the social fields in which they operate, their habitus. Moreover,
10 It is possible to identify four main types of "capital" in Bourdieu's work, of which all others are variations:
economic capital (e.g. money, consumption), cultural capital (embodied and instittionalized knowledge), symbolic
capital (e.g. tides, accreditations, legitimizing references), or social capital (e.g. relations, obligations, connections,
social position) (Bourdieu 1986, 1979, 1980, 2000). However, none of these forms of capital has been dearly
defined by Bourdieu, and there are clear overlaps between them (Smart 1993).
11 For an overview of this type of criticism, see Mounier 2001. Bourdieu's approach has also been criticized on
similar grounds by Smart (1993) and Di Maggio (1979). Nonetheless, Bourdieu (2000) himself criticized the work of
American sociologists such as-Granovetter for what he termed an "economic understanding of social relations". He
has also responded directly to these critiques in several works, such as Raison Przrlqmr (Bourdieu 1994).
Bourdieu's social capital is differential and relational; it acknowledges the correspondence
between one's accumulated (social and other) capital and one's standing in social hierarchies and
it recognizes unequal abilities to accumulate capital across actors (Bourdieu 1980). Furthermore,
and unlike exogenous processes of social capital formation described by American political
scientists such as Robert Putnam (Putnam 1993), social capital for Bourdieu results from actors'
own strategies (Bourdieu 1986).'2
Finally, the structures of a social field are themselves dependent of the relative
accumulation of capital between actors within them. Thus, according to Bourdieu, the structures
of a particular social field are the result of the accumulated strategies" of individuals or groups
who are conscious of their importance in determining the outcomes of processes of capital
accumulation and social positioning within them and who, therefore, invest time and energy in
altering them, within the confines of macro-structures, and given differential capacities to
impose this change. To go back to the example of a housing market, one can predict, following
Bourdieu, that the existing institutions that create opportunities for particular entrepreneurs to
control a housing market result (in part) from the efforts of these actors to institutionalize
particular practices that empower their participation, such as creating credit associations among
housing consumers in order to facilitate the process of housing acquisition, or imposing market
barriers in order to retain monopoly or control access over or participation in the market.
I do not attempt here to directly apply Bourdieu's analysis to the actors of Hayy el
Sellom, nor will I appeal directly to his notion of babits:. this sociological exercise that seeks to
explain the determinants of human action is outside the scope of my investigation. However, the
dialectic relation between individual and group actions on the one hand, and the context in
which they are embedded on the other, or between actors and their institutional environment, is
at the core of the explanation of the market mechanisms and changes that I put forth as the
main methodological approach in my dissertation and as such, the elements of Bourdieu's social
analysis are central to my own study of the Hayy el Sellom's land and housing market.
12 This description of the models of theorizing social capital in American social sciences is based on Foley and
Edwards (1999).
131 use the world "strategy" as used by Pierre Bourdieu, that is, to paraphrase Bourdieu, "strategies without strategic
intentions". Bourdieu clearly explains that actors do not partake in deliberate and conscious calculations to optimize
1.C.2 Methodology
My methodology brings together several elements of three approaches to market
analysis: political economy, new institutional approaches, and Pierre Bourdieu's "institutionalist"
theory.
The thesis seeks to investigate the type and character of a housing market (e.g. facility of
access, number of players, ability to retaliate, kinds of protections, etc.) using a micro-
investigation of the relationship between, on the one hand, the social agents (social standing,
religious affiliation, gender, etc.) who intervene in the housing market at a particular time, and on
the other hand, the formal and informal rules on which they rely (e.g. building regulations) and
the institutions to which they appeal (e.g. religious and geographic relations, public agencies) in
their market operations (e.g. gathering information, securing transactions, reducing risks of
default in market exchanges, organizing the production of housing). It is built around three
groups of actors who were directly involved in the production of the neighborhood under study:
developers (Chapter 3), public agents (Chapter 4), and homebuyers (Chapter 5).
Given the dialectic conception of actors and institutions described above, particular
attention was given to understanding what types of housing markets and institutional
arrangements empower particular actors to take charge of the housing market and how these
actors, in turn, influence and re-shape institutional structures to allow them to access or maintain
their positions in the market. Thus, my investigation was not limited to looking at how actors
rely on informal and formal institutions in order to conduct their market activities, circulate
information, secure transactions or access credit (as is the case in New Institutional Economics
or Sociology). It also went to show how particular institutional structures influence the ability of
actors to penetrate and act on this market at a given time and how, in turn, these social agents
use and extend their positions and possibilities based on their ability to change these institutional
structures.14
Another necessary layer of analysis, suggested by the above-described political-economy
approach (ones and Ward 1994), requires looking at how (actor/rule-institution) relationships
their actions. These strategies are however implicitly limited by structural conditions since actors tend to
(unconsciously) limit their aspirations to the boundaries defined by objective structures (Bourdieu 1980).
14 An important point to be raised here is that it is possible not to separate between "formal" and "informal"
markets in this type of investigation. Given the widely acknowledged intertwining of formal and informal
institutions and the laws and norms these institutions sustain, it is possible, through such a micro-investigation, to
distinguish more thoroughly how different types of institutions are simultaneously appealed to and the types of
interactions and intersections that occur between them.
are influenced by external citywide parameters. Specifically, there is a need to test the impact of
changing state attitudes and policies vis-a-vis informal housing markets (Ward 1999), as well as
changing city-wide land and housing market conditions (e.g. prices of land, availability of
affordable lots, scale of housing demand in the city given particular population movements), and
the position of the neighborhood in the city (whether it is considered as part of the city and
hence attract city-wide actors or not) on the types of institutional structures that are put in place
and the opportunities they create for actors in this market.
The proposed methodology extends thus the period of investigation over several
decades in order to allow for changes in the above listed parameters and the actors and
institutions that they are likely to affect. I should note that such extended historical analysis of
informal land and housing markets have rarely been conducted, despite the importance of this
type of studies for distinguishing trends from cyclical shifts and understanding long-term
patterns of change within Third World cities (Harris and Wahba 2002).
Finally, the investigation of the changing (actor/rules-institutions) relationships in the
macro-context in which they are set allows to test how these relationships impact the character
of the land andl housing markets (e.g. easy/difficult market entry, information flows, etc.) that
operate in different phases of the evolution of the neighborhood, how they enable new actors to
penetrate the market at a given time and exclude others, or how they facilitate the process of
housing acquisition for particular groups in relation to others.
1.C.3 Case Study and Justification
In order to test this methodology, the thesis carries out a case study of Hayy el Sellom,'5
an informal settlement located in the far suburbs of Beirut. Today, Hayy el Sellom is the largest
settlement of Beirut and its suburbs. The neighborhood extends over an approximate area of
85ha and houses approximately 100,000 inhabitants. (A detailed description of the settlement is
provided in Chapter 2.) The thesis extends its investigation of this neighborhood over a period
of fifty years (figure 1-1).
Several reasons have guided my choice of Hayy el Sellom as a site for investigating my
research questions.
I5 In Arabic, the Ladder Neighborhood.
First, unlike most other informal settlements of Beirut, access to housing in Hayy el
Sellom has occurred essentially through market transactions rather than non-market means (e.g.
public allocation of land, squatting). Therefore, the neighborhood provides an adequate case
study to investigate the workings of informal markets and the institutions and norms that
organize them.
Second, Hayy el Sellom has not experienced large-scale population swaps, eviction, or
demolition during the years of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), providing an almost
continuous history for analysis, which is unusual in the Lebanese context. The fifty years of
investigation provide interesting illustrations of shifting mechanisms of housing production,
changing population groups, and state attitudes and public regulations. Indeed, the period covers
important shifts in the country's history Cindustrialization, building of urban public agencies, civil
war, and post-war reconstruction) that have impacted the housing market considerably. It also
covers the phases during which most political parties active in the neighborhood under study
were initiated and gradually gained importance. These conditions allow for tracing changes in the
place, role, and strength of public institutions, their changing relation to informal ones, and how
these have impacted this land and housing market.
Third, because of its linkages with other "formal" markets in the city and the extended
duration over which it is investigated, Hayy el Sellom provides several modes of urban
production over time that rely on different combinations of formal and informal institutions and
regulations and various types and levels of violations to legal codes. It therefore provides an
adequate case to investigate the interaction between these different types of institutions and the
impacts they can have on the functioning of the housing market.
Finally, in its model of production (rural to urban migrants), Hayy el Sellom resembles
the scenario of informal settlement development in most Third World countries, in terms of
rural to urban migration and proximity to industries, allowing for interesting comparisons with
other cases in the abundant international literature on the subject. This is important for
potentially generalizing hypothesis and lessons on the development of such neighborhoods
around the Third World, given the similarity of a number of factors with other contexts, such as
industrialization, the process of public institution building, and the increasing social polarization
in the city. That said, the specificity of the Lebanese context should not be underplayed. This is
especially the case during the civil war phase, during which the role and position of the state
were openly contested and militias controlled the belligerent sections of the city. This is also
. 4,0
Figure 1-1: Hayy el Sellom, lots and building in 1999, scale 1:10,000.
Source: Reconstructed on the basis of aerialphotographs.
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because of the particular history of Lebanon, the sectarian legacy of its process of nation
building and the religious divisions of its society (including access and control of land) as well as
the special type of public sector that was created in this country (no promise of social welfare,
for example). These specificities will be further described in Chapter 2.
1.D RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE
By bringing the structural and institutional approach of social investigation developed by
Pierre Bourdieu to the study of land and housing markets, the thesis develops a novel
methodology, which is particularly suitable for analyzing the way land and housing markets
function in Third World countries. Indeed, this approach provides new insights into the
relations between actors (social standing, religious affiliation, gender, etc.) engaged in housing
market activities, the rules-institutions systems that legislate and organize these markets, the
macro political economy context, and the character of the land and housing market (e.g. facility
of access, number of players, ability to retaliate, kinds of protections, etc.) that is generated in a
neighborhood.
This approach departs in several ways from previous investigations of housing markets.
It looks beyond the category "informal market" to investigate the multiplicity of institutional
arrangements that organize markets with varying characteristics (e.g. openness, flexibility) and,
therefore, unequal capacity to respond to the needs of low income urban dwellers looking for
housing and uneven opportunities for capital accumulation. It also enables a better
understanding of the role played by various actors engaged in these markets, including public
agents, and unravels the relation between on the one hand, different market arrangements and,
on the other hand, the ability of particular actors to engage in market transactions, as producers
or consumers, and sometimes to influence the market's institutional structures. In addition, this
analysis brings in a notion of power into the analysis of housing markets, by accounting for
differential relations between developers and buyers and among buyers, and allows a better
understanding of how such differential relations influence the outcome of market transactions.
These findings have relevance for others interested in broader urban studies. The
detailed investigation of actors and institutions in a specific microcosm reveals important aspects
of the way urban spaces are produced and managed, about the circulation of laws, norms, and
regulations across spheres of the city, and how various social agents reinterpret them over time.
They also tell of the ability of low-income urban dwellers to make and change the city at its
fringes and the impact of important urban changes (such as the recently global pressures) on
these capacities.
Finally, a case study that looks at the historical evolution of an informal settlement in
Beirut addresses an important knowledge gap in the development of informal settlements and
policies towards them in Lebanon. Despite a growing body of research on Beirut (Tabet, 2001,
Verdeil 2002) arid its suburbs (Harb 2003, Khayatforthcoming), the subject of informal settlements
has been largely neglected. Research and literature on Lebanese low-income housing in general,
and the country:'s informal settlements in particular, is -to say the least- very limited. With a few
exceptions (Bourgey and Phares 1973, Charafeddine 1985 and 1991, Yahya 1994, Fawaz and
Peillen 2002, Clerc 2002), no research was undertaken to elucidate their evolution or the causes
of their growth. Until recently, there was also no comprehensive understanding of the overall
map of these settlements in the city (Fawaz and Peillen 2002). Instead, at least four different
types of low-income urban settlements (i.e. camps hosting international refugees, settlements
subdivided illegally, squatter settlements on land with conflicting property claims, and war-
generated squatter settlements) are lumped together as a single type of urban "aberration" and
treated as a "temporary" phenomenon, despite ample evidence of their long history.
1.E DATA COLLECTION AND SOURCES
The primary data for this research has been collected through interviews, which in turn
were verified and cross-checked using historical aerial photographs, archives, and newspaper
searches.
As in many lower income countries, research in Lebanon is hampered by the lack of
public data or accessible official data. Statistical data, when available, is at an aggregate regional
level and there are little assurances of its accuracy. As for public archives, when they are made
accessible -and this is only through informal/ social connection, they are incomplete, partially
destroyed during the war, floods, thefts, or simply inadequate storage. Furthermore, archive
keepers are often unaware of the contents of these archives and there is little help in looking
through the piles of dust.
My first visit to Hayy el Sellom was in the context of a field trip with two colleagues with
whom I was planning to teach a field methods class in the Lebanese University. The course
ended up focusing on Hayy el Sellom, and I was able to visit the neighborhood many times,
meet residents on the streets, engage in casual conversations, and begin to develop a sensitivity
and familiarity with the place. Once the course was over, I had met a large enough number of
residents and heard enough of the complexity of the neighborhood that I was convinced that
Hayy el Sellom provided a rich case for a micro-study of housing production and acquisition.
My fieldwork extended over a long period: In 1999, I undertook the largest section of
my fieldwork which extended over 8 months, conducting interviews and archival searches. From
October 2000 to the time of this writing (une 2004), I have been in Lebanon (almost
continuously) where I have been able to follow changes in Hayy el Sellom and its context.
During this latter phase, I conducted two rounds of systematic research, going almost daily to
Hayy el Sellom. These occurred during June-July 2002 and then March-June 2003. The last phase
allowed me to go in specifically looking for missing data in order to complement the stories I
was developing.
1.E.1 Interviews
Interviews were the most important source of information for my case study, since, in
the absence of clear historical information or archiving, I needed to rely on the stories collected
from actors involved in the making of this neighborhood in order to learn about mechanisms of
housing production and acquisition.
I mostly relied on open-ended, semi-structured interviews with a diversity of actors
(developers, residents, public agents) whom I interviewed about their individual trajectories,
practices, and perceptions of the development and changes in the neighborhood. While I always
prepared a set of questions beforehand, I encouraged interviewees to bring in the stories that
they thought were relevant. In gathering data, I decided early on not to rely on tape recorder but
rather take written notes and to the extent possible, report the comments of my interviewees in
their own words. This is because the absence of a tape recorder put my interviewees at ease and
allowed a closer relation between us, especially given that I often had to conduct several
interviews with the same person and needed to develop some sense of trust between us,
especially with developers. Furthermore, in attempting to learn about events that occurred thirty
or forty years ago, the various techniques of "oral history", the "interviewing of eye-witness
participants in the events of the past" that rests, in large part, on an "active human relationship
between historians and their sources"(Perks and Thomson 1998: ix) also became relevant
especially that no written documentation of the history of this neighborhood was available and
that newspapers of the time rarely reported on the events of this area.
In the conclusion of the La Misre du Monde, Bourdieu compares the social studies
interview to a "social encounter", a structured meeting in which particular information but also
signals and forms of violence are exchanged. There is, according to Bourdieu, a "space of
differences" between the two actors, and the size of this space can either facilitate or deny
exchange of information (Bourdieu 1993). According to Bourdieu, there are times when
interviews cannot happen, precisely because the "space of difference" is either too large or too
narrow to allow for a proper circulation of information. To me, the extended period of
fieldwork responded precisely to the need to close this gap: the longer I stayed in the area, the
more knowledge I acquired and the more trust I gained in the eyes of its residents, which
eventually allowed me to collect the stories of a number of developers, especially public agents-
turned-developers, who I would have otherwise never been able to understand. During this
period, I was able to understand the social codes that legislate the area, the pressures, the
reservations and evasive allusions, and know when I could push questions further and when it
was preferable to let go. In addition, I should recognize that the social, religious, and geographic
background of my family (Shi'ite migrants from the South of the country) encouraged many
residents and developers to trust me, especially when they heard my last name and learned about
my family's origins. There were however times when I realized that the "space of differences"
was too wide to be filled. This was especially the case when I attempted to interview militiamen
who were engaged in the Hayy el Sellom front during the war. All my efforts to conduct such
interviews properly were not fruitful because of the sensitivity of the war topic in today's
Lebanon, the reluctance of interviewees to discuss these years, or their opposite tendency to
exaggerate and brag with unfounded stories. It was however mostly my own unfamiliarity with
the "street" lingo of the war that made it extremely difficult to follow on the answers I was given
and I therefore limited the interviews to residents involved with political parties with whom
enough trust had been already built through my prior interviews. This therefore remained a gap
in my research.
I conducted interviews with actors or observers during the period under study. In Hayy
el Sellom, I was able to interview 9 developers who have worked in the neighborhood
throughout its various phases.' All these developers were met in the neighborhood, following
residents' advice. These interviews were conducted in order to learn about the practices and
personal trajectories of these actors. When it was impossible to interview a developer, I
interviewed his representative (in the case of the last generation) or sons (in the first generation).
Detailed interviews were conducted with each of these developers and whenever possible, I
went back for additional details once or several times. In addition, I interviewed the main notary
public who worked in the area and the only topographer still alive who was involved in these
developments. These interviews allowed me sometimes to access data from the personal records
of these actors. It was notably the case with Mr. Ali el-Mawla, the topographer, as well Mr. Spiro
Michel Saab who gave me unconditional access to his father's note books, repertoires, and other
personal notes and provided hence an invaluable source of information.
As for residents, I conducted in total 100 detailed interviews with residents who had
arrived to the area during different phases. These were first conducted randomly but then
directed to include roughly 30 interviews in every generation. These interviews included old
Christian residents at the fringes of the neighborhood, members of the Haydar, 'Abdel Siter,
Kan'in, Issi, Chamas, 'Amhaz, and other large families in the neighborhood, as well as other
residents who came following adds and 4 interviews with foreign workers living with/without
their. families in the area. An additional twenty interviews were conducted to gather background
information about the families (income, revenues, work, family status) in the context of a study I
co-authored with Isabelle Peillen on living conditions in the Siums of Beirut for UN-Habitat.
These interviews were conducted in June 2002. In addition, in the Fall of 2003, when
newspapers spoke again of a potential highway project that would cross through the
neighborhood, ten interviews were conducted randomly about residents' perceptions of the
highway and the potential compensations they could be paid. Finally, 300 questionnaires were
conducted during the summer of 1999 with the help of a resident of the neighborhood (a
student in architecture at the Lebanese University) verifying information dates of arrival, role of
developers, phases of construction, and perceptions of legality/regularization (survey results in
Appendices).
16 Actually, as will be made clearer in the chapter about the developers, all these developers belong to what I called
the "second generation of developers while", it was impossible to interviews developers in the two other
generations. On the one hand, Abu Raymond had passed away in 1997, and on the other, all developers in the last
generation refused to talk to me about their work.
In order to learn about how various public actors in public agencies had conceptualized
responses to the neighborhood and how various policy decisions were taken, it was also
necessary to interview public officials. These interviews were generally more structured than
those I conducted with residents and developers; however, I also encouraged "stories" of
"incidents" that have occurred recently or in the past, often inquiring about particular events
that I knew would recall stories for these actors.
I interviewed in total 20 public sector officials (current and past), some of them several
times, at public agencies including the Directorate General of Urbanism (DGU) local and
central, the Land Registry, the Beirut Planning Agency, the Public Corporation for Housing, the
Housing Bank, the Ministry of Displaced, the Prime Minister Office, the Ministry of Works, the
Expropriation Commission of Mount Lebanon, Notary Publics offices, and at the Choueyfat
Municipality. These interviews included actors at all levels of the hierarchies (clerks, director
general, engineer, etc.). The former head of the DGU, the highest planning authority, allowed
me over these three years more than ten interviews and provided me with important historical
and technical/ legal information, notably about the process of decision making and the shifting
perceptions of informal settlements in the planning public sector over these 50 years. At the land
registry, I was also allowed access to the records when they were available. Finally, I was able to
interview the Cadastral Judge who decides on all property disputes (there is only one in
Lebanon).
Finally, given the close circulation of opinions between private and public sector and the
influence that many planners have had on the development of public urban policy in the country
(Verdeil 2002), it was necessary to interview actors in the private sector who had played a role in
the neighborhood. I therefore interviewed 5 professional engineers (several more than once)
who had different experiences working on projects in the area and have dealt with the local
authorities. Two of them were involved in the design and follow-up of the design of the highway
that goes through the neighborhood, the first in the design of the overall transportation strategy
in the post war era and the second in the design of the actual highway project and its approval in
the 1990s. Two others were involved in the design of the master plan for Choueyfit area in the
post-war era as well. Finally, one was involved in the design/ improvement of the infrastructure
system of the entire southern suburbs as of the 1980s and was also involved in the upgrading of
the Ghadir riverbanks and had conducted detailed surveys in this area during the early 1990s.
1.E.2 Archives
Archives were necessary first to reconstruct a "legal" history of the events that occurred.
They were also useful in order to cross-check references made by particular actors, look up laws,
particular regulations and exemptions, and especially find documents, such as building permits,
that could provide written proofs of some of the so-called legal "exemptions" that were often
mentioned to me orally, but never documented (Chapter 4).
However, as mentioned above, access to the archive was no easy job and often depended
on the good will of the officers who could easily change their mind. Furthermore, archives are
often not indexed, with documents piled randomly, making it impossible to access information
systematically. Four public institutions in Lebanon possess relevant archival information for this
project. The Directorate General of Urbanism (in its central and local branches), the
Municipality of Choueyfit archives, the Land Registry, and the National Archives.
The Directorate General of Urbanism (in its central and local branches) does not possess
a proper documentation center or an archival index. Instead, in Beirut, documents were stacked
on the same floors where particular procedures were filed (e.g. lot subdivision, building permits,
land use plans, etc.) but were not clearly indexed. Nonetheless, I was able to secure the director's
permission to access the DGU-Aley building permits archives in 1999 for two weeks, directly
after they had been indexed. This is where copies of existing building permits for Hayy el Sellom
were available. A good part of these permits had been destroyed during the years of war when
the DGU archives were severely damaged and it was therefore impossible to develop an
exhaustive count of the number and frequency of building permit applications. Nonetheless,
access to these archives allowed me to examine building and regularization permits and hence to
trace building processes in various phases of the neighborhood's development and learn who
were the engineers and public sector employees who had approved them.
In May 2003, I was also able to briefly access the DGU-Beirut archives in the lot
subdivision section, where I could assemble copies of lot subdivisions in the late 1950s, early
1960s and some of the archived material/projects for the area in the recent period. It was
however impossible to gather much of the project documentation I was looking for or to access
the director's personal archives where copies of old correspondences are assembled.
At the Choueyfit Municipality, I was after much effort allowed access to the building
permit and record archive for a single day, in June 2003, when I was able to copy building
permits for constructions during different phases, as well as records of complaints brought forth
to the municipality by residents.
At the land registry, I was able through personal contacts to access public records for a
few days after hours where a local employee helped me trace the histories of a number of lots
and the date of subdivision, the methods in which registrations were conducted, and other
similar procedures.
The national archives center is currently in the process of digitizing its information and
compiling copies of public legislation and decisions taken by parliament and ministerial
meetings. Digitized information is made available for researchers, provided they can prove that
the topic of their research fits "acceptable" norms of urban research. In June 2003, I1 was able to
visit the archives for one morning and granted access for a short time in which I looked at and
downloaded copied of a number of "extra-legal" or "exceptional" decisions taken by the council
of ministers with regard to urban service provision in informal settlements. Since all information
is to-date digitized as images rather than text, search engines have very limited capacities and
aside from looking through meeting minutes one at a time, it is only possible to search particular
records once prior knowledge of an approximate date when the decision was taken is available. I
therefore restricted my search in this archive to decisions that I knew had been taken by the
Council of Ministers during a particular year.
1.E.3 Newspaper searches
Like the National Archives, Lebanese dailies have begun to digitize their old papers but
also in the form of images rather than text, which means that here too, search engines have very
limited capacities and events have to be looked for individually. Under these conditions, I guided
my searches by looking at specific dates (months and years) when I knew that important events
had occurred in informal settlements in the capital city. A number of journalists also helped me
identify particular journalistic investigations that their papers had followed in certain dates.
These were useful in order to reconstruct particular events, but also to look at the visibility (or
lack thereof) of the neighborhood in the city.
1.E.4 Aerial photographs and maps
Aerial photographs have been taken by the Lebanese Army in several instances and I was
able to compile pictures for 1963, 1978, 1983, 1991, 1995, and 1999. In addition, maps were
compiled for this area in 1959 (by French geographers), in 1978, and in 1993 (by OGER)7 .
Based on the 1993 map and the 1995 aerial photograph, I developed an updated map of the
neighborhood on which became very useful in order to identify the various neighborhood
development phases and identify interviewees accordingly.'"
1.F A WORLD ABOUT TRANSLITERATION AND NAMES
I have mostly relied for transliteration on the IJMES system. In this system, the
Arabic vowels are replaced by "a" for afartab, "u" for a damwab, and "i" for a kasm Long vowels
are indicated by a dash over the letter, so that "I" stands for akf and 'T' for a ya or "ee". In
addition, letters of the Arabic alphabet that have no direct transaction into English are
represented by symbols, such the " '" for tayn and " ' '" for hama. The table below reports on
the adopted transliteration throughout the thesis. Note that in referencing papers, I adopted the
spellings that were used by authors for themselves and not the official transliteration of their
names.
a U
i I I
h C q L k
j C sh u gh
Table 1-1: Main transliterations adopted in the thesis.
A last point about writing concerns the names of my respondents. In order to respect
the privacy and trust of those I have interviewed, I have generally only used first names to refer
to residents and developers in Hayy el Sellom. To distinguish them from residents, public sector
agents were referred to by initials.
'
7 OGER is a Saudi based contracting firm owned by the current Lebanese Prime Minister (Rafic Hadri) that
undertook several surveys of Beirut and its suburbs in the 1980s.
Is Maps were also very useful in the neighborhood whenever I interviewed "authorities" in the area. They were
often willing to exchange information and maps for an updated map of current projects.
Figure 2-1: Beirut map, taken in 1956 and updated in the mid 1980s.
"Municipal Beirut" appears in black in the top of the map. Hayy el Sellom is
just outside the map.
Source: Lebanese Army Maps.
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Chapter 2
Case Study &
Context
This chapter provides a background for the case study. The first section (2.A) presents
briefly the context, including Lebanese planning policies, the development of informal
settlements of Beirut, and public policies towards them. The second section (2.B) introduces the
case study, particularly the neighborhood's physical, social, and political organization. These will
be then referred to throughout the dissertation.
2.A CASE STUDY IN CONTEXT
2.A.1 Overview of Lebanese Planning Policies
Unlike most post-colonial societies where independence launched a process of nation
building with the creation of new planning agencies and the promise of a welfare state that
would provide healthcare and housing to all, Lebanon gained its independence from French rule
in 1943 with a commitment to liberalism and the least possible public sector intervention
(Gaspard 2004).' The country was then run by
what Trabulsi called a "financial oligarchy" who
sought to use its newly gained independence in
order to strengthen its financial and economic
standing (Trabulsi 1993). This historical
commitment to the "free market" was
translated in the reluctance of successive
Lebanese governments to intervene in the
delivery of social services, including the
provision of housing (Sadik 1996).
With respect to the field of housing, an
overview of public interventions in this sector
indicates that little if any measures have ever
been taken to build public housing, design sites
and services projects, or provide subsidized
Date Event
1922 Creation of Modem Lebanon
as part of the Modem Middle-
East (Versailles Treaties).
French rule begins.
1943 Lebanon gains independence
from French Mandate authority
1958 First events of social unrest in
Modern Lebanon (state vs.
pan-Arab).
1969 Cairo Treaties: Allow PLO to
openly resist Israeli occupation
from South Lebanon
1975 Outbreak of the Lebanese civil
war
1978 Israeli invasion of South-
Lebanon
1982 Israeli invasion of Beirut
1990 End of civil war
2000 Israeli withdrawal from South
Lebanon
Table 2-1: Modem Lebanon;
Time line of relevant events
credit or housing (Sadik 1996).2 Similarly, the state has been reluctant to intervene in land and
construction markets, so that few regulations and taxes are imposed on land sales, speculation,
and other land, market activities (Aveline 2000) and state policy has been limited to the
encouragement of private initiatives either through legislation (e.g. raising the floor area ratio) or
by facilitating housing loans (Fawaz 2003, Samaha 2000).
It was only after 1958, following weeks of civil conflict (Gendzier 1999), that most
Lebanese public planning agencies were created and the public sector began to intervene in the
direct regulation of urban and social spaces (Tabet 2001, Verdeil 2002). The 1958 conflict had
brought to power President Fuid Shehab, a former army commander. Unlike his predecessor,
1 Until 1922, Lebanon (as we know it today) consisted of a number of provinces in the Ottoman Empire that had
no geographic, social, economic, or political unity. It was only in 1919, with the Versailles Treaty that sealed the end
of World War I, that Lebanon as a modern nation state (with its current boundaries) was created and placed under
the rule of the French Mandate (1922-1943). Much of the political and institutional system was initiated under
French Rule, often in continuation with earlier Ottoman reforms (known as the tant#,ad-) (Verdeil 2002). The
country disposes of an executive body (the president and the government), a legislative body .(the parliament,
elected), and a judicial body. The first republic (and its constitution) was declared in 1926. The second was declared
in 1990, with a new constitution that marks the end of the Lebanese civil war, in what is referred to as the Ta'ef
agrmenaM (1989).
2 To be more accurate, there have been rare instances of direct public interventions in the production of one or two
housing complexes in times of emergency, such as after Abu 'ASl river flood in Tripoli (North Lebanon), after the
1956 earthquake, and during the post-civil war reconstruction. These are however very limited in scale and scope.
Shehab believed in the necessity of establishing modem institutions and adopting national
development plans. In the few years that followed his take-over, several public agencies were
created to regulate urban spaces, such as the Directorate General of Urbanism and the Higher
Council for Urbanism (Verdeil 2002). Furthermore, (see Table 2) urban regulations were
adopted, building permits became mandatory in all areas of the country (1961), zoning and
planning regulations were gradually developed for cities throughout Lebanon, an elaborate
network of highways was designed for Beirut and its vicinities (1964), and the first five-year
national plan was approved (Ghorayeb 2000, Verdeil 2002). Shehab routinely appealed to
intemational consultants, such as: IRFED, to develop a comprehensive assessment of socio-
economic conditions in the country in order to develop a national master plan (Mission IRFED
1963); Constantinos Doxiadis to develop a comprehensive analysis of the housing sector in 1959
(Sarkis 1998, 2003); and Michel Ecochard, who designed two successive master plans for Beirut
and its suburbs in 1943 and 1964 (Ghorayeb 2000).ý However, this process of institution
building slowed as subsequent regimes lost control of the city, particularly by the 1970s, when
militia groups challenged the state even before its semi-breakdown during the civil war (El-
Khazen 2002).
The Lebanese civil war, 4 which extended over fifteen years (1975-1990), divided the
country in belligerent sections (along religious sectarian lines), run by rival militias. Save for a
few "reconstruction" or "emergency planning" initiatives during periods of relative calm, little
planning was conducted during this era. It is however worth mentioning that the war had
devastating effects on the country, not only in terms of the breakdown of public institutions, but
also in human and economic casualties: some 65,000 deaths, 84,000 wounded individuals, 22 per
cent of the Lebanese families displaced at least once, and 700,000 to 900,000 persons emigrated.
Material costs were also important; they included the destruction of the physical infrastructure of
the country (e.g. water, electricity, telephone, roads) estimated by the UN in billions of dollars,
some 300,000 houses severely damaged, and most productive sectors negatively impacted (CDR
1992, 1995). The war and its various consequences (including severe inflation) is also recognized
3 For the list of public agencies, see Table 2-3 at the end of this chapter.
4 A comprehensive summary of the various reasons put forth to explain the Lebanese civil war is provided by
Najem (2000). These are: (i) class conflict, related to the concentration of 32% of assets in the hands of a 4% elite
and the predominance of Beirut in the economy; (ii) the lack of a political community and the sectarian social
divisions; (iii) growing demands for political redistribution by groups who perceived themselves as under-
represented; (iv) breakdown of the elite-mass relations; and (v) the geopolitical regional conditions, especially the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Figure 2-2: Beirut map in 2000. The map shows Hayy el Sellom in the bottom left
corner, behind the airport. The map also shows the projected highways in the
suburbs of the city, many of which have been implemented since.
Source: Guide Stephan (2000).
for having substantially impoverished Lebanese households, reduced the size of the country's
middle class, and exacerbated already existing income differences (Haddad 1996). By the end of
the war, the Lebanese GDP had decreased by two thirds (Baz 1998, Najem 2000).
Since the end of the civil war in 1990, Lebanon has been actively involved in a large-scale
reconstruction process, while holding onto its prior commitments to limited state involvement
in social and economic matters. The post war reconstruction phase is marked by two national
plans: the National Emergency Reconstruction Plan (NERP), orchestrated for the first five years
of reconstruction, and Plan Horizon 2000 (extended later through Plan Horizon 2005). These
plans are managed by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), a public central
management organism for all reconstruction works (created in 1977) (CDR 1992). Most
investments are concentrated in physical infrastructure and large-scale "showcase" projects, such
as the reconstruction of the city's old urban core and its transformation into a high-end business
downtown with a vision to attract international financial elite and reposition Beirut on the global
chessboard (Kassab 1997). A new airport was built, the current port was enlarged, and an
impressive number of large infrastructure projects (especially highways) have been executed.
Public transit, low-income housing, and other salient social problems have been neglected. s In
order to solve the problem of displacement, a temporary ministry, the Ministry of Displaced was
instituted, and a "program of return" was launched in order to organize and finance the "return"
of displaced populations to their areas of "origin," as well as clear ruins, repair buildings,
evacuate illegal settlers, and rehabilitate public services (Ministry of Displaced 1998).
The results of post-war reconstruction policies have not matched the expectations of
their designers. Between 1993 and 1995, substantial economic growth was noted in the country.
However, since 1996, the economic activity in the country has shown a substantial slow-down,
especially because of the current crisis in the real estate and construction sectors (Aveline 2000)
and the unstable regional context. The budget deficit has now reached alarming levels' and the
volume of debts (both internal and external) has substantially increased.7 Since the end of the
war, several studies have pointed to increases in poverty levels and worsening of living condition
s The first reconstruction plan, Plan Horizon 2000, allocated 27.8% of its resources to "social infrastructure."
However, much of this percentage went to the building of new schools. Only 1.1% of the budget went to Social
Affairs and 9% went to "Housing and Resettlement," half of which was allocated to "reconstruction grants and
loans." Horizon 2000 allocates a limited amount of money for "upgrading informal areas," under the Housing and
Resettlement section, but these funds have not translated into projects (Najem 2000).
6 The budget deficit had already reached 38 per cent in 1999 (ESCWA 2001).
7 The country is unable to service its debts that have reached over 30 billion dollars (ESCWA 2001).
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Figure 2-3: Informal Settlements and camps in 1975 Beirut
Source: Lebanese Army Maps, research for survey based on Fawaz &Peillen (2002)
indicators: over 25% of the population lives below the poverty line (Haddad 1996). Also, median
incomes have been reduced considerably, according to one study, by 50-60 per cent in
comparison to what they were in 1966. Currently, 25.8 per cent of individuals living in Beirut
cam less then $106/month (Hamdan 2001). These changes have considerably reduced the ability
of low-income dwellers to access housing. Conversely, public policies to address these problems
have lagged behind. There are, to date, no public housing subsidies, no sites and services
projects providing small lots to lower income urban dwellers, no mechanisms to provide
housing credit for 75% of the country's lower stratum, and no taxes or regulations to curtail land
speculation that has exponentially increased the costs of housing production (Fawaz 2003,
Samaha 2000).
2.A.2 Informal Settlements In Beirut
Since the 1920s, the Lebanese capital has not ceased to grow as a result of political and
economic forces that favored this city over other regions of the country (Beyhum 1991, Tabet
2001) (Figures 2-1, 2-2). By the 1950s, Municipal Beirut had become a dense city and several
new urban quarters had been created (Beyhum 1991, Tabet 2001). At the time, surrounding
villages (such as Chiyih, Ghobeyri or Sinn el-Fil) were being transformed into suburban areas
and their economy tied to the activities of the city (Khuri 1975, Nasr and Nasr 1974 and 1976).
This pattern continued in the following years. Between 1950 and 1970, Beirut's population was
multiplied by four, going from 300,000 to 1,100,000 inhabitants, and at the eve of the civil war in
1975, Beirut housed one quarter of the population of Lebanon, most of them living in its
congested suburbs (Bourgey 1985, Faour 1981). This process was further exacerbated by various
military conflicts (civil and regional) that precipitated the rapid movements of population
displacements." Today, an estimated 1,340,000 inhabitants live in Beirut and its suburbs (what is
considered Metropolitan Beirut), which amounts to around one-third of the population of
Lebanon (ACS, 1996). Next to rutal migrants and war-displaced groups, this population includes
8 Military conflicts triggered several waves of migration towards informal settlements in the southem suburbs of
Beirut In 1976, as a result of the division of the city in two sections, residents of informal settlements in the eastern
suburbs of Beirut were evicted from their settlements which were razed to the ground. Many came to squat in the
southern suburbs of the Beirut Later, two successive Israeli invasions of Lebanon, in 1978 (the South only) and
1982 (all the way to Beirut), also created major waves of migration to the informal settlements. In total, around
75,000 people are: estimated to have arrived to the southern suburbs of Beirut between 1975-1987 (Beaudoin and
Kasparian 1991).
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Figure 2-4: Informal settlements of Beirut, based on survey by Fawaz and Peillen (2002)
Source: Base map Guide Stephan 2000, research for survey Fawaz and Peillen (2002)
waves of international refugees9 who
had arrived to Beirut between 1920 and
1950 as well as foreign migrant workers
who are attracted by work opportunities
in Lebanon.'o These population
movements generated a new urban
geography for Beirut and its suburbs, as
illustrated in figures 1 and 2.
Like other large cities in the
Third World, Beirut has seen a good
proportion of its growth happen in
violation to construction, zoning,
and/or property codes (Bourgey and
Phares 1973, Bourgey 1985, DGU
1973). The reasons are also similar to
those described elsewhere, such as the
imosition nof r+igil modern urban
regulations for land subdivision (e.g. Table 2-2: Necessary steps to acquire a building
permit in Lebanon, 2003.
minimum lotl sizes, passages) and , Source: The Bminae.r Handbook, InfoPro (2003).
building construction (e.g. maximum
9 International refugee groups include Armenians, Kurds and Syriacs who arrived in Lebanon as of 1922, as well as
Palestinian refugees who arrived between 1948-1951. An estimated 350,000 Palestinian refugees live in Lebanon
today; half of them are still living in refugee camps in very precarious conditions (UN-UNRWA 1992).
10 Migrant workers (especially Syrian) have constituted a significant proportion of the population of Beirut and
Lebanon since the 1950s. Pre-war studies list 25% of the population of Beirut as non-Lebanese, mostly Palestinian
(refugees) and Syrian (migrant workers) (Bourgey 1985).
Current official statistics for the post-war era systematically downplay the number of foreign workers, usually
estimated according to official permits that range around 75,000 (ACS 1998). This figure is however far from
reflecting the real numbers since the large majority of these workers (especially the Syrians among them) do not
have legal work permits. UNDP estimates place the number of Syrian workers alone at 400,000 (UNDP 1995).
Furthermore, the Sri-Lankan embassy estimates around 80,000-100,000 Sri-Lankan currently working in Lebanon
and the Filipino embassy counts 20,000 Filipino workers currently in Lebanon). These numbers are approximately
three times higher then the figures provided by the ACS for 1999, allowing us to multiply for everybody except
Syrians ACS figures by three. A quick extrapolation of this bias leads to an estimate of foreign labor to at least
600,000 (Jureidini 2001).
Foreign workers are usually employed in unskilled jobs (e.g. garbage collection, construction works, etc.). In order
to compete with local labor, they have to require very low wages (US 10-20$/day) and are hence forced into
extremely poor housing conditions (Jureidini 2001).
Required documents for acquiring a building
permit:
* Five certified copies of a permit application, signed by
necessary engineers and architects, and submitted to
the DGU. Documents needed: preliminary and
technical engineering study and details, statements of
mutual agreement from owner and engineer,
completed application form, planning and zoning
certificate
" Application form for the Order of Engineers and
Architects, includes: planning and zoning certificate,
property deed, technical study.
* Planning and zoning certificate (iMdq au tak"t), at
most three-month old, issued by DGU. Document
needed for Planning and zoning certificate: site map,
municipal certificate, ownership deed, application and
document sent to DGU, land subdivision documents
if relevant)
Required signatures on each permit:
* Up to 500m2, civil engineer and architect;
* Above: electrical engineer (500-2000) and site and
mechanical engineers (above 2000m2).
Estimated fees:
* Minimum $3,000.
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height, maximum floor exploitation) dictated by new planning and construction codes (following
French regulations) that conflicted with existing modes of housing provision and the financial
capacities of urban dwellers. Requirements for approval of several institutions (e.g. local and
central town planning institutes, municipalities, and syndicate of engineers and architects) and
other costly and time-consuming procedures also contributed to people building outside the law.
(Table 2-2 provides an example of such procedures, using the building permit.) So did a
conception of space and land that came out of the social and rural habits of these new urban
dwellers and conflicted with the requested setback and low floor exploitation ratio dictated by
modern urban regulations.
Until the 1970s, two types of informal settlements were common in the city. First,
settlements on informal land subdivisions grew in the far suburbs of the city, near factories and
large employment institutions (e.g. the airport, the Tobacco Rigie), and gradually moved away
from the urban core, as the city expanded in size (see figure 2-3, informal settlements of Beirut
in 1970) (Fawaz and Peillen 2002). Second, smaller squatter settlements appeared, either on
properties where conflicting claims for ownership facilitated the process of illegal land
occupation (Clerc 2002)" or as spillover of refugee camps in the city.
With the outset of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, Beirut was divided in two belligerent
sections along religious sectarian lines (East and West Beirut), displacing large population groups
to areas controlled by members (or militias) of the same religious group, thus changing the city's
map (Beyhum 1991) and the distribution of its informal settlements (Charafeddine 1991, Yahya
1994). The eastern suburbs of Beirut, until 1975 its biggest industrial suburb and the location for
the vast majority of informal settlements (including neighborhoods grown out of illegal land
subdivision projects), quickly fell under the control of Christian Militias who forcibly evacuated
all its informal settlement dwellers (among others).'2 Conversely, squatting quickly spread in a
number of areas in the city, notably its south-western suburbs, where rival militias seeking to
impose their order and challenge weakened state authority encouraged illegal land occupation.
By the late 1970s, large sections of the southern suburbs of Beirut had been transformed into
squats (Yahya 1994), making it the location of "illegal developments" in Beirut (Charafeddine
1985 and 1991, Harb 2003). Furthermore, everywhere in the city, blatant violations of
I" Conflict over property resulted essentially from the consolidation of land registries under the French Mandate,
and later the newly instituted Lebanese state. For more information, see Val6rie Clerc (2002).
'2 For data on the: eastern suburbs of Beirut, see Nasr and Nasr (1974 and 1976). For evacuations in the first years
of the civil war, see Massabni (1977).
construction and urban codes became visible and many people acquired their services through
illegal hook-ups.
In the sky-rocketing real estate prices of post-war Beirut, and given the recent liberation
of new rental contracts," the absence of credit for low income groups, and poor public
transportation systems that limit access to outlying areas for those who cannot afford a private
car, informal settlements have become the only low-income housing option for rural migrants
driven by the lack of income generating opportunities in rural areas, international migrant
workers with daily wages and unsteady employment, recently impoverished lower middle income
couples, and populations displaced by so-called reconstruction projects (such as highways or the
rehabilitation of the old city core). s5
Prohibitive land prices throughout the capital city have however rendered the costs of
land unaffordable, while heavy policing of the suburbs of the city considerably reduced the
opportunities for squatting. As a result, most informal settlements have increased their vertical
density and many slum dwellers have subdivided their already narrow houses to rent out rooms
for additional sources of income. During this phase, rent has become the dominant mode of
housing supply in all the informal settlements of the city. Today, at least 10% of the Beirut
population lives in informal settlements, as is shown in figures (2-4) (Fawaz and Peillen 2002).
2.A.3 Lebanese Public Policies Towards Informal Settlements In Lebanon
Although Lebanon's public institutions are instrumental and even indispensable for the
operation of the low-income land and housing market under study (as I will argue in Chapter 4),
this is far from indicating a benign disposition of Lebanese policy makers towards these areas or
their residents. To the contrary, public policies vis-i-vis informal settlements in Lebanon have
been systematically hostile. Since the late 1950s, there has been numerous attempts to evict their
populations, ultimately unsuccessfully, through targeted operations that often took the form of
13 By 1992, a new rent law liberates all new rental contracts, but keeps a hold on those signed prior to this date
(Fawaz 2003).
14 The number of rural migrants who still arrive to Beirut has considerably dwindled, especially because of Lebanon
is now almost 86.6 urban (ACS 1996). Nonetheless, the latest drives against marijuana plantations without adequate
alternative farming policies has brought new waves of migrants to the settlements of the capital city.
Is These populations generally obtain the equivalent of 5-10 thousands US dollars in "compensation for
displacement" from the Ministry of Displaced, a sum that allows them to purchase an apartment only in the
informal settlements of the city.
political retaliation rather than orchestrated urban policy (Ruppert 1999).6 Furthermore, it was
common, especially in the post-civil war reconstruction era, for large infrastructure projects
(such as highways) to cross through these neighborhoods, wipeout substantial sections of their
urban fabric, and displace many of their residents (Deboulet and Fawaz 2004)."7
Historically, it is clear from old planning documents that as of the 1960s, public agencies
were well aware of the development of informal settlements throughout the city. While no
attempts were made to upgrade or provide services in these areas, public agencies (often advised
by international experts) had begun to commission studies about these neighborhoods, or to see
them included in broader studies for improving the Beirut cityscape.' s The results of these
studies had invariably been proposals to eradicate entire neighborhoods and, whenever
professional expectations dictated or social pressures were high, their replacement with
"adequate housing". Thus, foreign experts such as Michel Ecochard who had also developed a
comprehensive master plan for Beirut and its suburbs (and therefore drafted the 1964 planning
regulations for Hayy el Sellom) saw the necessity to build governmental housing to replace what
he described in his reports as "habitat insalubre" (unhealthy housing), an urgent problem in Beirut
that needed to be addressed (Ecochard 1963)" (figure 2-5). Around the same time, the well-
known Constantine Doxiadis who was invited by President Shehab in 1959 to devise a housing
16 The first (recorded) slum clearance campaign dates back to 1958, in the area of Ouzii (a squatted neighborhood
in an area of conflicted property rights in the southern suburbs of Beirut) and coincides with the 1958 mini-civil war
in the country which opposed Pan-Arab Nasserite supporters on the one hand (with members in the settlement)
and the Lebanese army on the other hand (Gendzier 1999, Ruppert 1999). In 1983, and following the Israeli
invasion of Beirut, president Gemayel also sent tanks to the southern suburbs of Beirut, to the squatter of Raml
where the intention was to bulldoze several hundred houses (As-Safir 1983, Charafeddine 1991). None of these
operations ever succeeded in dislodging residents or demolishing more than very few houses. Newspaper records
contain man references to these events, such as An-Nabar, April 1974 or As-SafirJuly 1983.
"1 During the post civil war era, between 1993 and 2003, several highways were executed and cut through most
informal settlements in the capital city (Deboulet and Fawaz 2004, Khayatfortbcoming).
s During the first period (state-building), when the design of a well-planned urban space motivated these initiatives,
the Ministry of Plans and later the Directorate General of Urbanism commissioned projects as part of their nation-
building efforts. Later, during the phase of state breakdown, efforts in periods of calm (notably in 1983) were
initiated by central agencies but never reached consolidated into projects. Finally, during the reconstruction era, new
initiatives came from Central Government through special public agencies created for that end (in the southwestern
suburbs of Beirut) or again by the DGU.
19 Ecochard in his document refers to "habitat defecteuux," (defective housing) a category that includes "bidonvilles"
(recycled material), "taudis" (barracks), and "habitat insalubre" (unhealthy housing). In 1963, Hayy el Sellom is not
included in his listing however, which concentrates on Palestinian camps and the eastern suburbs of the capital city,
then its industrial core (Ecochard 1963).
IFigure 2-6( (a): Doxiadis, design of low-income housing project to
replace "slums" in 1958.
Source: Sarkis (1998).
.. J..
Figure 2-6 (b): Low cost housing designed for the Elyssar area in the mid 1990s to
replace scquatter settlements in the southern suburbs of Beirut. These were 7-8 stories
buildings.
I I
strategy for Lebanon also suggested the necessity to build working class residential
neighborhoods and eradicate existing "slums" all over the capital (figure 2-6(a)).21
In the early 1970s, most informal settlements had fallen under the rule and/or protection
of guerillas and militia groups who actively recruited members among their populations. As a
result, public officials began to see in informal settlements a threat to public security and
attempts at curtailing their development increased in the years preceding the civil war. In
informal settlements where the presence of militia groups was more visible, the army was
recurrently sent but failed to implement any eviction.2 1
However, the beginning of the civil war in 1975 weakened considerably public agencies.
The two sections of Beirut (East and West) were difficult to administrate and planning agencies
had lost their implementation capacities. Thus, the government had no effective control over the
city and its poor financial and administrative resources forced it to ignore blatant breaches of its
laws. By the time they were able to react to widespread illegal developments in the city, the
southern suburbs had become a large squatter settlement that obtained de-facto services through
illegal hook-ups. As a result, public policy towards these areas changed radically, shifting to after
the fact management in an attempt to curtail and limit illegalities by issuing new urban
regulations and charging people for illegal hook-ups (Chapter 4). Furthermore, in the sole
instance where they were able to intervene during this period (in 1983, following the Israeli
invasion and withdrawal of Beirut in 1982), public agencies declared informal settlements in the
southern suburbs of Beirut in "emergency state," summoned the army troops to penetrate and
control them, and devised a short-lived emergency plan that was never implemented (As-Safir
1983).
Since the end of the war, informal settlements (especially those in the southern suburbs)
gained visibility as grandiose plans were devised for the demolition of the largest ones and the
relocation of their residents. This was, however, only the case for squatters located on high value
property that provided attractive investment opportunities, that is the southwestern coast of
20 For more information about Ecochard, see Ghorayeb (2002) and about Doxiadis, see Sarkis (1998 and 2003).
21 In the early 1970s, scattered military conflicts that opposed the pro-Palestinian movement on the one hand
(heavily mobilizing residents of informal settlements) and the Lebanese army on the other also lead to many clashes
in and around informal settlements such as in Jnih and Ouz"i (south-west of Beirut) and Dekwaneh (north-east of
Beirut) (An-Nabar and As-Safir dailies reported many of these clashes, sometimes in the form of "squatter
evictions". See, for example, April 1975).
Figure 2-7: Hayy el Sellom in context, scale 1:10,000.
Base Map: MAPS, Aerialphoto taken in 1999.
54
Beirut (Elyssar project)2 and Wata el Moussaytbeh (located within Municipal Beirut, figure 2-4).
The new projects condemned neighborhoods on the grounds of high density, poor physical
conditions, and illegal land occupation. Plans were thus devised in both areas to build alternative,
low cost housing, for residents within the same area, well in line with the 1960s modernist
housing ideology, 30 to 40 years later (figure 2-6 (b)), and to transform sea-front areas into high-
end beach resorts.
However, none of these projects ever reached the phase of detailed design or
implementation, especially because public agencies lacked the commitment to address their
social components, while active mobilization among the residents of these informal settlements
and the support of political parties allowed a de-facto acknowledgement that their
neighborhoods will not be easily eradicated. Instead, public agencies have implemented heavy
policing, especially in squatted areas, where they have sought to control construction in order to
limit potential compensation costs in the event of future displacements.
In sum, the share of informal settlements in "reconstruction" has been minimal, while
their physical conditions have considerably deteriorated, given the above described population
increases. Save for a few local municipal upgrading initiatives (e.g. road paving), poor physical
conditions have been overlooked. Furthermore, policymakers are to-date reluctant to recognize
the existence of informal settlements as permanent elements of the cityscape. Instead, public
officials generally describe informal settlements as the result of the Lebanese civil war (1975-
1990) and the large waves of population displacements that occurred throughout its fifteen
years. Rural migrants and foreign migrant workers are lumped with populations displaced by
military conflicts in the country and they are all considered as "temporarily displaced groups"
who should be assisted in order to "return to their areas of origin." Given this description, the
legal jurisdiction of the residents of informal settlements goes back to the Ministry of Displaced,
who is to help them "return" to their "areas of origin," despite ample evidence of their well-
established settlement in Beirut (National Emergency Reconstruction Plan NERP 1990).
22 The Elyssar project planned to displace 80,000 squatter residents occupying prime sea-front land in the southwest
suburbs of Beirut and to re-house a section of these populations in housing projects built to that end. The project
was proposed soon after the end of the civil war, and as a result of negotiations (notably with the political parties
holding the area), a special public agency, Elyssar, was created in order to develop the displacement plans, build new
low-income housing, transform the squatted areas into high-end tourist resorts, and leave way to large through-
traffic arteries. The Elyssar project has been halted for over seven years now. The board of the public agency has
also lost several of its members and is considered dysfunctional (Harb 2001, Clerc 2002).
Prior to Prior to Prior to
1959 1963 1967
Prior to Prior to Prior to - Prior to1978 1983 1992 1996
Figure 2-8: Evolution of Hayy el Sellom between 1959 and 2000, reconstructed on the
basis of aerial photographs and old maps. Lots are colored according to when they were
"inaugurated". Figure scaled 1:10 000.
Source: Base map reconstructed by author, based on BTUTP 1993 map.
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Given this history, it is not surprising that Lebanon remains one of the few states around
the world never to implement an informal settlement upgrading or regularization project. To
the contrary, the combination of its projected planning policies has intensified the threat of
imminent displacement and thus the precariousness of living conditions for the residents of
informal settlements throughout the country.
2.B CASE STUDY: HAYY EL SELLOM
Hayy el Sellom is one of several areas that were transformed in the mid-fifties from
agricultural land in the far suburbs of the city into a refuge for lower-income families looking for
shelter. It is located between the Beirut International Airport and the industrial zone of
Choueyfat, mostly within the jurisdiction of the Choueyfat Municipality, although the
neighborhood trespasses to the Mrayjeh Municipality, the old village from which it emerged
(figure 2-7). Originally planted with mulberry trees that fed the silkworm industry controlled by
Druze and Christian Maronite families of the area," the Choueyfit plain was gradually planted
with orange and olive orchards as the silk trade dwindled at the turn of the twentieth century,
and then urbanized as land value trumped potential agricultural benefits as of the mid 1950s and
large factories were established around this area (Nasr and Nasr 1974). Since 1953, this area has
evolved from olive groves into one of the most congested residential areas of the suburbs of
Beirut, with a density estimated at around 1,200 inhabitants/ha24 (figures 2-8 through 2-13).
Until the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, Hayy el Sellom developed in
informal land subdivisions, which provided affordable housing ownership for rural migrants. Its
population remained limited: an estimated 500 families, most of them rural migrants looking for
employment opportunities in the city, had settled in the neighborhood (figure 2-8).
During the years of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), conditions for accessing housing
in Hayy el Sellom changed considerably. First, the (albeit limited) possibility of squatting
property, until then impossible in Hayy el Sellom, became an option and despite the
23 Land was originally the property or Druze lords and was gradually bought up by Maronite families working in the
silk trade, an activity believed to have strained relationships between the two communities and lead in part to the
1860 civil war (Khuri 1975).
24 The density of Hay c/ Sloem has been estimated between 850 people/ha (BTUTP 1992) and 1400 people/ha, by
the students of the Lebanese University in 1999, in the class I co-taught with Mona Harb and Isabelle Peillen.
Figure 2-9: Hayy el Sellom, aerial photograph in 1963, scale 1:10,000.
The neighborhood extended over an approximate area of 13ha and was
surrounded by many agricultural fields.
Base Map: Georges Stephan &Fils.
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commitment to legal tenure (notably protected by developers), a number of families were able to
occupy terrains along the riverbeds and on two religious (Waq/) lots. Second, and in the context
of the religiously segregated city, Hayy el Sellom became one of the only alternatives for Muslims
(especially Shi'ites) looking for affordable small lots with legal property rights (albeit in shares) in
the capital city.'" These changes had considerable impact on the neighborhood by increasing the
flows of population to the area. In addition to the (albeit slower) pattern of rural migration to
the city, several flows of war-displaced populations arrived in 1976 (due to the civil war), 1978,
1982, and throughout the 1980s (because of the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon). Many
among these populations however lacked the financial means to purchase housing. They
therefore contributed to the vertical densification of the neighborhood and the development of
a large housing rental market.
Two important trends are worth mentioning in the post-war era. First, Hayy el Sellom
has shifted from being perceived as a remote informal settlement to be identified as another
neighborhood of the "southern suburbs of Beirut". Referred to as Ddhiyah or "The Suburb" by
most residents of Beirut, but also by practitioners and scholars in the city alike, the "southern
suburb of Beirut" is a socially constructed geographic entity that includes several old villages of
the southern periphery of Beirut incorporated as its "suburbs" by the 1950s as well as an array of
informal settlements that constitute its south-western and south-eastern sections (Harb 2003,
Khuri 1975). 26 According to Harb (2003), Ddhyah is a vast section of the Lebanese capital city,
equal in size and population to municipal Beirut, and predominantly populated by Shi'ite rural
migrants. It is stigmatized as "poor," "illegal" and unregulated," controlled by Shi'ite political
parties, especially Hizb'Allah, and recognized as "the -Shi'ite territory" of Beirut. Second, Hayy el
Sellom has acquired a new attractiveness in the suburbs of the city as one of the cheapest
options to purchase a house in the vicinity of Beirut, given a highly exclusive post-war housing
market. These two factors have contributed to increasing the size of population of the
neighborhood but also homogenizing it, to predominantly low income, Shi'ite rural migrants.
Today, Hayy el Sellom expands over an area of 850,000m2. Its population is estimated at 100,000
inhabitants, but the number fluctuates considerably because of rapid movements of local and
25 All three neighborhoods that had developed in informal land subdivisions in the eastern suburbs of Beirut were
forcibly evacuated by the early 1976.
26 The analysis of Ddbiyah as a socially constructed geographic entity was developed by Harb (2003). The
transformation of villages into suburbs in the southern suburbs of Beirut was analyzed and documented by Khuri
(1975).
Hayy el Sellom, aerial photograph in 1978, scale 1:10,000.
The neighborhood had already considerably increased in size and extended by
then over an approximate area of 40ha. It is possible to see the first squatter
developments by the Ghadir River.
Figure 2-10:
Source: Georges Stephan &Fils.
Figure 2-11: Hayy el Sellom, aerial photograph in 1983, scale 1:10,000.
The neighborhood extended over an approximate area of 55ha and its
density has considerably increased. The river beds are completely squatted.
Source: Georges Stephan &Fils.
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Hayy el Sellom, aerial photograph in 1991, scale 1:10,000.
The neighborhood extended over an approximate area of 60ha and has taken its
general final form.
Figure 2-12:
Base Map: MAPS, Lebanon.
Figure 2-13: Hayy el Sellom, aerial photograph in 1995, scale 1:10,000.
The neighborhood extended over an approximate area of 85ha and has
taken its general final form. It is possible to see the development of a
number of large-scale projects (e.g. center, and east towards the airport
runway).
Base Map: .MAPS, Lebanon.
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Hayy el Sellom, aerial photograph in 1999, scale 1:10,000.
The neighborhood extended over an approximate area of 85ha. A close
look indicates that the neighborhood density has increased considerably,
although its boundaries are not extending.
Figure 2-14:
Base Map: MAPS, Lebanon.
international migrant workers.' This places the current density at around 1,200 persons/ha,
which is extremely high in all counts (figure 2-13). The neighborhood suffers from extremely
poor physical and environmental conditions and poor levels of services. The areas' high density,
absence of open space, obstructed sun rays that seldom penetrate houses, constant traffic
congestions, proximity to industrial zones and to the airport, the Ghadir River that collects
industrial wastes from the region before it goes through the settlement on its way to the sea, and
a garbage recycling facility that emits toxic fumes at the edge of their settlement all pose threats
to public health.2s The situation of the squatters living on the sides of the Ghadir River is
however the most dramatic. Many still live in corrugated metal houses and their homes are
seasonally flooded by the river's polluted water.
2.B.1 Physical Organization
Historically, Hayy el Sellom was the natural extension of the urbanization process that
had already transformed the neighboring villages of Beirut into its suburbs (Khuri 1975). The
neighborhood grew in informal land subdivisions, out of an old node of legally subdivided lots
at the fringes of the old village of Mrayjeh, by then incorporated in the urban economy (figure 2-
8). There, and following the pattern of old agricultural roads, the neighborhood took form
according to the willingness of owners to sell their lots to newcomers, as is clear in successive
aerial photographs (figures 2-9 through 2-14). The main artery, the souq street as it is known for
the residents today, extends over one of these old agricultural paths that connected the old
villages of the area to the Tiro, the area south of the neighborhood where urban notables came
to hunt birds.
On the surface, the physical organization of Hayy el Sellom today follows no structured
logic. However, a closer investigation reveals that the neighborhood growth followed the early
social process of urbanization, which was organized according to family and geographic patterns,
each grouped around a bara (sub-neighborhood). Several sub-neighborhoods and streets carry
27 The figure of 100,000 residents is based on quick count from aerial photographs. There is no "official" estimate
of the population of the neighborhood. According to the residents' committee, there were in 1992 some 120,000
inhabitants; the municipality claims 200,000 and some quick surveys of private offices place the figures much below.
However, the figure of 100,000 seems to portray a relatively exact estimate, given the boundaries of the
neighborhood adopted for this study.
28 The garbage recycling facility replaces an old incinerator that operated in the area until 1996. It was closed down
by residents violently after months of showdown with the state. The details of this case study are developed in
Kingston (forthcoming).
1. Hayy el Mawqif al-Qadim (Old Parking area)
2. Hayy el Mawqif al-Jadid (New Parking area)
3. Hayy el Jami'ah
4. Hayy el Hibberiyyeh
5. Hayy Madrasat al-Ghazall (School)
6. Hayy el Zahra'
7. Hayy 'Amhaz
8. Hayy Kan'in
9. Hayy el-'Arab
10. Hayy el-Huseyniyyeh
11. Hayy el-Nahr
12. Hayy el-'Abbas
Figure 2-15: The main sub-neighborhoods of Hayy el Sellom, as they are known now, based
on residents' recollections.
Base Map: MAPS Lebanon (1999).
the name of families such as the 'Arab family, the Kan'in family, the 'Amhaz family, while
others carry the name of the village of origins, such as Hayy el Hibberiyyeh, or the national
origin of the residents, such as Hayy el Falastiniyyeh (Palestinians), dismantled since then. A
number of sub-.neighborhoods or streets carry the name of important local institutions, such as a
school in the case of Hayy el Ghazali, or indicate important locations in the neighborhood such
as Hayy el Nahr (the river neighborhood) or Hayy el Mawqif el QaFim and Hayy el Mawqif el
Jadid (Old and New Parking areas). Although quarters follow the name of a family or a village of
origin, it does not follow that all or even most of the residents belong to this group, but many of
its early comers (including often a mediator or a land developer) belonged to this family or
village group (figure 2-15).
Much of the physical development of Hayy el Sellom violates urban and construction
codes. During the early phase (1952-1976), illegality was restricted to violations of land
subdivision and construction codes (no building permits, constructions beyond the maximum
allowable floor and total exploitation ratios). Other forms of illegalities developed during the
war people squatted the borders of the Ghadir River as well as two other lots owned by
religious (Christian) institutions. Violations to construction codes also grew exponentially during
the war, as homeowners added several stories to their original houses, sometimes reaching seven
story buildings with no foundation.
Economic activities are generally commercial, although many stores also maintain
artisanal or small-scale industrial activities. Unlike other informal settlements where car garages
are dominant, this activity tends to be more limited in Hayy el Sellom, probably because of the
distance that separates the neighborhood from large transportation networks. The neighborhood
instead counts an active commercial area, especially its main souq artery, where shops rent for up
to US $700-$1,000 per month, a higher price than many other areas of the Beirut suburbs. The
souq counts an active vegetable market as well as stores selling clothing, food, and other daily
commodities that attract buyers from the southern suburbs of the city, notably because of its
low prices (figure 2-19).29
29 It was common during interviews with new residents in Hayy el Sellom to learn that they had first heard about
and came to the neighborhood because they were attracted to its cheap market, before they decided to move to the
area.
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2.B.2 Social Organization
Given the absence of a data profile for the neighborhood, I conducted in June 2002 a
questionnaire with 20 households living in Hayy el Sellom, chosen across neighborhoods and
types of households (i.e. nuclear families, workers, women headed households). This sample has
no statistical significance for an estimated population of 100,000. The findings are however
useful to illustrate living conditions in the neighborhood (Questionnaire in Appendices 1).
The majority of households in Hayy el Sellom are nuclear families, predominantly
Muslim Shi'ite. However, several types of households exist in Hayy el Sellom, including women
headed households, foreign workers pooling in one residence, foreign workers living in their
workplace in the neighborhood, and nuclear and extended families (Lebanese or not). The size
of the surveyed household varied, going from 2 persons to 13, and did not necessarily coincide
with dwelling size. The number of children per family also varied considerably, going from one
to eleven, but the large majority ranged between 4 and 6 (in line with the national average of
4.95, ACS 1998).
Around 2/3 of surveyed households rented their houses, while others owned apartments
or buildings, via the family. We also know that a limited number of households squat the
premises on which they lived, but they are mostly confined to the riverbanks or to two religious
(Waqf) properties. Length of residency also varied between early comers in the 1960s (generally
owners) and new comers (owners in large housing complexes or renters). All squats date back to
the civil war.
Surveyed rents in the area varied considerably, mostly because quarters (or hdrahs) vary in
physical characteristics and because the souq area that attracts clientele beyond Hayy el Sellom is
highly valued. Rent for a shop on the main artery went for up to US 1,000$ (2 cases, both rented
to Syrian workers). Elsewhere, and for residential uses, rent went from US 50$ and up. Foreign
workers (Syrian and Kurd) tended to pay higher rents, notably because they pooled together in
apartments and shared the costs, allowing owners to charge higher fees.
As for urban services, they were historically gradually organized provided by popular
(family and neighborhood) committees formed at the sub-neighborhood level, that extended
self-help sewer networks, repaved roads, and obtained water and electricity through processes of
political clientelism (during the 1960s) or illegal hook-ups (1970s onward). Today, many of these
coordinating committees have been disbanded. The survey indicated that the costs paid by
families for urban services varied considerably, especially that not all families actually reported
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paying for such services. Nonetheless, the few bills that were presented went up to
US40$/month for electricity." In one neighborhood, residents also declared they paid
US3.5$/month for a Syrian worker who was commissioned to collect garbage.3
Income was difficult to assess. Indeed, most of the described family budgets showed
higher expenses than incomes. Furthermore, one third of interviewed families indicated that they
were unemployed or had unsteady jobs. Generally, early comers who owned their houses tended
to have better financial standing because they were able to rent some of the units they built
earlier (one of them actually lives off and helps children from rents on three buildings he owns).
Government employees (2 in the sample, one of them, a woman, works in the nearby tobacco
Regie) described more stable positions (around US 500$/month) and received educational and
transport subsidies. Other household incomes also varied between daily wages of US $2.5 and
monthly wages of US $250/month, with some exceptions. Reported types of employments
included cab drivers, shop owners, menial low-paid jobs, factory workers, and cooking (for
women). Non-Lebanese shop owners (generally Syrian) should also be distinguished, since their
situation as shop owners in the lucrative business of used clothes or cheap Syrian produce
provided them with a listed income of US $2,000/month, substantially higher than others.
Since there are no public schools in the vicinity of Hayy el Sellom, education was the
biggest strain on family budgets, and all interviewees complained that they couldn't afford its
costs, even when they saw its value. Around half the interviewed families had pulled out at least
one child at the age of 12 for work. None of the families deliberately refrained from sending kids
to school, however they all explained that they have had to pull out the kids recently (with the
economic crisis) because they couldn't afford schooling anymore. It is hence no coincidence that
the most recurrent form of subsidy listed by these families is subsidies from political parties and
employers for schooling.
Healthcare seemed also out of reach for most of these residents, despite the presence of
a public clinic in the area (since the mid 1990s only). Families living by the Gbadir River also
complained about child health and skin problems related to the river (see above) as well as other
30 Since service agencies opted in the late 1970s for servicing all areas indiscriminately in exchange for fees (see
Chapter 4), the struggle between informal dwellers and these agencies has been whether they could still rely on
illegal hook-ups or whether they would be forced to pay for the services they are anyway getting. Recent clashes
have opposed residents of informal settlements with representatives of the Electricity Public Agency in several areas
of Beirut (See An-Nahar and As-Safir dailies and other local coverage in March 2004).
31 The main task is to move garbage from secondary streets to main arteries or to the neighborhood peripheries
from where they are collected by the private company that collects garbage in the Greater Beirut area.
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security threats. One woman described how her child drowned in the river during a winter
overflow. Others spoke of long-term problems whose treatment they couldn't afford (such as a
child with disability or depression).
2.B.3 Political Organization
State-citizen relationships for the residents of Hayy el Sellom, like elsewhere in Lebanon,
are historically organized around patron-client relations (Gilsenan 1986) and more recently,
heavily mediated by political parties. Between 1950 and 1970, residents relied on feudal
authorities (from their areas of origin) to mediate their relation with the state. They exchanged
votes in the Biqa' or the South (their areas of origin) for services in Beirut and its suburbs, but
never managed to gain actual political representation or the weight to change their legal status.
In the post-war era, state-society relations are strongly mediated by political parties,
through whom all claims, protests, and negotiations are organized. As part of Ddhiyah, the
population of Hayy el Sellom is affiliated to the two political Shi'ite parties (formally war
militias), Amal and Hizb'Allah, who control the suburbs militarily, along with the Syrian Secret
Services. 32 Amal had originally begun as a social justice movement lead by a respected Shi'ite
cleric (Imam Musa Al-Sadr) in the late 1960s and once marshaled wide popular support 3,
including that of the residents of Hayy el Sellom. Today, however, Amal's popular base rests on
the distribution of public services and jobs, under the tutelage of its leader, Nabih Berri, who
also holds the second highest Lebanese government position as head of the parliament (Picard
1995). As for Hizb'Allah", its wide network of service-providing NGOs in the southern suburbs
32 In one of the last episodes of the civil war that opposed Amal and Hizb'Allah over the control of the territories of
the southern suburbs of Beirut, a resolution was finally reached with the mediation of the Syrian Secret Services
who formed a joined Amal-Hizb'Allah-Syrian task force to "secure" these suburbs. The Syrian Secret Services have
since then been a main "security" force in the suburbs of Beirut. They are also present in many other areas of
Lebanon.
33 Amal, also known as Haraket el Mabroumin (Movement of the Deprived), was founded in the late 1960s by a
Muslim (Shi'ite) cleric, Imam Musa el Sadr, as a social justice movement that reclaimed equal national entitlement
for all Lebanese nationals, including even regional development. Although the founding members of the party came
from many religious groups in the country, most of its followers are Shi'ite, the poorest community of Lebanon.
During the Lebanese civil war, as every religious group formed its own militia, Amal degenerated into a Shi'ite
militia. Amal is now a recognized political party in Lebanon, and its leader, Nabih Berri, heads the Lebanese
Parliament (Ajami 1986, Norton 1987).
34 Hizb'Allah, or the Par y of God, is a religious (Shi'ite) political movement that has been active in Lebanon since its
foundation in 1982 (Sharara 1997). Hizb'Allah has played important political and developmental roles in Lebanon,
notably in leading the military resistance in occupied South Lebanon against the Israeli Army (1982-2000).
Hizb'Allah also runs a wide array of social services (Harb 1996, Fawaz 1998). Since 1996, the party has also had
several members in the Lebanese parliament.
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Figure 2-19 (a): street view on the main market
artery.
Figure 2-19 (c): top view over main market
artery.
Figure 2-19 (b): street view on the
main market artery.
Figure 2-19 (d): top view over main
market artery.
Figure 2-19: Views on the main market artery taken in April 2004.
Source:ack Gemnayel.
h
of Beirut has generated a wide popular support base which is bolstered by the party's role in
military resistance to Israeli occupation (Harb 1996, Fawaz 1998). Both political parties mediate
local claims and subjugate them to the parties' lines and interests.
As for formal political representation, the majority of Hayy el Sellom residents does not
vote in local elections and has no way of influencing local political processes, including
municipal elections.35 This is because only thirty of the 17,000 families residing in Hayy el Sellom
vote in their municipality of residence (Choueyfit), where they constitute a minor "block" with
very limited power, while all others continue to be registered in their areas of origin. This is
primarily the result of the Lebanese voting system, where local (municipal) and central
(parliamentary) elections are coupled, and generally remain attached to the area of origin rather
than the place of residency.36
Thus, while they live and work in Beirut, most rural migrants have no impact on local
electoral politics. This is particularly problematic for informal settlements dwellers, since they are
mostly rural migrants who are perceived by local authorities as a burden rather than a voice.
35s This is not to say that elections are an adequate process of representation in Lebanon. In modern Lebanese
history, local elections have only happened three times. Furthermore, central elections, which were held every four
years since 1943 but suspended during the years of civil war, have been known for many frauds and political
interventions.
36 Given that 90% of Lebanon is now urban, the majority of residents are still registered in rural areas and either do
not participate in local elections or elect local authorities in areas of origin rather then in their place of residence
(Favier 2000). This makes municipalities unaccountable to their local populations. This is, for example, the case of
the Choueyfat Municipality who counts around 200,000 residents of whom, according to the Mayor, only 10,000 are
voters.
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Figure 2-21 (a): Hayy el Sellom in the newspaper. The "manchette" says:
"Hayy el Sellom, Out of All Legality. Sixty thousand citizens [obviously a
huge exaggeration at the time] live at the margin of citizen's rights and
outside the state's sight."
Source: An-Nahar, April 1975.
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Figure 2-21 (b): Hayy el Sellom in the newspaper. "Tell the state that in
Ha y el Sellom there are forty thousand Lebanese person in need to feel
that they are [...] Lebanese. The pictures portray the then in construction
incinerator that was to be closed by residents a little more than ten years
later.
Source: As-Safir, March 19 1974.
Figure 2-21: Hayy el Sellom in newspapers.
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Table 2-3: Public Planning Agencies
Agency Date Authority
Ministries
Ministry of Planning 1962- Developed physical and development plans for Lebanon,
1977 dissolved and replaced by the CDR in 1977.
Ministry of Housing Created to develop public housing policies, supervise public
provision of housing loans, and legislating rent control, the
Ministry of Housing was dissolved and the Public Housing
Corporation (credit provision) was placed under the Ministry of
Social Works in 1999.
Ministry of Displaced 1994 Created as a temporary ministry in order to organize the return
of war-displaced populations to their areas of origin, The
Ministry of Displaced also runs the Displacement Fund that
disburses compensations for displaced families.
Ministry of Public Works Ministry in charge of the planning, design, and execution of
planning project in the country. The Ministry supervises the
DGU and the HCU.
Public Agencies
Directorate General of 1962 The emblem of the endorsement of modem urban planning,
Urbanism (DGU) the DGU is in charge of developing urban and building codes
for all cities in Lebanon, processing and delivering lot
subdivision permits, and approving large-scale building permits
and all building permits for municipalities that don't have a
technical office (all except Municipal Beirut and Tripoli).
The DGU reports to the Ministry of Public Works. Its central
offices are in Beirut, but the DGU possesses several regional
units. (Hayy el Sellom or Choueyft report to the Aley DGU.)
Higher Council of Urbanism 1962 Council created to review and approve urban regulations, large-
(HCU) scale projects, and other urban interventions. This council was
created to allow for coordination between ministries concerned
with urban issues.
Order of Engineers and 1951 The Order organizes the engineering profession and advocates
Architects the rights of its members. All practicing engineers are mandated
to register.
The order necessarily reviews building permits in the country.
The main branch is in Beirut; a secondary branch exists in
Tripoli.
Others
Municipalities Local elected authority, the municipalities were already created
under Ottoman rule (not in the current divisions). Since 1983,
Municipalities are entitled to commenting on planning projects
but their opinion is only consultative, not mandatory.
Municipalities deliver building permits.
Council for Development and 1977 Created to replace the Ministry of Planning and directly reports
Reconstruction (CDR) L5/1977 to the Council of Ministers.
The CDR is the leading planning agency with jurisdiction all
over the country and financial autonomy. It is granted
unprecedented powers as the Lebanese planning unit.
Table 2-4: Public Planning Legislation
A. Selected Building Permit Regulations
Date T e Leislation
1940 Building Law; First comprehensive building law: regulates the conditions for obtaining building
61LE/1940 permits (issued by municipalities) and introduces the housing permit to attest
conformity of construction to permit. (his regulation applies to Hay el Sellom).
1961 Building Law; Regulation institutes building permit as mandatory in all areas of Lebanon (issued
Decree 7279 by municipalities and approved by the Order of Engineers and Architects) and
institutes restrictions on servicing without housing permits.
1971 Amendment of First amendment of the comprehensive construction code to the 1940 building
Building Law code. It lists and details all building regulations such as height and exploitation
Law 59/71 areas in all of Lebanon. It also restates the regulation forbidding hooking up
services to constructions without housing permits.
1971 Regularization First regularization law. allows for the regularization of illegal constructions on
Law; legal properties.
Decree 2347
1981 Regularization Extends the precedent regularization law.
Law;
Decree 4156
1983 Amendment of The building law is amended again with tighter regulations. It notably imposes the
Building Law role of the DGU in the building process.
Law 148/83
1983 Regularization Extends the precedent regularization law.
Law;
Decree 13
1994 Regularization Extends the precedent regularization law, All violation of construction codes prior
Law; to 1994 are "regularizable," construction violations that precede 1964 are
Law article 324 amnestied.
1994 Displaced Permit Allows displaced individuals to build and restore constructions with "displaced
Legislation building permits" that violate building law without official permit or fees. The law
322/94 was renewed successively for two more years in 1996 and 1999.
1997 Regularization Extension and amendment to earlier regularization laws.
Law
B. Zoning and Urban Regulations
Date Type Legislation
1953 Master Plan; Approval of Master plan for the southern suburb of Beirut that dictates minimum
Decree 2616 lot areas and zoning regulations in some areas of the suburbs.
1992 Law of First legal text to legislate urban regulations, including regulations for land
Sept. 24,1962 subdivisions.
1964 Master Plan, The master plan, based on the work of the French planner Michel Ecochard,
Beirut Suburbs delineates "metropolitan Beirut" boundaries as the municipal city and surrounding
Decree 16 948 areas up to a 400m altitude. The plan regulates zoning and constructions in this
area.
1970 Master Plan, Amendment of the 1964 (Ecochard) zoning and land use regulation.
Beirut Suburbs
Decree 14 313
1973 Airport Security A special decree enforces regulations on the area surrounding the Beirut Airport,
Decree 4 807 in order to protect the "security" of the airport.
1996 Proposal for A decree places the area south of Hayy el Sellom, in the vicinity of the airport
revised Master under study.
Plan
C. Services
Date Type: Legislation
1961 Building Law; Law makes it mandatory to have a "housing permit" before public services are
Decree 7279 provided.
1967 Law 53/67 Amendment to decree 7279 (that forbids hooking water and electricity to
structures with no housing permit) through the law 53/67. The law is smspudud
1983 Decree 148 Decree 148 issues a new law that restates that no services can be provided
with structures that have no housing permits.
Chapter 3
Three Generations
of Developers
3.A INTRODUCrION
The current housing policy paradigm (described in chapter 1) placed a renewed focus on
informal developers as central actors in the production of housing mechanisms, since it
recognizes that learning from the practices of informal markets requires researchers to look into
the strategies of the very actors who are engaged in their organization and the institutional
contexts in which these developers operate (Razzaz 1996, Berner 2001b, McAuslin 2003).
However, the housing literature has not given developers (formal or informal) the weight
they deserve. Topalov's work pioneered research on developers in the French housing market
during the 1970s. Topalov described developers as social agents who play a crucial role in
facilitating the circulation of capital and hence housing supply, by investing in land (to free it for
construction) and participating in financing mechanisms for construction (Topalov 1987).
Topalov's analysis provides an excellent analysis of developers as "middlemen" in the housing
market, and this description has been useful in other contexts where his framework was applied
(Garcia and Jime6nez 1994). However, further work has been needed in this direction in order to
develop better understandings of the role and strategies of developers in various cultural and
urban contexts. There is also a strong need to extend critically this type of analysis to developers
operating in informal settlements (Garcia and Jimenez 1994). Indeed, the latter as often
described as "pirates" (Chabbi 1988, Aristizabal and Ortiz G6mez 2004), who are "experts at
using puppet figures and unscrupulous attorneys to recuperate land or resell land that had
already been sold informally to low-income families" (Aristizabal and Ortiz G6mez 2004: 251),
but their potentially positive role in the provision of housing and the know-how they develop in
this process have generally been overlooked.
More recently, efforts to analyze and learn from the workings of existing housing
markets have shed light on some of the institutions on which developers rely in their operations,
such as the role: played by reciprocity and reputation in the organization of market transactions
and the enforcement of informal contractual agreements (Razzaz 1998). However, the
descriptions of informal developers that are put forth by these studies have centered on
understanding why developers choose to operate "informally" rather than "formally" (De Soto
2000, Berner 2001a) and have often fallen back on profit maximizing assumptions in order to
explain such choices. These representations do not account for the myriad of context specific
and socially rooted factors (e.g. social institutions and practices, macro-economic and political
factors, attitude of the state) that a few earlier in-depth investigations of developers had
described (Chabbi 1988, Garcia and Jimenez 1994). They also tell us little about the strategies
that informal developers devise in order to activate particular housing markets and organize and
secure informal transactions and how their strategies are affected by city wide changes that occur
over time in ever larger cities.
This chapter looks at the strategies of developers in the Hayy el Sellom land and housing
market (see Chlapter 2) during its fifty years of growth. It follows the trajectories of three
generations of land and housing developers who participated in the production of housing in
this neighborhood. The analysis centers on these developers' modes of operation, specifically
looking and the norms and rules to which they appeal, the institutions on which they rely, and
how these modes of operation change over time.
The chapter argues that despite the fact that the three generations of developers adopted
different strategies and provided different housing products (land and apartments in large
housing complexes), there are clear similarities between them. First, all developers have devised
elaborate strategies in which they tapped on existing (formal and informal) institutions and built
new ones in order to penetrate and organize this housing market, sustain their practices and
secure a position within this market. The chapter will also show that (different types of) social
networks always occupied central stage among the types of institutions that these developers
relied on in order to build and sustain their practices over the years. These social networks were
useful in providing access to the necessary resources for producing housing (Granovetter 1985,
Jenkins and Smith 2001a), but, more importantly, they allowed developers to accumulate the
necessary "social capital" that enabled them to reposition themselves in the social hierarchies of
the neighborhood, a process that proved to be necessary for them to organize and maintain their
practices (Bourdieu 1986). Finally, the chapter will show that the strategies of these developers
and their ability to penetrate or activate a housing market are tightly confined by a number of
political and economic factors that occurred within the neighborhood (e.g. neighborhood size,
presence of political parties) and in the wider city (e.g. prices of land, political conditions).
The chapter is divided in three main sections, each looking at one of three generations of
land developers in the neighborhood. The chapter then concludes on comparing these three
generations, first between each other, and then to other representations of informal developers
in the housing literature.
3.B THE EARLY YEARS: A MONOPOLISTIC INFORMAL MARKET
3.B.1 The Early Days (1950-1973): Abu Raymond Saab
The first and most well known
resident of Hayy el Sellom was a Christian
man, named Michel Abu Gh~inem Sa'ab,
who is popularly remembered as "Abu
Raymond"' (Figure 3-1).
Abu Raymond's family originally
resided in an area close to Hayy el Sellom
that was selected by the government in 1949
for the construction of the Beirut
International Airport. Hence, in 1950 the
Sa'ab family had to move. The family
decided to purchase empty land nearby, at
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Figure 3-1: Abu Raymond, Identity Card.
Sour.ce Abu Raymond personal records,
courtesy of his family.
the edge of Mrayjeh, then a Christian village in
Beirut's southern suburb where a few of their relatives lived. The land belonged to a Christian
family who had owned other land in the area and was willing to sell a small parcel to Abu
Raymond because of his similar religious and geographic affiliation. When Abu Raymond's
family built their house and moved in towards 1952, legally, following the existing rules at the
time, there were less then five other houses in the area which was then known as the Mawqýf
area, what was to become the first core of Hayy el Sellom, and extension of the old Christian
villages of Mra.2ieh and Tahwitat al Ghadir (Figure 2-7).2
Around the same time, in 1951, a group of Muslim Shi'ite families from the H tribe,
fleeing from their villages because of a tribal dispute, arrived in Beirut. The H families first
rented a number of rooms in Tahbitat al Ghadir, south of the olive groves that were to become
Hayy el Sellom, from a Druze family. But soon, the families started searching for land to
purchase, and they were willing to build if they could buy cheap land in the same far southern
suburb of Beirut where Abu Raymond had just built a house. At that time, all land in the area
belonged to Christian and Druze landowners who lived in the nearby hills of Choueyf~t. Being a
In Arabic, Abu means "father of"' and is a colloquial and informal way in Lebanon of calling a member of one's
community in reference to his eldest son's name. In this case, Raymond is Michel Saab's eldest son.
2 Choueyfat consists of several real estate districts that follow the names of old areas: 'Amrussiyeh (where most of
Hayy el Sellom is located), Choueyfat city, Qobbi, el-Umari', and Tahwitat el-Ghadir. Mrayjeh and Tahwitat are
also old villages in the area.
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Christian and a resident of Choueyfit, Abu Raymond had known many of these landowners.
When approached by the H family, Abu Raymond introduced the head of the family to one of
the landowners who agreed to sell them a land lot. The H family members then subdivided the
land among the various families, and each family built its own house in adjacent lots, as was the
tradition at the time in rural areas.
The housing of the H family encouraged Abu Raymond to become a land developer. He
was quick to understand that this mode of housing provision could be profitable because of the
steady flow of rural migrants to the southern suburb of Beirut who usually paid high rents for
rooms. He was also aware of areas in the eastern suburbs of Beirut that were developing in the
same way (Bourgey and Phares 1973). These migrants were drawn to Choueyfait in the hope that
they would find employment either in the new airport or in the factories located nearby (Nasr
and Nasr 1974). Given their agricultural background in which land is considered a form of
security, most of these migrant families preferred to buy property rather than rent; but they were
able to pay only modest amounts from the money they had from selling their homes in the
villages from which they had migrated. The existing lot size were however too large for them to
be able to purchase land. Abu Raymond understood this constraint. He procured land from the
landowners he knew well, then subdivided the lot into smaller plots and sold them to the
migrants.
In the early days, Abu Raymond's practices were not strictly illegal: His subdivisions
were not recognized by public authorities, but, in the absence of an approved master plan for the
region, they did not contradict urban regulations. He was however selling lots to migrants in full-
knowledge that they will build illegal structures, since the dimensions and layout of the lots
excluded the possibility of legal constructions, given the 1940 building Law. When zoning
regulations' imposed a minimum 2,000mZ lot size in 1964, his practices became more openly
illegal since his informal subdivisions violated urban regulations.
In the mid 1950s, Abu Raymond gave the settlement its name: Hayy el Sellom, in
Arabic, "The Ladder Neighborhood". The name was appropriate because much of the housing
was built on a hilly topography with steps and terraces to reduce soil erosion.'
3 Master Plan for the suburbs of Beirut, Decree 16 948 issued on July 23, 1964.
4 There are several narratives about the origins of the name of Hayy el Sellom. Some have chimed that "sellom" or
"ladder" referred to the many ladders in the area that were used to harvest trees. Others have described a ladder that
served as a footbridge over the Ghadir River for long and earned the neighborhood its name. However, Abu
Raymond's role was the most recurrent story I heard (also see Bouzeid 1985).
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Figure 3-2 (a): Abu Raymond's Book. Figure 3-2 (b): Abu Raymond's Book.
Record for land sale with payment in 1973.
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Figure 3-2 (c): Summary of sale, the list of
payments includes the price of asphalt (for
the topographer) and the commissions.
Figure 3-2 (d): Record of land sale in 1973.
Figure 3-2: Abu Raymond's records and books. The developer kept up-to date books.
Source: Abu Raymond's personal records, courtey of hisfamily.
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3.B.2 The Sale Process
In 1953, Abu Raymond, who did not know much about how to subdivide the land,
sought the help of a formal land developer, Sa'eddedin, from Beirut. Because of his experience
in land development, Sa'eddedin was able to recommend state accredited topographers, point
out a notary public, arrange a legal land transfer contract and then help in the creation of a
subdivision plan. Most notably, a government-accredited topographer, who was introduced to
the buyers as "an Engineer",' drafted the subdivision plan (figure 3-3). Abu Raymond also hired
a contractor to layout the internal roads within the site and pour a layer of asphalt over the
roads.
As the land sale began, Abu Raymond did not bypass all formalities. In fact, he recorded
transactions in the formal notary registries (kdteb 'ade); and then, when all the lots were sold, he
paid sales taxes to record the sales in the Public Land Registry. At the time, the Choueyfat
Municipality had urban jurisdictional authority over the area. Since it did not raise any
objections, Abu Raymond continued his business, which was not clearly in violation of informal
regulations at the time, although he was becoming increasingly bolder in his defiance of formal
rules, which required a lengthy process to register the details of each of his land sales with the
Public Land Registry.
Abu Raymond always hired government-accredited topographers to survey and to
subdivide the land. He also kept his own record of the informal transactions and gave each plot
a number. On average, the plot sizes varied between 150 and 200m2. When it was possible,
notably within the Municipality of Mrayjeh where minimum lot areas were relatively small, Abu
Raymond tried to abide by urban regulations. However, the plot sizes were always well below
the 2,000m 2 required by the 1964 master plan of Beirut and its suburbs.'
Abu Raymond continued this practice, relying on his relationship with landowners, some
of whom simply sold him their land, while a few others entered in joint ventures with him.
Business relations with landowners were formal and protected by all necessary legal measures. A
formal contract was drafted for every lot by a lawyer and signed and registered at an official
notary public (figure 3-4). It either transferred property to Abu Raymond or, more frequently,
s This title connoted professional legitimacy at a time when such modern symbols of meritocracy were highly valued
by the migrant society of Hayy el Sellom.
6 The 1964 master plan of Beirut and its suburbs (decree 16948 in 1964) is widely known as Plan Ecochard,
following the name of the French planner who had developed it (Ghorayeb 2000). This master plan regulated land
use and minimum lot areas (see Chapter 2 and 4).
Figure 3-3: "Informal" lot subdivision plan for lot 1058, in 'Amrussiyeh, Hayy el
Sellom. The subdivision plan reproduces elements of the formal code, including the
table listing all property shareholders and formal references to the Lebanese Republic
and the loca jurisuiction.
Source: Topographer's personal records.
entitled him to "represent the owner and sell at whatever price he deems right, in part or in
whole, to one or several individuals" the lots they possessed. While they did business on the
basis of their similar personal backgrounds, Abu Raymond and the property owners protected
themselves from default through official legal measures.
Abu Raymond's ability to subdivide and sell lots was facilitated by the structures of land
ownership in this section of Choueyfat. Since local Druze or Christian residents of the
surrounding areas, rather than absentee owners, held land in this area, it was possible for him to
contact and involve these owners in land sales. In addition, landholding structures in the area
were rather dispersed, in relatively moderate sizes. Unlike large-scale property owners who
would denigrate the small profits that came out of this business, these landowners were
interested by the small gains they accrued from this form of land sales.
Social connections to property owners were, however, not sufficient for Abu Raymond's
practices. He needed to gain the trust of buyers, and the plots had to be sold to a different
group that had no social or religious connection to Abu Raymond because the demand at the
time was coming from rural migrants, essentially Muslim Shi'ites.7 He also wanted to secure the
transactions in the event that buyers breached their verbal contracts with him. Abu Raymond
pursued these dual objectives by relying on the formal symbols of government and professional
institutions to provide a credible and secure image to the prospective buyers. The subdivision
map is a good example: it was drawn and certified by a government-accredited topographer who
was introduced to the prospective buyers as "The Engineer". The map was marked with several
symbols of official approval. The topographers used emblems borrowed from formal
government documents with the "Lebanese Republic" logo, and wrote down the lot areas in
exactly the same manner as in formal subdivision documents (figures 3-3). Abu Raymond also
relied on formal institutions, such as the Land Registry, to make the land sales appear legitimate
to the buyers.
Although the subdivision map was not a legal document, residents used it to resolve
conflicts over property boundaries. Both Abu Raymond and the topographers kept copies of
the map and, in case of disputes, made them available to the residents. They also used them in
building permit applications. Through this process, this document, which was initially created to
7 There were many waves of rural migration towards Beirut, and these followed religious lines to the extent that
regions of Lebanon were predominantly inhabited by particular religious groups. The 1950s corresponded to the
migration of Shi'ites, at the time the poorest religious group in Lebanon, to Beirut. They occupied its suburbs. See
Chapter 2 for more details, also Faour 1981 for migration to Beirut.
evoke a sense of formality, gradually gained legitimacy to be eventually accepted as a valid
evidence of ownership, even by public agencies. Thus, in the instances when they applied for
building permits or sought to comply with other formal legal requirements, residents included
the subdivision map as a site map that was accepted by the Municipality or the Directorate
General of Urbanism (DGU).'
There are other examples of how Abu Raymond and the topographer relied on
government symbols and drew on formal regulations to create a set of rules and standards to
protect the area against.totally unrestricted housing developments. They applied standards from
formal construction codes, such as setbacks and maximum floor area ratios, to create broad
construction guidelines hoping that their adherence to such codes would eventually allow the
area to be regularized. Hence, early settlers learned about maximum built up areas, maximum
heights, and setbacks. They also abided by the rules Abu Raymond had improvised to organize
the development of their neighborhood. In some ways, they paid heavier dues than residents in
other areas, since Abu Raymond charged them the price of the setbacks that served as streets in
their lots. As a result, the initial phase of the settlement was not marked by haphazard
construction and gross violations of all codes and property rights. In fact, it was quite orderly,
but somewhat congested and unfinished in appearance when compared to formally subdivided
areas. It also lacked public services such as paved roads or sewer and water networks.
Abu Raymond was ingenious in other ways. To protect land sales to the buyers who
could not initially pay the entire price, Abu Raymond devised a system whereby the name of
such buyers were marked with a special note ('irbdrab) in the official land registry.9 This signified
to the buyers that they could not violate their verbal contract with Abu Raymond, as this mark
was the proof that they had not paid the full amount and were hence unable to sell their share
formally or use it to get any of the benefits attached with legal ownership (such as credit). Thus,
Abu Raymond did not rely only on the "social network" and "trust" to protect informal
transactions; he used the formal system, without paying all the costs associated with it, to ensure
enforcement of the informal contracts. In effect, Abu Raymond created mortgage notations
within the Registry without the formal creation or recording of mortgage documents. It is not
dear whether Abu Raymond had to bribe officials in the Land Registry to mark the names of the
8 I was able to find many examples of these maps in the archives of two public agencies, the DGU and the
Choueyfait Municipality.
9 Isbdrab on a property record puts a hold on a property that indicates to anyone consulting land records to learn
buyers who owed payments (the procedure exists and is relatively inexpensive). Neither is it
clear that Abu Raymond ever used the registry books to either demand payment or evict
defaulting residents. What is clear, however, is that the residents remember that there was a
system of monitoring in place to counter the uncertainty usually associated with informal
transactions and flexible payment schedules.
3.B.3 The Strategic Alliance Phase
As the flow of rural, Muslim migrants to Hayy el Sellom continued, the H family - the
first family housed by Abu Raymond - began to play the role of a partner in Abu Raymond's
business. There was a complementary division of labor between Abu Raymond and Hajj Hamad
H, the eldest member of the H family. Abu Raymond concentrated on procuring land from
landowners, and restricting the access of others to these landowners by working closely with the
"land guardians" who watched the land on behalf of the landowners. So tight was Abu
Raymond's hold on the process that between 1953 and 1970 almost all land sales in Hayy el
Sellom were conducted by him alone.10 Abu Raymond could now rely on Hajj Hamad's social
network with the buyers to arrange informal land sales and, in some instances, to ensure
recovery of credit provided to the buyers for home construction. This alliance between Abu
Raymond and Hajj Hamad was informal at first. Gradually, they created a formal joint venture
and expanded their operation by procuring larger plots of land and creating larger subdivisions.
Abu Raymond did not only rely on Hajj Hamad in his relation to newcomers. He also appealed
to a number of intermediaries, referred to as wasits, who were paid commissions to facilitate land
sales. A wasit was often the first member of a village or family to have arrived at Hayy el Sellom
and purchased land from Abu Raymond. He acted as an intermediary between the developer and
the other members of his family/village group, providing an informal assurance of security to
both parties. This explains why Hayy el Sellom expanded as a set of contiguous neighborhoods
that are named after the intermediaries, such as Hayy 'Arab (the 'Arab family quarters), Hayy
'Amhaz, Hayy Kan'in, or Hayy el Hibberiyyeh (after the village of origin), and so on.
By the mid 1960s, the business began to boom. It was further accelerated by political
events. Indeed, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and especially the 1969 Cairo treaty which gave the
about that a particular aspect of the legality of the lot is temporarily questionable.
10 This is reported in the survey I undertook with 300 property owners in the neighborhood that showed that all
families who had bought land before 1973 had dealt with Abu Raymond. However, the bulk of these sales actually
Palestinian Liberation Organization a de-facto permit to operate in South Lebanon created large
migration flows from southern Lebanon to the suburbs of Beirut and further escalated the
demand for housing." At that time, Abu Raymond and Hajj Hamad attempted to expand their
business and they began to construct finished houses on some of the plots for sale. But, these
houses were not sold as quickly as Abu Raymond and Hajj Hamad had anticipated. So, the
partners returned to their original strategy.
As the number of wa•its increased, Abu Raymond and Hajj Hamad became less
interested to make each transaction appear formal and legitimate. Instead, they relied on the
waf-ts to guarantee the transactions with the buyers who, by then, had become more confident
about Hayy el Sellom's longevity. They, their children, and the wasiar also began to ignore
construction restrictions and built several multi-storied structures that they rented to migrants,
thereby creating a new rental market in the area.
3.B.4 Abu Raymond's Market Strategies: Building Social Capital
The story of Abu Raymond's practices in Hayy el Sellom provides a good glimpse of the
type of strategies he developed in order to organize and secure the land market he had
established. It tells of an intricate balance of formal and informal institutions that the old
developer simultaneously appealed to in every transaction he conducted. More specifically, one
can show that a set of informal institutions, such as families, tribes, or neighborhood relations
formed the basis of his practices, along with a number of formal institutions, such as contracts
drafted by lawy.ers, land registry, and state accredited agents. However, the ability of the old
developer to rely on these two types of institutions was the result of his ability to cultivate a wide
web of social networks that connected him to actors located within these institutions, such as a
limited number of topographers or notaries who associated themselves to his practice, but also
wasits or mediators, who insured the connection with clients.
These descriptions attest that networks in the strict sense of "housing networks" that
connect one actor to basic "housing resources", as defined by Turner and Fitcher (1972) or
Smith (2003), played an important role in Hayy el Sellom, in the provision of land, connecting
Abu Raymond to landowners (religious and geographic networks) and to clients via Hajj Hamad
H (kinship, religious, and geographic networks). In fact, a housing network was put in place in
occurred after 1965 (see Appendix 2).
11 For Cairo Treaties, see Salibi 1976, el-Khazen 2000.
the neighborhood and it included an aray of people exchanging resources (including legality)
that went into the production of housing. However, this analysis of social networks needs to be
expanded beyond the direct resources accessed by these networks in order to account for "social
capital", or the ability of social networks to transform into "capital" and enable an actor to
reposition her/himself socially vis-A-vis other members of her/his community (Chapter 1).
The process of accumulating "social capital" illustrates well Abu Raymond's own social
ascension. The son of an unknown farmer who raised a few cows and harvested a limited
numbers of olive trees in the area, Abu Raymond began his life in Hayy el Sellom as the modest
owner of a small grocery store. However, a few years after he initiated the land market business,
he became a kbauj&iab, a respected member of the community and later a Sheykb, Shaykh Abu
Raymond, the highest informal title of respect in his community. 12 At the end of his cardter in
Hayy el Sellom, Abu Raymond was known as a "man of connections" or an "electoral key" to be
visited by candidates before elections. He had contacts and influence as his phone book attests
(figure 3-5). "He was a highly visible person", his daughter-in-law explained during one of my
visits to the family, "people knew his whereabouts and in this village [as she refers to Hayy el
Sellom], that was an important sign of respect and importance".' 3," However, the basis of Abu
Raymond's positive "reputation" was not derived from his kinship relations or his religious
position per se. In fact, his cousins spoke unfavorably of him, mocking his "prince-like
attitudes". 's Many of the neighborhood's old Christian families also blamed him for having
"facilitated the access of the Shi'ites to the area". Instead, his social standing was the outcome of
a long-term strategic investment in institution building and tapping, especially in developing
social networks and alliances, but also a long-term investment in creating and building the
persona of the Hayy el Sellom "developer". In the next two sections, I will describe these two
strategies.
12 Unlike the Muslim communities for whom the tide of Shaykh has religious connotations, Shaykh for Christian
communities in Lebanon connotes important social standing.
13 In a study of the socio-political structures of the southern suburbs of Beirut in 1975, Khuri differentiated between
different types of political leaders in the area, notably differentiating between a XTo, a leader with following beyond
his geographic area and other types of community leaders with standing derived from their local practices through
which they are essentially know. Clearly, Abu Raymond is part of the latter form of leadership and cannot be
recognized as a Ta' V himself (see Khuri 1975).
14 This was mentioned to me in one of several "visits" to the family of Spiro Michel Saab, in their house in Zouk
(Eastern suburb of Beirut) between April and June 2003.
Is This condemnation of Abu Raymond was reiterated during two interviews held with Abu Raymond's cousin: On
June 14, 1999, in the family house in Hayy el Sellom and on April 04, 2003. I noted a similar attitude in three
Christian families of Mrayjeh, at the border of Hayy el Sellom, whom I interviewed on June 18, 2003.
Figure 3-4 (a)
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Figure 3-4: Typical agreements between Abu Raymond and landowners
(a) or the formal developer (b). (a) is certified at the notary public.
These two forms entitle Abu Raymond to follow to dispose of the lots,
sell and registrer.
Souurce: Abu Raymond personal records, courte•y of hisfami#
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Building a Persona: The Developer's Good "Reputation"
Abu Raymond invested in building the positive social image of a benefactor in order to
gain recognition from the residents of Hayy el Sellom. He was happy to be known as a
"forgiving" and "generous" person. While he established multiple mechanisms to insure
compliance and repayment, he never really enforced them.16 Neither was he known to charge
penalties on delays. Instead, he made gestures of generosity such as forgiving payments or
providing legal titles before full payment was made. Moreover, Abu Raymond visited and (more
importantly) was visited by the neighborhoods' residents on diverse occasions and many
interviewees remembered the line in front of his house's door, another important proof oh his
distinguished social standing. Finally, Abu Raymond participated and financed the construction
of the first mosque of Hayy el Sellom. As a Christian who was facilitating the entry of members
of a different religious group in his neighborhood, this gesture carried important symbolic
significance to the old residents of the neighborhoods who still talk about this initiative fifty
years later.
Simultaneously, Abu Raymond created an upper income persona which he thought
would appeal to the property owners he wanted to convince of the reliability of his business: He
regularly hired a car and a driver, gambled excessively, and went frequently to the casino, where
he often invited others.17 With his image, he also sought to distinguish himself from the lower
income residents of the neighborhood where he lived, including his own family members, with
his clothing, his habits (such as carrying a cane and walking around the neighborhood quarters as
was common among feudal lords at the time), and his house (which was built in stone, a sure
mark of wealth). He also maintained a small animal farm in front of his house where he raised a
few domestic animals such as a peacock and several cows and he distributes the milk to the poor
in the area. Many stories circulate in the neighborhood around these practices. For example, one
of his old clients, Hajj Niyef, remembered how:
Abu Raymond wanted the cow I had at ay cost. It vas most pmrtdutip d cow, it was
on4 2years old and it on, dehivred tinr so I xws ratant to sell it [...] To aoninc me,
he gavmeme a plot of land in exchange for the cow! [...]. It as unbelkevable: he gave me
400 dra' [225 in] at 10OLP ach, when the cow could not be worth hbaf thibt mrn [...].
'6 For purposes of accuracy, I should mention that I heard about a number of incidents where Abu Raymond was
angry and threatened buyers to take back the land, but these threats were not followed through.
17 Abu Raymond's addiction to gambling was to take the best out of the old man eventually, since he lost all his
money to the playing table after he left Hayy el Sellom. His personal daily to-do notes also contained innumerable
mentions of organizing poker sessions.
'9·
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Figure 3-5: Abu Raymond personal notes; example of '"Things To Do" list, with list of phone
numbers for people to call. Includes numbers for Fawzi Haydar (Hayy resident, public agent at
the DGU), Shaykh Michel el-Khouri (son of Lebanese president, Director General of Tourism),
Emile Sa'ideh (land owner in Hayy), and others.
Soumrc: Abu Raymondpersonal records, courtey of hisfamib.
To top it all, he said I could have the oliv trees on the land I real thought he wasjoking,
these trees wore enough to make ten tanks of oil, that was a lot of mon~y but be actually
meant it [...]. The cow was vey productiv, but that was not what be cared for; he just
wanted to look at it, be thought it was a prety cow [...]. Importantpeople came to visit him
from all the area and he would rceive them on his balmony that overlooked the garden where
he bad all these animals. [...] He would send the cow's milk to friends or to the poor in the
area; he didn't even bother with sellig it [...]. He was the father of all the poor; he made a
lot of mone, in the thousands "#i 1."
Part of the social image Abu Raymond built was directly tied to his business. To begin
with, Abu Raymond had access to land in a traditional context where land is unavoidably
associated with wealth and social standing. Furthermore, Abu Raymond had a wide practice and
many connections in the local construction sector (controlled then by the mediators, see below),
which meant he could help people find employment, another sign of good standing. In addition,
the fact that people owed him money gave him importance in the neighborhood. Finally, in the
way he conducted business, Abu Raymond was able to build a positive reputation that would
serve'his social image: He was known as a "man of his word" who rarely defaulted and never
cheated on the areas he sold. His clients explained that they could easily trust him since "he had
sold all the land around here, so it was safe to purchase land from him"."? This is not to say that
Abu Raymond never defaulted. There were instances where mistakes occurred (e.g. one lot
promised to two different persons, etc.). However, very few people knew these stories in the
neighborhood and by and large, his clients remembered him for his generosity and his
straightforwardness.
Building Networks
As described above, Abu Raymond already benefited from networks that tied him to
property owners in the area, and, via-Hajj Hamad, to potential clients. Many of his efforts,
during this phase, were therefore geared towards creating networks with public agents and
important political figures, and it is only through them that he managed to organize and secure
his market transactions.
The role of networks with public agencies in furthering one's interests has not escaped
the political science literature in the Middle East. In her research on informal networks in Egypt,
18 Interview held with NLyef in his house in Hayy el Sellom, on June 6, 2003 in the presence of his wife and several
children and grandchildren.
19 This is further discussed in Chapter 5.
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Figure 3-6(a): Abu Raymond, personal
appointment book, which mentions a
meeting in Beiteddine, in the House of
Prince Talal Arslin (Member of
Parliament, old feudal lord), in the
presence of Walid Jumblit (important
political figure of the region era and old
feudal power), Sheikh al-'Akl (Highest
Druze religious authority), and others.
Source: Abu Raymond personal records, courtesy
of hisfamiy.
Figure 3-6(b): Letter heard for
notary public, Joseph Na'im
Source: Abu Raymondpersonal records,
courtesy of hisfamily.
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Singerman describes the concept of dsitah or mda'fah that refers to personal contacts created
with actors within public agencies in order to improve access to publicly distributed goods and
subsidies and facilitate some of the tasks facing families in need of processing papers, amidst a
poor bureaucratic system (Singennan 1995). In Lebanon, just like in Egypt, wdrtab refers to the
ability of someone to shift or modify regulations in order to privilege a particular course of
events that can improve his/her individual standing. In the case of Hayy el Sellom, Abu
Raymond relied on a very wide set of wdstabs that he carefully built over the course of the years
in which he managed his land sales in this neighborhood. Such networks with the state should
not be seen as a strategy of penetrating the "legal realm", or the result of a choice between
operating "legally" or "illegally" as several studies of informal markets and developers have put it
(De Soto 2000, Bemer 2001a & 2001b). They rather illustrate the old developer's ability to co-
opt small sections of the state (Heyman 1999) that could facilitate his illegal practices. Here are a
few examples of how Abu Raymond went about this task.
First, Abu Raymond purchased the protection of the local police station. We know from
accounts of his own family and clients that the old developer regularly bribed the head and
members of the nearby police station with fruit harvested in the neighborhood and/or
percentages on every illegal construction. The developer sold this "protection" to his clients, as
part of the "housing package" they were purchasing. Such "protection" often replaced the need
for legal building permits since the sole enforcing authority, the police station, had pledged to
protect the practices of the old developer and close its eyes when the same building permit
circulated on an entire lot.
Second, Abu Raymond helped in setting out a state penetration strategy, once Hajj
Hamad H's nephews sought employment as clerks in planning agencies. The elder, Mohamed H,
in the Ministry of Public Works and the younger, Fawzi, a few years later, in the then newly
instituted Directorate General of Urbanism (the highest town planning agency at the time). The
H brothers were to insure the important link of the old developer with the state: providing
building permits, when these were needed. They secured the necessary connections with
engineers whose signature was legally required on any building permit, devised tricks in their
capacity as public sector servants to bypass legal requirements, and soon established themselves
a business providing building permits in the neighborhood."
2o Chapter 4, The Informal Public Sector, describes this process in detail
Third, Abu Raymond played the election card. One cannot claim that Abu Raymond's
standing rested on swaying a large electoral base. Indeed, he lived in a suburban context, where
most residents were rural migrants having political, economic, and social linkages to their villages
of origin where they voted and no political representation in the city (Chapter 2). However, Abu
Raymond took part of this practice. The developer facilitated the official residency transfer of a
number of migrant families (the H family and others) to Choueyfat where their votes could
influence the results of local elections. Furthermore, he had good relations with landowners,
many of whom were his partners and began to trust his judgments. Having then a hold on a
number of voters allowed the old developer entrance in the political scene and initiated a process
by which he could create some pressure on local authorities or obtain some services for the
area.21
Thus, Abu Raymond became acquainted with a number of important political figures
that helped in providing services, "protecting" his business, and maintaining his social standing.
In the late 1960s, when one of the property owners provided an introduction to the son of the
first Lebanese president, the then General Director of Tourism (Michel el-Khoud2i), Abu
Raymond did not hesitate to organize a formal reception for this visitor. "He distributed shot-
guns to all of us and instructed us to shoot in the air, 40 shots, as soon as the "Minister" went
out of the car, explains Abu Mehdi, one of the oldest mediators in the area. So we did, [...] and
two weeks later, we had asphalt on the streets!"' 3 In his notes of the period, one can also find
references to important figures whose phone numbers were listed or again reminder notes the
developer scribbled to remember scheduled meetings with some of them (see figures 3-5, 3-6).
A Monopolistic Housing Market
The processes of institution tapping, networking, and building an image were not
separate. In fact, they fed on each other considerably. As Abu Raymond's ability to control the
police station grew, for example, so did his image in the neighborhood, and his respectability...
and along with them the number of clients.
21 This is not to say that this was Abu Raymond's central strategy. It however did have an impact in the few times
when municipal elections were, for example, held in the country, which are limited historically to three instances.
22 The son of the first Lebanese President, Michel el-Khouri was also a journalist and later Director General of
Tourism. This is a significant "network" for the old developer because the Khouri and other few families made a
clan that controlled the countries' political economy for decades. For more, see Trabulsi (1993).
23 Interview held with Hajj Mehdi in his house in Hayy el Sellom on July 20, 1999.
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Over time, an entire network of social relations tightly connected to public actors (e.g.
police station, low-level planning agents, and political figures) created the basis for a housing
market that was monopolized with all its linkages (e.g. construction labor, materials, permits) by
Abu Raymond and a number of his partners. The developer controlled tightly how land was
procured and sold, as well as how it was purchased by prospective homeowners through Hajj
Hamad and a number of other intermediaries.
Furthermore, linkages were gradually consolidated with Spiro Saab -the son of Abu
Raymond- and Mohamed Hamad H -the son of Hajj Hamad-trading construction materials
together. As of the mid 1960s, the 15-year-old Spiro Michel Saab initiated a business selling
construction materials from the nearby quarries in Kfarchimi or loading sand for construction
from the sea shores of the Beirut southern suburbs nearby. He sold construction materials on
credit to newcomers who had just purchased land from his father and gave them exceptional
facilities, benefiting from his father's networks and securities. By 1970s, he and Mohamed
Hamad H teamed up to open a stone cutting factory in the neighborhood (that still operates
until today). Their only competitor was Mohamed H, Hajj Hamad's nephew, who by then had
resigned his employment in the Ministry of Public Works to invest his full-time in the
construction business.
Moreover, by the mid 1960s construction became the guarded turf of a few asmt•. These
intermediaries soon acquired social standing and visibility in the. neighborhood, as we will see
below. Here is how one of these builders who later became an important developer, Abu Medhi,
described the process:
We, the [X], and a fw otherfamilies... We conIrold the neighborhood al the wny to the
Chougfit aley. Here, then wre no other big tribes like East Beirut such as the Z'ayer
or Msbeik [vry lae trinbes fom the Biqa' VallAy. The Zaytr fam controlled three
settlevents in the Eaterw suburbs of the capital. The tnf ws ours. We sold some
50,000#/ in the area! [.We wr• atd'ey pmawnsig othenr fiom penatrndi g the mawket
If it wer someone an knew, such as Mohamed H or Mobhaed F, we xvldd not ob'et to
his role. But if a stranger tried to interns, we would ml=ediat# outbid bim; we paid a
bgher price for the land and droe him out. No one could beat as Athb the prics and take
oer our market. [...] Besides, pople aw poor and the price of land was har to matcb.
[...] It was not y for a stranger to play the oe of the deaIper. [...] I was not so poor
when I arriz I owned a fock of sheep in the illage that I sold befor I came bee, so I
bad 800LP upon aff 4 and that xws considered a lot ofsoneY. Sa'eddedin [the formal
developer from Beirut] did not last long in the business; aM soon wre able to handle the
market ithbout bim. We also kne the byers, and that was the most iportantfC factor.
2 Interview held with Hajj Mehd in his house in Hayy el Sellom on une 16, 2003.
Figure 3-7(a): Personal "to do list" written by
Abu Raymond. The note carries a reference
for the notary, Mr. Nalm, and several
reminders for scheduling appointments and
following up on planting a lot
Abu Raymond's records contained many
similar notes.
Soruw: Aba' Rqamond puoualn nsr, cmary of
his famib
Figure 3-7 (b): Personal "to do list" written
by Abu Raymond.
Soman: Ab, Raiymndpmrsonal rmonr, snrauy of
hisfamij
Figure 3-7 (c): Scribbled name of the
assistant to the head of the police station in
'Amrussiyeh (where Hayy el Sellom falls), as
if to remind the developer of the name of
this person.
Somre: AbI Ra~yodpronal r&onrds coxrnV of
bis fami
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The police force guaranteed the monopoly on the land market. police forces could be
used to prevent anyone from building if s/he had bypassed the actors in charge of this place.
Here is how one of the clients remembered the process:
Abu Raymond would come with the mediator/builder direct. In our neighborhood,
Mahmoud Isma'il was in charge. [...] Abu Raymond arrived with him when sales men
about to happen and the sale was conditional to the client accepting that Mahmoud builds
the house. Of course, he would say that Mahmoud had access to good materials and workers
and be was wiling to provide crdit for constrction [...]. Thean Abu Raymond gave his
client a building pernit validforffteen days and acceptable to the poicepatroL2' If ou did
not show this permit to the poice patrol, it would preventyou from building [...]."
Other clients looked at this phase with less indulgence:
Thbgey did a kind of mafia. Abu Raymond and Haqy Hamad were at least honest. The
others fooledpeople andprotected themselves.27
In this pattern, Hayy el Sellom continued to grow with increasing numbers of
intermediaries (wasits). It was inevitable that by the early 1970's, Hajj Hamad and a few wasits
started their own land subdivision businesses. Clearly, the city authority could no longer rebuke
Abu Raymond alone for Hayy el Sellom's growth. As the number of land sub-dividers grew, the
authorities did not even know their names. The political protection of the area by various
political groups had also increased by then.
When the civil war broke out and Beirut was divided into two belligerent sections, Abu
Raymond found himself in a difficult situation. As a Christian whose house in Hayy el Sellom
fell under the control of Muslim militias, Abu Raymond's visibility played against him. As the
civil war escalated, Abu Raymond had to leave his house in Hayy el Sellom and he moved to the
eastern section of Beirut, which was then controlled by Christian militias.2 He did not terminate
all his business ties to Hayy el Sellom, however, his son followed up throughout the war. Abu
Raymond kept coming to areas bordering the neighborhood where some residents he had
become close to would still come and meet him.
25 Often, this was a legal permit that would give the police station and the developer protection that was then reused
on the whole plot for all constructions.
2 Interview held with 'Ayda, in her house in Hayy el Sellom on June 6, 2003.
27 Interview held with Sa'id, in his house in Hayy el Sellom on June 18, 2003.
28 With very few exceptions (including some of Abu Raymond's cousins), all Christian families left Hayy el Sellom
and Mrayjeh during the years of civil war. However, Abu Raymond left ahead of everyone else. It is said that his
dealings put him in a vulnerable position vis-i-vis the militias and forced him to run away overnight from the
neighborhood.
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3.C DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE MARKET AND THE RISE OF INFORMALITY
Abu Raymond's exit from Hayy el Sellom marked a
qualitative shift in the housing market. As hundreds of civil
war refugees flooded Hayy el Sellom 29, many previous wasits
became independent land developers. Hajj Abu 'Ali was one
such wasit turned developer. It is by describing Hajj Abu 'Ali's
practices that I try to describe the second phase of informality
in Hayy el Sellom.
3.C.1 Hajj Abu 'Ali
Hajj Abu 'Ali grew up in the Biqa' plain in a poor
farming family."' In 1952, he moved to Beirut, rented a room Figure 3-9: Abu 'Ali
in the nearby suburb of Hadath, and found a job in the Source:As-Safir daily, July 8
1983.
Ghandour candy factory in Choueyfat. Ten years later, in
1962, Abu 'Ali first heard about Abu Raymond from his neighbors in Hadath and traveled to
Hayy el Sellom. He bought land on credit provided by Abu Raymond, built, first, a wooden
shack, and then, three years later, constructed a single room that gradually expanded to a four-
storied building.
When A.bu 'Ali moved to Hayy el Sellom in 1962, he changed jobs and began to work as
a construction worker building homes for other area residents. Soon after, he expanded his
operation, became a building contractor, and hired workers to do the kinds of work he was till
then been doing himself. Abu 'Ali mentioned that this experience was crucial to his eventual
success as a land developer. "I arranged for building permits and other official papers. I dealt
with police patrols, and learned that we could negotiate with them a lot", Abu 'Ali said.
As Abu 'Ali was a building contractor, he came to know Abu Raymond well. Abu
Raymond had referred some of his land buyers to Abu 'Ali. Soon after, some of Abu 'Ali's
relatives from the Biqa' came to Hayy el Sellom, looking for shelter and jobs. Abu 'Ali had acted
as a wasit - an intermediary - between these relatives and Abu Raymond. Today, the
29 See Chapter 2.
30 Hajj Abu 'Ali's story is based on two interviews with the wasit-turned developer in July 15 and August 6, 1999
and on the narratives of three members of his family held in July 1999. All the below quotes of Abu 'Ali are taken
from these two interviews.
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neighborhood where Abu 'Ali lives is named after his family name, in reference to all his
relatives who had purchased land in the same area through him.
3.C.2 Respect and Distrust
Abu 'Ali acknowledged that he learned how to be a land developer by working with Abu
Raymond as a building contractor. "We learned the business from Abu Raymond. He and the
original landowners were Khaxmdt (gentlemen) who visited the area. We opened their car doors,
followed them, helped them, and had the opportunity to observe and learn from them", Abu
'Ali explained. 'What Abu 'Ali and others learned, however, was not just business manners. They
learned that contrary to what Abu Raymond had conveyed to them, he did not own the land;
and that he bribed the property caretakers to stop them from giving the landowners' names to
other prospective land developers. "'We had to pay the property caretakers extra bonus to direct
us towards the real landowners", Abu 'Ali mentioned, as he also reminded me "all the original
landowners were Christians or Druze, like Abu Raymond". "Although we didn't know the
owners, we started a hidden competition with Abu Raymond during the last years of his
monopolistic rule. When the civil war started, and Abu Raymond had to leave, we finally had
the market solely for us", Abu 'Ali noted.
But, even prior to Abu Raymond's exit from Hayy el Sellom - when Abu 'Ali was a wvait
- he was deeply involved in the consolidation of the neighborhood, not only building houses but
also organizing neighborhood groups. For example, in the late 1960s he had helped create a
Residents' Committee of twelve members and headed it for a while. This Committee was
eventually registered as an official neighborhood committee with the Ministry of Interior in the
early 1980s. Abu 'Ali mentioned that, under his leadership, the committee had performed
several tasks, including visiting politicians, lobbying for service delivery, operating trucks for
garbage collection, and even installing a sewer network, illegally, and hooking it to public
networks. Abu 'Ali also mentioned that in performing these tasks, the committee did not rely
upon government agencies. Instead, they went to feudal leaders from their areas of origin and
requested them to put pressure on public service agencies. Various religious groups also
supported the residents and pressured the municipality to provide basic services. As the various
militias began to establish their presence in Hayy el Sellom during the civil war, the residents
asked for their help too. The power of these militias grew significantly during the civil war, in
part, because they were able to get services for the residents.
Abu 'Ali did not disregard all government rules and regulations, however, even when
protected by Amal, the militias in charge of the neighborhood. He continued Abu Raymond's
practice of recording all land transactions at the notaries, and hired a state-accredited
topographer to draw the map and demarcate the land subdivisions. As the maps were drawn,
Abu 'Ali first marked the roads before any plot was sold, and watched carefully that no one built
on the roads.
As the demand for housing increased, however, because of the influx of families
displaced by the civil war and various other military conflicts, Abu 'Ali, as well as the other
developers backed by the militias turned political parties, began to disregard even those
regulations they had voluntarily followed in the past. For example, some developers began to
encroach on public land on the banks of the Ghadlr River, taking advantage of the newcomers
and selling them public land. And, both the developers and the residents began to build bigger
and taller houses, violating regulations that restricted the maximum height of buildings and
maximum floor area ratios. These houses were built primarily for renting to families displaced by
the military conflict who, unlike the earlier migrants from rural areas, sought temporary
accommodations and were neither willing nor able to pay for land.
The demand for accommodation reached such a level that many developers, including
Abu 'Ali, became desperate to procure land. But these new developers did not have the social
connections with the landowners that Abu Raymond employed. As a result, some developers
resorted to coercive practices to force the landowners to sell land. According to one story, still
commonly heard in Hayy el Sellom, a developer had buried a dead donkey on an unsold plot of
land and then informed the landowner- that his land was gradually becoming a Muslim
cemeteryl Scared to lose his lot, the owner, it is said, immediately agreed to sell the land which
was promptly used by the developer to build a multi-storied apartment building.
I asked Abu 'Ali how he reacted to this intensification of illegality, and whether there was
any pressure from the residents for regularization to counter the uncertainty that illegality
created. Abu 'Ali mentioned that he had advised the residents not to press the government for
regularization because he knew that "the government would have abused the people". However,
Abu 'Ali was not against regularization. In fact, he had earlier appealed to militia and religious
leaders seeking their support to secure formal registration papers for the land he had subdivided.
But, such appeals were fruitless. Abu 'Ali then discontinued his effort at regularization through
the formal institutional channels. In fact, he had discouraged other residents from pressuring
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the government for regularization, arguing that since the government was not interested in
helping lower income families, they need not abide by state regulations. Other developers
mentioned that they too did not approach the state for legalization of their properties because
they knew that the costs and amount of paper work required would be prohibitive.
Abu 'Ali thinks that the sheer size of Hayy el Sellom prevented the government from
taking any disciplinary action. "We were so many already by the 1970s that the government
could not kick us all out, or put us all in jail". Moreover, he had the backing of the political
party/ militia groups Ama] and, since the late 1980s, Hizb'Allah, both active in Hayy el Sellom
as service providers." These groups did not encourage the residents in this neighborhood and
elsewhere to seek regularization so they can continue to be the "protectors" of these
communities and serve as the link between the government and the neighborhoods' residents
(Harb 2000).
When asked how he could be successful in business with an unhelpful government, Abu
'Ali responded: "The most important thing in life is sadakab (trustworthiness). If you deal once
with someone, and you prove to be trustworthy, you've established the first point in a positive
chain. Trust and faithfulness are very effective". In this, he is similar to the developers of this
generation who all believed that their good reputation explained their success. Thus, Mohamed
H concluded his description of his own trajectory in Hayy el Sellom with this statement
"Straightforwardness (Istqdmab) always lasts. The way I deal with a client and people is what lead
me to accumulate all the money I could accumulate from the business. And it was a lot!" As for
Abu Medhi, he answered, when I asked him about copies of old subdivision plans: "Maps lie.
My words don't. We used maps in ways that suit us but we never gave our word lightly [...]. I am
walking on a straight path, this is why no one ever hurts me or defaults on me".
3.C.3 The Market Strategies of the Second Generation Developers
Hajj Abu 'Ali, Hajj Hamad H, Hajj Abu Mehdi, and the other members of the second
generation of developers all began their carriers as mediators for Abu Raymond and builders
before they invested in developing lots. Like Abu Raymond, none of these developers was a
professional full-time developer. Instead, they included in a wider web of survival strategies a
new practice of land subdivision and sales that could complement their incomes nicely.
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's See Chapter 2.
Furthermore, and also in line with Abu Raymond, all these developers gained important social
standing that helped them in their practices. Over time, they too became "notables" in the Hayy,
known figures who could provide land and services reliably. The older among them, especially
Hajj Hamad H, were remembered or known by residents as "well meaning people"; "good
doers" who helped them access land. Many among them went to Mecca for pilgrimage and
came back with the rewarding title of Hajj. Some of them, such as Abu 'Ali and Mohamed H,
took up several wives, an important tribal symbol of wealth since one is able to sustain several
houses.
All of these men derived their position as developers from their earlier practice with Abu
Raymond: Mohamed H, for example, became a developer after he worked in the provision of
permits with Abu Raymond and Abu 'Ali and Abu MehdI worked in the neighborhood's
construction industry, others planted land in the neighborhood under his auspices. However,
these men all began from a different social position than Abu Raymond: they were insiders to
the communities where they worked, familiar with its codes, and this position strengthened their
practices. They were only different from their co-residents in the neighborhood because they
had developed networks (notably with public sector actors) and know-how by working with Abu
Raymond and because they had accumulated (a little) more wealth than others.
Throughout the phases, the second generation of developers combined a three fold
institutional strategy, they capitalized on and strengthened their social networks within their own
communities, they sought to penetrate and tap on existing institutions (especially public
agencies), and they built new institutions that could sustain and enlarge their practices. Since they
worked during the juncture phase of the weakening of the state that preceded and went through
the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), their institutional strategies were heavily affected by the
macro-level changes that were transforming the country at the time, as we will see below.
It is first and foremost on social networks, especially family and geographic networks
(and later religious networks) that the second generation of developers built its practices in the
early phase. Members of tight family structures, these developers had established their practice
by offering guarantees on sales to their kin and they knew they could rely on family members to
enforce defaulting contracts, insure compliance to their rule, and transfer information about new
land sales. In fact, many or most of these developers came from the Biqa' rather than the South,
32 Some of these developers are actually members of "clans" or "tribes", that is groups who share a common
ancestry and culture -including models of conflict resolution (tribal law).
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where social structures where traditional tribal structures were more engrained. Family and
village networks as well as institutions transposed through these networks also provided the
reference for the security of many of these agreements, such as subdivision plans, which were
commonly referred to as "amicable land subdivisions" (taqsrdt bobfhyab), in reference to
amicable agreements sealed with trust and guaranteed by tribal honor rather than state
institutions.
As of the mid 1970s, a common religious background (strengthened by the events of the
first years of the civil war) replaced family and village networks in providing transaction security
between members of the same religious group. While religious authorities did not play any role
in securing informal transactions, traditional practices like sealing an agreement by swearing over
the Koran were sometimes described. Several old developers also indicated that when they were
about to collect money (for services or other), they would assemble partners and swear over the
Koran that they would follow the entire process honestly.
Social networks were also necessary for these developers to establish contacts with
property owners and access land. To do so, many developers relied on the social relations they
had developed with property owners through their years of residence in the Hayy (often via Abu
Raymond). For example, Abu Mehdi who had harvested the olive grove of a family for years
convinced them to enter in partnership with him and sell their land. Other developers relied on
old Christian residents of the area who agreed to play the role of mediators with property
owners in exchange for percentage shares of profits, reversing the trend set by Abu Raymond.
Most of these mediators were old residents of Mrayjeh who were well known in the suburbs of
Beirut, and they were willing to cross the demarcation lines dividing Beirut in order to organize
such sales and make some profit.
Second,, the second generation of developers continued the practice of tapping on public
agencies initiated by Abu Raymond and building on these institutions to secure their informal
practices. They continued to manage a tight relation with the police station, especially during
periods of relative calm when public agencies were attempting to regain control over the physical
development of the area because infractions to building codes had increased with the scarcity of
land and the emergence of a rental market that dictated vertical expansion. This is evidenced in
the narratives of many residents who had built their homes during this second phase: police
bribe rates were quoted for every slab and protection from police force was clearly bought
through well-known agents. Here is how one of these developers, Abu Mehdi, described the
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situation:
It wxa not ahys easy witb the darak (Polic). One timr, a new peson was appointed as
the head of the headquarers police sation in Fourn el Shebbak and be decided to send a
new parol to this nesghborhood and pment all cotrstiruon [...]. I rs in a bind then, I
absolute needed to pour a slab for a client so I had to devise a srateg. When the bys
animd, I inkited them to a frsh rstaurant andprolonged the stay in the ntaurant [...]. By
the timewm as back, my men had poured the slabs [...]. The boys nre angry, but I gae
them 5OLP each and coninced tfem that it as too late now to do anything about the
construdion! [...]33
Another resident who had married into a developers' family explained the procedure:
Bribes don't stop at the ledl of the man who somer to collet them. Each is b•ying the silene
of his suprior and pris varied with the strength of the appoined head of the enal pokla
station. The bribes also changed with the strength of these men.M
One builder who had worked for a long time for one of the developers of this
generation, emphasized how blatant policemen were about bribes:
It is not like it was a secrt. I wxrked with Aba Hmssein for 20 years, fiom 1968 until
1988, and his practic elied on his social rlions, the peopkle he knew, eecia the
poliame who e bribed en in front of eeryone. [....] Th• had a fixed rate y
constrution sit; it used to be 100LP for verY site when we began [...]. Somedibes, they
would t to play tricks, and after they cash farm somebod, the V ould send otherpolak sen
a few days later who ronld pretnd that thy non not paid the dues yet. They had gunsr,
thmatenedpeople [...]. You needed the delopers to deal with them [...].3s
Another old resident summarized the relation of the developers to the police:
Abu Touftq [Hajj Hamad H] as the engine of the poli station rits be was the person
in control... he was also a x y important builder and deselop&r.
Protection from the police was even more consolidated through the offices that were
established by the H brothers, notably Fawzi, who soon began to issue his own construction
permits that provided clearance from the police:
All w bad to do was install proper arrangements with evey new bead of t• station.
All of them smo after mon~, and all of them lef bhes a gar in the mota! [...] In tXe
beginnin w had an arrangement with poicamen. Tbhy vould stop anyone building and tell
him or her that thj 6 needed a constrcaion permit that thy could obtain through my offlc
3 Interview held with Hajj Mehd! in his house in Hayy el Sellom on June 16, 2003.
m Interview held with Hajj Nisser, in his store in Hayy el Sellom on June 18, 2003.
" Interview held with Hamnd (arrived in the early 70s), in his house in Hayy el Sellom, on May 12, 2003.
36 Interview held with Habiba, on July 11, 1999.
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So all the dients would ome to me and I wuld gi thbm a penit on a nglar piw of
paper tat I ied and tal dle to shov it to thepoat so tb !caBin bV ilWng bfurm
proedma is fnihod Sometims, I amed do a fonralpermit but mon fj then no4 I
would cha& e ath for te piece ofpaper. PrfiT mt shanrd 50-50 bhawen te poli and37
It is however not clear that the relation with the police was always harmonious. There
were times when policemen asked for prohibitive fees that exceeded those of a regular building
permit (that could be by then anyway impossible to get) so the developers resorted to public
agencies in order to reduce-olicemen fees.
I wauld do ten permitsfor a lot that had owr 40 houes and then penmit would cirdake
beteen& o boea. It s• a measr to cut ats on the bribus to the poi station. Thb wnre
asking for too ma!bl [...] v
At one point, whAi I sws an mibyee of the TanWri [Directorate General of
Urbanism], a wusarplan asw draw and apprmwd for ths iomalJ sbdirizo of a gy
large lot so that it Iegal rAeirements [see Chapter 4]. On the basis of thisrplan,
the DGU ga residends gal buid%,igperitr. [...] Ween mxade pie of thir master
plan in reswm, wbich xr possible boseaw enginers umed *nresan~tp paer We cnEfused
the po&mewan abo didn't know how to read a map pnpenr and were able to nase the sW.
permrit on seeral lots. Thbs DGU map as osy uqsfl to as bmraue, ulke our own
subdivision plans that shoed the ruads w ikformfaly twognigm on the lot, the DGU plan
bad no rad&. The polaiamn could not read naps without roads; thqy wre cfid... bt
thV saw the DGU tamp on Mtse maps so th sould not ramke them [...]!
As these stories attest, the relation to the police station was key in these developers'
strategies. It allowed them to perpetuate their practices despite municipal pressures to stop the
development of the neighborhood.
These developers also took further Abu Raymond's strategy of penetrating public
institutions in order to gain work and authority. In their capacity of public agents, they managed
to deviate the public services that formed the basis of their business. These will be described in
detail in the next chapter.
Third, the new generation of developers resorted to creating new institutional structures
through which they strengthened their social position in the neighborhood hierarchies.
37 Interview with FawPr H, held in his home in Hayy el Sellom in Hayy el Sellom on May 14, 2003.
3 Interview with Mohamed H., in his office in Hayy el Sellom on April 15, 2003. I had conducted another interview
with Mohamed H. on March 30, 2003 in his house. All the following quotes are taken from these two interviews.
39 Interview with Fawz! H, sp ia.
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The developers organized a neighborhood committee (fineh) that included originally
twelve members representing the main family and village groupings of the neighborhood and
grouped under its umbrella the sub-neighborhood committees formed earlier among family and
village members. This was in 1970-1971. "We had six members from the South and six members
from the Biqa' ", explained Mohamed H, one of the committee members and a prominent
developer in the neighborhood. Most if not all the men were from large families and tribes. "I
represented my family, he added, because I was the head of the family league"." The committee,
officially in charge of neighborhood services, undertook over the years important service
delivery tasks such as garbage collection, the installation of self-help sewer lines in the entire
neighborhood (hooked directly to the Ghadir river and to the main airport line), and other
municipal services to the point that residents came to refer to it as our "munialiaty" or "the Ha.y
el Sellom popular municipaliy". The committee also undertook the construction of the first mosque
and the husseyniyah (meeting hall near the mosque in the Shi'ite tradition) and established a
Muslim cemetery in the neighborhood. In order to finance its activities, the committee
essentially relied on the collection of monthly fees from all residents. However, there were times
when the committee also appealed to the municipality for equipment, such as during the
installation of sewer networks when the municipality agreed to finance some of this process in
kind." At other times (during the years of war), the committee also resorted to less orthodox
ways, stealing material if there were no other means. Thus, when the installation of sewer
networks in one of the sub neighborhoods coincided with some construction works in the
airport nearby, the committee dispatched a few men to steal a number of pipes and install them
in the neighborhood. In several instances, when potholes rendered the neighborhood streets
unbearable, the committee also organized the hijacking of trucks of asphalt going through the
nearby Old Sayda Road in order to use their material in their neighborhood. Here is how one of
the committee members remembered the process:
During the war [1975-1990], our neighborhood committee provided all the services: water,
garbage collection, sewers, and even road pavement. We used to send militiamen to stop the
state trucks carrying asphalt on the old Sqyda road, East of the neighborhood, to deviate
their contents to the Hay and pave our roads. The state did not care, we had to do
40 Interview with Mohamed H, op cit.
41 Based on written correspondence between the Municipality and the committee, provided by a member of this
committee.
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somting about it.
We also prmide our on watr. We dug our oxw swlls. We hae at least 450 aelsr in the
nsaghbeorbodo '
In 1990, the committee also mobilized for the establishment of the 'Amrussiyeh or Hayy
el Sellom municipality, independently of Choueyft. Like other areas in the southern suburbs
where the process of urbanization and rural migration gradually transformed old villages into
suburbs and lead to the creation of new municipalities earlier in the 1960s (see Khuri 1975), the
committee hoped to create its own municipality-
We tied to mobigl mith the &d4pau of Ba Ilbak to bhe# saLIat a nAm2n(l y in HqY
d Sedlo. The Chaoyft mrunixkay did not want toprovide s ith the quind sen~cm;
wo brk & sers at wor copmes so w might as welbha oer o"n muinapak. .. ] But
ws bam not bee able to do it.
Membership in the committee was prestigious and over the years, all the developers I
interviewed claimed to have headed the committee for a while. The committee also got involved
in boundary disputes, social affairs, and the protection of property in order to avoid the
development of squatters (like elsewhere in the suburbs) and hence a loss of market Here is
how one of them, Hajj Abu Mehdi, remembered it:
Towards t bginning of t& dil war (1974), the stat swr ery &ak and ts bhecmw tA
state in tde nehborood... sw formed a comnitte (lunb) in Hay dl Seloas ithb
ersentateim fium sevrrlfamilke [...]. We ws Are tA depsetsi of h nghborbod and
nothing happened in the • ighborbood cod•t sing • [•... We wen intened in
marital dipxr . [-..] We also proacd t nshboerodfrm squating [this is why
Hayy el Sellom did not witness the same squatting we see elsewhere]. IfVayone
trid to take land byfrim, or sd alsomethin,& w beat aths p or we sent tn to the poai
sttion when a had connetions. Our x&wd ws wr important her. [...] The ommittAe
also ~srked on urban sernai . If a wa~trpoe leake4 or a sewar i w bkorked/ as knew
whbo to ask to fix it. 45
The developers also created local offices for the political party Amal. Changing political
and military forces on the ground, especially the mounting forces of active militia groups and the
weakness of the state pushed the developers to pledge allegiance to the strong Shi'ite political
4 Interview with Fawz H, ap t.
43 Interview with Hassan, a small developer in Hayy el Sellom, on July 30, 1999.
4 Interview held with Mr. Mohamed H, sp i
4s Interview held with Hajj Abu Mehd, * at.
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party at the time, Amal." The developers instituted an office for the party in the neighborhood
and thus insured access to weapons and services in order to prevent other parties, notably the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), from taking control over the area.' Here is how Abu
Mehdi narrated it
The Palestinians [meaning the PLO] bad rented an offi and th wwn pmiding
seices [..]. So te men stared to talk about acratng a Eouatfr-frm. Membe of the H
fami , A ke Mohbame and a few othme came ly and thy asked me what I thought of
making a local office for th Amral Mownent, or the Musa al Sadr Mommnet as it was
know then. We met for about four months without anything happening but when men
from the Progmrssi Sodalist Part (PSP) (to be know later as the Dmr militia) came to
the eighborbood and stawsd setting up a bealh nter to cxtnd their infljuene hlre, w
knew wi had to sto hem [..]. No, no PSP here [..]. So e emovd quickv, w rxnted two
rooms friv a wvoman in Hay el Nabrfor 100LP and e instituted the Amdal fiar in
Hq l d Sellom... After that, w mated networ*s with Armal and they Vould send us
weapons (what thy called the Abu d Dakn), and w fought and we sn.. - We protted
the Hay.
This narrative was repeated by others, such as Abu 'Ali who retained his membership to
Amal, but also by members of the H family who recalled how they held a festival for Sayyed
Musa al-Sadt, the prominent Shi'ite cleric and founder of Amal. This is how 'Ali Fawzi H (the
grandson of Hajj Hamad) described it
It was around 1976. We bad a big rwption for the SqVed in mu grandfathers hous It
was a political rally with oeybody from the H joining in. We raisd funds for his
movoment as well as for the onstruwion of a mosque, a gathering s.pa bussynyab and
landfor a Cmetery. We pledged allegiane to his movswnst qf sodialjstie. 49
Next to protection from police forces or the threat of other militias taking over the
neighborhood, this new allegiance provided them with access to special services and subsidies
(such as fuel) when they became a rare commodity during the war, or others.
Amal did not remain throughout the civil war, however, an internal movement to the
neighborhood, controlled by its developers. Later, when the war raged, Hayy el Sellom's position
at the boundaries between Western and Eastemrn sections of the city gave the area a strategic
46 See Chapter 2 for more details about this (and other) political parties in the area.
4 The 1969 Cairo treaties gave the Palestinian Liberation Organization, as of 1969, de-facto free weapon circulation
in the country. See El-Khazen (2000).
4 Interview held with Hajj Abu Mehdi&, p it
49 Interview held with 'All H at the Choueyfait Municipality on May 7, 2003.
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military role that required members of the national party Amal to come and establish offices in
the neighborhood. However, most of the old developers kept good relations with them,
especially that the central Amal bureau militiamen did not engage in any land sales activities in
the neighborhood. To the contrary, the old developers sought to prevent the spreading of illegal
squatting in Hayy el Sellom (as was happening elsewhere in the suburbsS), and their allegiance
with members of central Amal (who were otherwise encouraging such practices elsewhere in the
city) allowed them to retain this control sl
We xorked a &ttk with the members of Amal whben thy came, as thy bad subdiided the
ne;ghborbood in several subsetions and our committee coordinated withb them. Thby did not
realy prmvide seres or played an important rok in the ndghborbood It was more of a
'JMrotefion " thing.5"
The circulation of methods and practices between the political party Amal and the
neighborhood committee is clear in several of their common practices, such as the division of
the neighborhood in seven main sub-areas that corresponded to the same sub-neighborhoods
used by the families (figure 2-14).'
During the second phase of growth, the Hayy el Sellom housing market became
undeniably more inclusive and more dynamic. It however did not become, in any count, an easy
entry market. Even such simple steps like adding a few stories on one's building for renting out
(or selling) had to be condoned by the committee, and committee members had to pave the way
in these practices before others followed. This was in part due to the nature of the product: the
construction business required assets, including capital, networks with public agents, and a large
family base that can help in procuring clients and insuring security. Members of the second
generation of developers had acquired these assets from their earlier activities and it was building
on that history that they were able to base their new practices. Moreover, these developers
continued to hold strong forward and backward linkages between each others' practices,
strengthening old market ties developed under Abu Raymond in order to procure construction
materials, building permits, or labor.
50 See chapter 2.
5s The exact details of this process were very difficult to collect, especially because the second generation of
developers liked to boast about "their" control of the area, while former Amal militiamen positioned in the area
were difficult to interview, because of a number of reasons (see Chapter 1, Methodology section).
s2 Interview held with Mr. Mohamed H, op dc
53 These are: Hibberiyyeh, Hayy el Zahra', Hayy el Maktab (Office, in reference to Amal's office), Hayy Kan'in,
Hayy el Zahra', Hayy el Jadid, and Hayy el Mawqif el Qadim.
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The closed nature of this market was double edged. On the positive side, it perpetuated a
system of accountability that goes a long way in explaining why to-date no building fell down in
Hayy el Sellom: "Most of the contractors and builders in Hayy el Sellom had worked with me
before. They were all residents of Hayy el Sellom. They were attached to the neighborhood and
could therefore not make mistakes. If a ,nmal&m (master builder) makes a mistake, you can go
and get him from his house", explained Mohamed H. 'This is why we never really needed
engineers. People knew they had to be accountable", he added. On the down side, this closeness
allowed developers to protect each other and they all refused to check on each other's work.
Thus, when a number of developers began to dupe their clients, mostly by cheating with
measurement,e4 none of the developers was willing to arbitrate and denounce them. Here is how
one of the builders, a resident of Hayy el Sellom, explained the process:
While Abs Raymond and Ha. Hamad comwed a dra' into 9/16 of a meter
systematicaly, the later delopers staed equating the dra' to 0.48# or 0.30, cheating
thdr cdiAs [..]. Ox# when p le compared their lots and saw the incoiteny did thy
?rali thy had been cheaed [..]. Some tried to appeal to the engineers, bt the latter
wmould near come. Even Mohamed H who never ceated and knew bow to take awmam
measurements refusd to bhe them out. He did not like to le but be also wat tied with the
solidari to other dealopers so bejust aMided coming-."
Nonetheless, the control of the market did not rely solely on prohibitive costs and
solidarity networks. In some instances, competition was faced with violent reactions on the side
of the developers, now backed by militias. One old resident described how bringing builders
from his native village became a source of trouble:
When it caue to constacion, I had a lot of rlations in g village so I inied a master
builder flom my bomeown while others on the same lot brmght builders fiom Haqy d
Sello [...]. The builders of Hay dt Sdelo, howb er wantod to impose themsekes as the
on builders. They had some form of committe of 'antarktyh " and thy tried to show
off..Abu AR nwu very a•ggress and took out a gun on us saying that be was Ae builder
and no other. He even arranged that the steel that was brought by the master builder I hired
be stolen stop ny bik ng [...].7.
" The most common method of defaulting was selling changing the area of the dra', the widely accepted surface
measurement in the arme. Since tides were in square meter, the official method of measurement, the developer could
simply alter the conversion of dra' to meter and dupe his client until the sale was concluded.
ss Interview held with Said, old builder and resident of Hayy el Sellom in his house on June 18, 2003.
" 'Ataqjuh cannot be easily translated into English. The word refers to Amasr, the hero of an Arab epic who was
known for his courage and strength. Pajiqg 'Astar or 'Aaimarpr~ are common expressions in colloquial language
used to signify that someone claims and projects more physical strength than they actually have.
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Also, and throughout this phase, the police station continued to play the same role it did for
Abu Raymond, insuring a last safeguard for the protection of these developers' business:
[...] When we built in 1976, then was a clear agreement between a number of master
bilders/ developers and thepolic. Ifyou wanted to build hb , you bad to hin the builders
from hem Thy would then take over and buildfor you. [...] The mastar builder wouldjust
make one pemitfor a large lot and use it to buildfor evrybody on the lot. He was proteced
[...]. The also providedpaymentfaditi•es, thy would build and then later cash in month#
installments that sometimes extanded over two years. This is what th gave me. [...] Over
time, the police prices became unbelievabkle. It reached US $4,000 during the 1990s
construction boom.sW
[...] Towards the end of the 1980s, my son who was getting marnied wanted to build an
additional floor above our house. He went to one of these denlopers who charged him a huge
sum for 100#/. He then went and looked for another building who was willing to build for
half the price but as soon as that builder arrivd, the police was hen and thy stopped the
construction. One of the policemn explained to us that we could still build but it had to be
the local builder [...]. The local builders and the policemen are in it together, thy "liw"
together, we could not afford to pay all this mong for the police so we stopped all constrution
and instead my son rented a house in the neighborhood [...]."
3.D THE POST CIVIL WAR BOOM
With the end of the Civil War in 1991, Hayy el Sellom entered a third phase of change
and development which is captured here by focusing on yet another developer, Mr. 'Abdel
Raouf Darwish, who personifies a new type of developer who replaced Abu 'Ali and his like as
the housing market took a new turn.
3.D.1 'Abdel RaoufDarwish and the 'Abbis Complex
One can recognize from the name that Mr. Darwish is "an outsider", not from Hayy el
Sellom. He is neither a Hajj, nor an Abu -- the two colloquial terms people of Hayy el Sellom
use to refer to senior male area residents. Few know for sure where Mr. Darwish came from.
His name indicates that he is a Shi'ite Muslim; and that evokes some legitimacy but not strong
allegiance among Hayy el Sellom's residents. They refer to him simply as "Darwish", and
mention that he never went to school, implying that he does not descend from a respected
a Interview with Hajj Mustafa, in his house in Jamiliyyeh (near Ba'albak), on April 20, 2003.
5 Interview held with Hajjeh Zaynab, in her house in Hayy el Sellom on June 12, 1999.
-" Interview held with Hajjeh Mariam, in her small store in Hayy el Sellom, on June 18, 2003.
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family, and, hence, the source of his wealth may be somewhat dubious. They also mentioned
that he had been involved in several other businesses, notably importing shoes, and that he was
attracted to the lucrative business of housing construction after the civil war, at the time when
this sector was booming, even though he had no previous experience in building. In the first
years after the civil war, he was involved in two or three construction projects in the vicinity
before he initiated his project in Hayy el Sellom.n
Mr. Darwish is the developer of Madinat al-'Abbis (al-'Abbis City), a huge housing
complex of 21 blocks, 535 apartment units, and 220 shops, which was built in Hayy el Sellom in
only two years (1994-1996) (figures 2-15(a) and 2-16(a)). The land on which Madinat al-'Abbis
is built was the last agricultural plantation left inside Hayy el Sellom. Although privately owned,
the plantation used to serve as the only public open space in Hayy el Sellom until the
construction of the new housing complex. A large section of this same piece of land had been
marked for the construction of a highway that was planned in 1973 and approved in 1983.61
Madinat al-'Abblis was built as a joint venture between Mr. Darwish and the landowner. The
landowner was to be paid from the benefits gathered from the apartment sales, earning a profit
much higher than she could have made had she simply sold the land.
Mr. Darwish had initially obtained a building permit for the housing complex submitting
a design that complied with existing rules.2 This had allowed him to secure cash advances from
the bank for the project There are also rumors that he mostly secured the finances because of
his personal connections within the bank owner, via the political party Amaal. 3 When it came to
construction however, Mr. Darwish did not follow the guidelines of his building permit, he built
a denser complex than is legally mandated.
Mr. Darwish did not work entirely outside the previous developers' networks. He relied
for getting a building permit on the services of Fawzi H, the same commissioner who held an
office for building permits in Hayy el Sellom for the last 30 years. He also followed many of the
60 This was common in the Lebanese post-war construction where the lucrative construction business was one of
the most attractive sectors for investors in the 1990s. A 1999 study of the Lebanese real estate sector estimated that
around 95% of the developers were not professional developers (Aveline 2000).
'1 Chapter 4 describes further the highway.
62 In fact, the design did not entirely comply with rules, since a section of the comple fell inan area zoned as
"industrial". However, the planning agency had somehow "overlooked" this factor (and maybe others).
3 According to the Bank that provided the financing to the developer, the money was disbursed on the basis of
credit forms (known as msad), that is sales agreements in which the clients of Darwish promised regular monthly
payments. It was therefore not an investment loan provided on the basis of a formal bank assessment but rather an
"arrangement" on the basis of Darwish's personal relations and his ability to show potential cash flow.
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same steps taken by the second generation of developers, going through the same notaries, for
example, in order to secure agreements with the landowner and with clients. Mr. Darwish also
knew that he needed the protection of local political parties to whom he made promises and
visible gestures: he named the project Al-'Abbis after a prominent Shi'ite religious figure and
included a mosque and a Husseyniyyah (community meeting place) in the complex to appease
religious groups. He also donated a number of apartments in the complex to Amal, one of the
two locally strong political groups, to earn protection.
Madinat al-'Abbis is such a large housing complex that Mr. Darwish had to create an
advertisement campaign for the sale of apartments in the local newspaper and on the radio."
Like the other developers of this phase, he commissioned the design of a poster showing the
future complex with a swimming pool, large playgrounds, a jewelry market, a school, and other
attractive facilities to prospective clients. He also opened a local office where his agents received
payments from buyers and dealt with his clients who rarely met him in person. Mr. Darwish was
under financial pressure to sell the apartments in order to provide the bank with proofs about
the viability of his project in the form of advance payments from prospective buyers. As
construction proceeded, Mr. Darwish sold in advance all apartments. At the time, the post-war
policies of the Ministry of Displaced were paying indemnities throughout the city in order to
evict squatters and leave way to so-called reconstruction projects and flows of families were
arriving to the neighborhood, looking for housing to buy.6 Like other developers in the
neighborhood, Mr. Darwish knew he could not let go of this opportunity and within six months,
he applied for a permit to build an additional floor on all buildings in the complex that he sold to
these prospective buyers as well. The rate of sales was much faster than earlier housing sales, say
under Abu Raymond, the first developer, who had sold as many plots in nearly 15 years as Mr.
Darwish sold in two.
The turning point in this episode was in 1997 when buyers began to fail to pay their
installments on time. After investing their personal savings, or payments they had received from
the Ministry of" Displaced towards down payments, many families ran out of money, as the
economic boom of the post-war years turned into a bust. Noticing that defaults in payments
were increasing, Mr. Darwish began to sell the same apartment to more than one buyer,
64 A survey of over 100 large-scale complexes in the suburbs of Beirut in 1997 indicated that Madinat al-'Abbis was
one of the largest among them (Katkhouda 1997).
65 This is notably the case for the families evicted from Beirut old city core who now constitute 30% of the residents
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planning to transfer the apartment to whoever paid the full amount first, and retain part of the
advance payments made by the other buyers as a penalty for the delay." However, even this
arragement did not generate the cash flow Mr. Darwish had hoped for. As a result of large-
scale default by prospective buyers, Mr. Darwish himself defaulted on his bank loan and was
imprisoned for a few months.
Today, Mr. Darwish is in an extremely difficult situation: some of his clients have filed
complaints against him at the "National Office of Complaints" at the Presidential Palace opened
in the late 1990s to offer citizens recourse in times of trouble because they were dissatisfied with
the quality of the apartments they had purchased or because he had allocated the apartment he
had sold them to other buyers. These apartments had developed serious plumbing problems
soon after construction had ended; and deep cracks had begun to appear on walls infuriating the
buyers who had paid very high prices for these apartments. These prices perhaps offer the best
indication of the problems of the 'Abbis Complex: while a 3 bedroom sold for US 27,000$ at
the time of the construction of the project and was not much cheaper than any other apartment
of the same size in the far suburbs of Beirut, today the same apartment has lost half its value and
sells at US 15,000$. Despite these price drops, many buyers sold back their apartments when
they could afford to leave the complex.
Mr. Darwish was not able to undertake the promised legal subdivision of the complex
that would entitle his clients to individual property titles in full shares. The multiple illegalities he
committed during the construction process implied prohibitive regularization costs and
prevented him from carrying through this legal procedure. Thus, the residents of Madinat al-
'Abbis now own their houses in property shares, the same way clients of earlier generations of
developers own their lots. In fact, Mr. Darwish has still not registered the legal transfer of these
shares, which renders his clients' ownership status precarious. Finally, the Bank which had
financed Mr. Darwish has taken hold of his properties because he failed to pay back his dues and
is now in charge of the building complex.' The Bank has been looking into a method of
legalizing the Madinat al-'Abbis housing complex and transferring property for a few years now.
of the complex according to the records of the developer's assistant.
" In fact, the developer had drafted extremely strict contracts with his clients that allowed him to keep most of the
money and evict them upon default. He however quickly realized that it was impossible to implement such legal
clauses (Chapter 5).
6 Next to the Madinat al-'Abbis complex, the Bank also seized the Zahra' project nearby (in Kfarshima) that Mr.
Darwish was building at the time.
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Today, Mr. Darwish is ill He refused to talk about the 'Abbis project or his construction
business. "I am a sick man", he said, in the sole phone conversation I had with him.6" "This
business has made me ill and I don't want to work in this sector anymore". The developer is
broke and looking for a financial exit.
As for the residents who have purchased houses in Madinat al-'Abbis, they all seem to
regret the purchase. Those who could afford to, have rented out their apartments or sold them
at loss. Others bitterly complained that they had lost their lifetime savings. The transfer of
ownership of Madinat al-'Abbis to a private bank has not altered the feelings about this project
among the (long and short time) residents of Hayy el Sellom. Long-time residents dislike
Madinat al-'Abbis because it contributed, in their view, to increasing the housing density in the
neighborhood and therefore intensifying its environmental problems. They mourn the loss of
"public" open space where children used to play and adults could relax. The residents of
Madinat al-'Abbis also view the project with disapproval Many wished the highway planned to
go right in front of the complex would be executed so it could wipe out some of the houses in
front of them and create "more space to breathe". Some explained, it was part of the
advertisement points they were promised when they bought their apartment, suggesting that the
passage of the highway in front of their houses was perceived as a positive element of the
project. Others even wished the highway to be deviated to go right through the complex so they
could be paid indemnities to go elsewhere. They complained that due to the increasing heights
of buildings overshadowing the area, very little direct sunlight reached lower levels and the
narrow streets which provide the setting for much of the public activities in the community.
The residents complained that lack of sunlight and increased air pollution from additional traffic
were causing respiratory problems among children.
3.D.2 Strategies of the Third Generation of Developers
Mr. Darwish is one of several developers who built large-scale housing complexes in the
post-war era, such as Mr. Baralkt who built 325 housing units at the border of the
neighborhood, Mr. Khanifer who built 150 housing units in the Jawid complex, or again Mr.
68 I also met Mr. Darwish several times in Hayy el Sellom, around the housing complex, when he was coming to
collect parking fees; from the guardian in front of the building. He was always very polite, but systematically refused
to talk to me about the complex or his own trajectory, explaining that his poor health prevented him from thinking
about these issuesl He finally agreed to give me his phone number to set up an apartment in May 2003, but then
refused again to give me an appointment.
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Shahrour who built the Shahrour complex with around 100 apartments (see figure).6"
Like their predecessors, none of these developers is a professional developer with
experience in the construction or housing delivery sector. Rather, they were all versatile
businessmen who had often accumulated some money abroad (either in the Gulf or in Africa,
common Shi'ite immigration destinations) and who, in the post-war real estate boom, gathered
their savings and invested in the then lucrative housing construction market70 However, unlike
the earlier two generations, this last generation of developers is generally better off than the
families to whom they sell houses; they never resided in the neighborhood and were not
accountable to its social structures. In fact, these developers refrained from visiting the
neighborhood once their projects were finished to avoid facing their clients' dissatisfaction and
anger. By then, most of them became known to the residents of Hayy el Sellom as
untrustworthy, whether they purchased housing from them or not. Their social trajectories
therefore reverse those of the two preceding generation of developers: they had begun their
careers impressing everyone in the neighborhood with a display of financial capital and status. A
few years later, they had however fallen from favor and were widely referred to as narsdbin,
dqjdin, or a dozen other colloquial terms used to designate crooks.
Looking closely at the institutional strategies of the third generation of developers, it is
possible to see similarities with the strategies of earlier generations. Indeed, like their
predecessors, these developers relied simultaneously on social and public institutions. However,
these developers had to face a more complex reality of post-war Lebanon, especially prohibitive
costs of land and the domineering role of political parties in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
These factors forced them to create new alliances and partnerships, especially with political
parties and banks, in order to sustain their operations. Here are the details.
First, the third generation of developers appealed to state agencies and public actors in
order to build the necessary credibility and gain the trust of clients and bankers. As outsiders to
69 Among these developers are The Five Wings, a group of developers with an (un-admitted and informal) affiliation
to Hizb'Allah. These developers have built several housing complexes in the suburbs of Beirut, two of them in the
close vicinity of Hayy el Sellom. However, I do not include them in this analysis because their strategies and modes
of operations do not respond to the same patterns of other developers, notably because they do not respond to
market forces the way other developers have to, and because their position vis-i-vis other political parties are also
played out very differently. For more on The Five Wings, see (Bundiers 2002).
70 The Lebanese housing sector is dominated by non-professional, small-scale developers who include housing to a
wider investment portfolio. This is especially the case during the real estate boom of the 1990s that encouraged
investment in the construction sector. But real estate has traditionally attracted important investments in the sector
either from expatriates' funds that find no other channels to place the money or other -sometimes shady- sources
of funding. It is generally believed that only 5% of construction is undertaken by specialized actors (Aveline 2000).
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Figure 3-10 (a): Cover for the pamphlet of Al Ghadir Housing Complex.
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Figure 3-10 (b): Cover for the pamphlet of Al Ghadir Housing Complex.
Figures 3-10: Typical advertisement for large scale housing complexes. On the
top figure (a), the cover announces that the complex is "exemplary" or namouthaji
The plan (b) shows locations for several playgrounds, a mosque, and a school.
124
--· ·--·
" · · ~
i· ;
r7"''
ii
71--s--
I
-- ii--·-
i-·-La,:, :: i^:i i i -·L-`~'-I
1
-I,
·-- ·~...--!-·----:i;
ii1-·i.
· i i
: ·: r ; :"d-.i~.-·····.,i 'frl?"I-·;
*·ir :::_l*,i .L:u·
this commun]ty (like Abu Raymond), they needed to accumulate the necessary state
accreditations, such as building permits, in order to establish a positive image.7 They also all
involved several engineers on their construction sites, as mandated by the law, and often
appealed to lawyers and notaries in drafting "sales contracts" and certifying sales, multiplying
thereby (like their predecessors) emblems of legality and professionalism.n These procedures
generated the necessary securities for prospective clients and debtors who were then willing to
invest in the project. Of the 50 households I interviewed in large complexes, almost all (49)
respondents explained that they trusted the developer because he was "legal" and had shown
them a building permit and a formal property title when they were about to purchase their
apartment."
Second, and unlike the earlier two generations, these developers tapped on private
market institutions, especially banks and advertisement channels, in order to sustain their
businesses. All surveyed developers of this third generation were granted financial facilities from
banks in order to fund their projects. Furthermore, all these developers relied on advertisement
campaigns, such as announcements broadcasted on television and radio and printed in
magazines, in order to attract clients.74 They also all hired the services of private architects (or
draftsmen) in order to develop three-dimensional images of their future complexes and illustrate
to their potential clients the advantages of the projects they were building. These were normal
procedures in the competitive housing market of the 1990s, where developers produced
elaborate pamphlets and billboards describing their projects as "exemplar7s" and promising
amenities and services known to be of prime importance to families (normally these included a
school, a mosque, and a playground and were all almost certainly not to be implemented). For
example, the earliest of these large complexes, the Ghadir Complex that was built just outside
Hayy el Sellom in 1983 (and therefore a very early precursor of this mode of housing) developed
a full-fledge catalog picturing greenery, a number of playgrounds, a wide parking lot, but also a
71 Unlike earlier generations, these developers did not develop informal subdivision plans because they were
building large complexes. In this case, building permits replaced subdivision plans.
2 While most clients considered these "legal" and "state accredited" contracts as important proofs of ownership,
Chapter 5 shows that they in fact disadvantaged considerably the clients and save for the few emblems of legality,
provided them with little securities vis-i-vis developers' defaults.
73 See Chapter 5 for more on household choices.
74 This is not to say that informal channels of information, such as family relations, local grocery stores where
postings were made, relatives who worked in these complexes and similar instances did not play a role. The first
section of Chapter 5 traces the patterns of information circulation.
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school, a medical facility, a multi-purpose hall, a supermarket, and a mosque (figure 3-10).
However, 20 years later, elevators have not been installed, let alone other facilities. Similarly, the
pamphlet of the Jawid Complex promised its future residents a large playground, parking
facilities, and a wide space in front of the building, none of which materialized, and the
pamphlets of the 'Abbis Complex promised a mosque, a swimming pool, a large playground,
parking facilities, a school, and a jewelry arcade, but only provided the mosque. Nonetheless,
these pamphlets had important impacts on attracting clients who heard or saw their
advertisement messages (see Chapter 5).
Third, like their predecessors, the last generation of developers relied essentially on social
relations in order to get through public procedures or access bank loans, because both formal
market structures and public agencies were otherwise inaccessible to them. Mr. Darwish
obtained financial facilities from a bank whose owner shared his trajectory (Shi'ite social and
economic networks in Africa) and his political allegiance to Amal, and it is through this social
network that he was granted money advances, and not a formal bank loan for which his project
would not have: qualified.76 These developers also tried to revitalize old social networks that tied
them remotely -to Hayy el Sellom. Thus, a number of residents mentioned that Mr. Darwish had
held a vegetables stand in the old Mawqif area, at the border of the neighborhood, prior to his
departure to Africa, and that he had then met and known the H family. Hence, Mr. Darwish
obtained his building permit with the help of Fawzi H who followed through the paper
procedures, making sure some of the irregularities were overlooked. Similarly, two of Mr.
Barakit's clients indicated that he had a Money Exchange store in the vicinity if the
neighborhood before he built his complex. When difficulties began to emerge in their projects,
these developers appealed to their old social relations within the neighborhood in order to solve
their problems. Fawzi H. intervened numerous times to solve problems between Mr. Darwish
and his defaulting clients, seeking to arbitrate between them, and the two men even held a short-
lived business partnership." As for relations between developers and clients, they also often
75 Projects are described in Arabic as Namoths .
7' This is especially because the Lebanese Central Bank has imposed severe restrictions on private bank loans for
real estate developments (Aveline 2000).
77 Mr. H managed to provide Mr. Darwish with a permit for a temporary vegetable market on the lot set-back in
front of his building, delivered by the municipality. However, the two men later disagreed on the distribution of
stalls (especially because Mr. Darwish was renting them out to the highest bidder, often Syrian migrant workers who
wanted to open small stores, while Mr. H thought it improper not to favor the old residents of Hayy el Sellom).
After several argmnents between the two men, Mr. H complained to the municipality about the vegetable market
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retreated to social networks after the initial "formal" contracts were signed. Thus, even if
stringent legal measures (prepared by lawyers and accredited by notaries) were setting the client-
developer relation in their early days, these relations often retreated to personal confidence later,
and both parties refrained from going through the legal channels again (Chapter 5).
Fourth, developers had to rely on and deal with local political parties in the
neighborhood. This was a direct impact of macro-political changes on the strategies of the
developers. We have seen in Chapter 2 that the integration in post-war Beirut of Hayy el Sellom
in the southern suburbs of Beirut, or Dihbah,78 imposed the power of three political parties
(Amal, Hizb'Allah, and the Syrian Forces) in the area. These new developers had to account for
these parties and insure their so-called "protection", by allocating them a number of apartments
and/or by providing their partisans lower rates and better payment facilities. For example, the
Amal party has its new offices in the 'Abbis Complex as well as other apartments where the
party conducts its political activities. Furthermore, Mr. Darwish has sold some apartments at
much lower rates to other "backed" members of these three political factions (including the
Syrian secret services). It is also said that he has had to refrain from requesting payments from a
number of families who have not covered their apartment costs because of political pressures.
Others, like Mr. Barakit, are said to have given six apartments to each of the two local ruling
parties, Amal and Hizb'Allah. In exchange, strongmen in political parties have insured that
public authorities did not inspect construction compliance with legal papers, allowing a leeway
for developers not to abide by their building permits and build denser and higher structures than
is legally possible. Here is how a municipal officer described the situation:
It is indeed possibl that many buildings do not comp# with tfe pesmits they obtained At the
time the Abbds Complex was built [mid 1990s], fr example, &we w unabk to send our
pokice forje for i5pecions. There was an exptional situation and the pokliti p ires we
twing the aea [...] Politdal forc (the so-cald searity forcs) protect rtain peopl or
pe mits. We get signals that we should not conse cose to thir or that buidkng and we comsp
~y tbese forcs because wn don't have the choie. We can't let ourpoliEmen get hbmiiatad infront qf everybo it has bappened [...]. AfwnS, 6ey bild what thy want [...]. But
the devlope rs also deal with powerful prsrmns from poidcal pares. Datish bad to deal
with many calls and ordie not to collect money fi om one or another client, he had to redua
prices forspealpeople, [...]."
that was duly closed, as attested by correspondences available in the Municipality, in the lot record.
•8 See Chapter 2
"Interviews held with Hassan, municipal employee on July 1, 2003.
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In all these cases, it is not clear how much these developers benefited from the presence
of political parties or how much choice they had in taking up their protection; it is rather a de-
facto imposition of the "existing power" with which they have had to make do.
Given all these financial and political W A
pressures, it is not surprising that the last generation 1
of developers has had to come up with new ways of L)Z.~)A j (49 m
cutting-down on costs. One strategy was to reduce
construction quality, incurring however further
costs and problems on their potential buyers. For
example, all thirty households I interviewed in the
'Abb-s Complex complained that they (and all their
neighbors) had had severe plumbing problems. The
marks of these problems are visible on the Figure 3-11: The Barakat Complex in
buildings where cracks, rusting, outdoor piping, and the news, "a sea of sewer".
marks of water leaks are visible on the walls of Source: An-Nahar, feb 23, 2000.
relatively new buildings. These problems do not go without threatening the security of residents.
For example, the doorman of one of the 'Abbis Complex buildings lost his life in an electricity
accident while he was switching a breaker in which water had leaked. In other cases, poor
construction quality lead to serious threats on building structures, such as in the Barakdt
Complex where sewers flooded the basements of the buildings for months, threatening the
building foundations and forcing the municipality to intervene and pump the water out (Figure
3-11).8o Furthermore, old construction workers in Hayy el Sellom have denounced the poor
quality of the new constructions, claiming that insufficient steel reinforcements were used,
buildings were improperly braced, and developers increased the ratio of sand in the construction.
These stories are fuelled by other horror stories outside the neighborhood where two similar
large housing complexes have crumbled on their residents in the suburbs of Beirut, killing many
of their residents."' As for developers, they all refused to discuss this matter, while their
assistants explained that residents knew what they were getting for such cheap housing.
80 Note that the municipality intervened after large mobilization of the population with the support of the political
parties and religious figures in the area and only agreed to pump the water out when residents advanced half the
costs of the procedure (An-Nahar newspaper, February 23, 2000 p. 14 and interview with Mr. 'Ali H. at the
Municipality of Choueyf-at on May 7, 2003).
81 See for example An-Nahar daily, Nov 13, 2000.
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"Compared to the price of the apartments", Mr. Darwish's representative explained, "the
problems residents are facing are fine". He then added: "Construction was done by several
subcontractors, and Mr. Darwish could not follow on them all. Besides, contractors are trying to
save money so they use cheap material. The subcontractors used poor quality piping which is
causing the problem but the steel and concrete in this building are sufficient [...]"."
If we account for all these factors, the image that emerges from the investigation of these
developers is slightly different from the dominant one in Hayy el Sellom. I did not find that they
were crooks or that they premeditated their final flops. Instead, they were dearly trapped in an
unfortunate set of procedures that doomed their projects (and careers) to failure. They all first
relied on public institutions when they initiated their projects, but later defaulted, pushing their
clients in the same direction, and found they had been trapped in a legal loophole. Furthermore,
all those I interviewed did not have the financial leeway to afford their clients' payment defaults,
they invested all they had in the building and borrowed money to finish construction. When
their clients defaulted on their payments, they immediately ran out of cash. Based on my
interviews, it was dear for all the actors involved (residents, public sector) that the developers
did not realize, at the time they initiated these projects, that things would get out of hand.
Multiple sales and unfulfilled promises came as the logical outcome of a chain reaction of events
that went out of hand, once clients defaulted, illegalities increased, and costs exceeded forecasts.
Here is how a clerk of the DGU described the situation:
The deeloper builds without conforming to the building pemit, thinking that with all the
regulariaftion decrees that have passed he should be able to regulaý,ie his project eventualy
and make more profit now. He adds floors and blocks and so, once the project is finished, he
cannot provide the residence permit that attests his compliance to legal codes [...] then he
cannot subdivide the lot andprovide people with the ownersho title... so the residents don't
want to pay him anymore and things are stalled: each party tell the other, give me the
paperl the mong and I will give you what you want. And the rgulariration procedures
turn out to be way more costy then he had plannedfor [...] Darwish , Barakt, all of
them! 83
Another developer of the earlier generation also defended the new developers:
[...] Darwish is not a real thief! What happened is the outcome of his lack of
professionalism. I have seen how things went out, he used to forget, make mistakes, him, the
engineerr, and the representatives he had on site. They were so eager to sell that thMy each
showed people the same apartment and then someimes, they would sell the same apartment
8 Interview held with Mr. Darwish's assistant on July 7, 2002, in his office.
83 Interview with M.C. on May 2, 2003.
129
to seerad people! [...] But look at Darwish now, he is desperate to rturn the mong. He
has transfered the rest of the lot in a public parking and he is gradual using the mong
from the ollected fees to reurn the loans be has acumulated [...] No, multiple saler neer
bhappen purpose#. Neither with him not with the others... *
Furthermore, all these developers did not have the sufficient financial or social capital to
cover for their defaulting clients. Hence, they quickly ran out of cash and found themselves in
jail, since banks were ready to enforce legal procedures when they defaulted on their payments.
All the developers I was able to identify in this last generation have been to jail at least once on
loan default or similar charges.
Finally, while residents blamed these developers for poor construction quality and
unfulfilled promises, it is also clear that residents often defaulted themselves on their own
contracts, made late payments or small additions to their apartments. This is the case, for
example, in the Shahrour Complex where residents used the elevator hole to enlarge their
kitchens but then refrained from paying their installments, claiming that the developer defaulted
on his promises and did not install the building's elevator. Similarly, in the 'Abbis Complex,
residents modified their apartments (e.g. dosing off balconies) and increased the number of
building code 1violations while complaining that the developer did not regularize their housing
conditions. The strategies of these residents will be further investigated in the fifth chapter of
the thesis.
3.E DIscussIoN AND ANALYSIS: THREE GENERATIONS OF DEVELOPERS
Following the line of investigation set out in the introduction (Chapter 1), this chapter
looked at three generations of land and housing developers in the Hayy el Sellom land and
housing market during its fifty years of growth. Through this description and analysis, the
chapter presented insights about the (social and economic) trajectories of the actors who were
able to penetrate and activate this housing market in every phase, the modes of operation and
institutional strategies of these developers, and how these strategies evolved over time. The
chapter also attempted to connect these changes to the kinds of regulatory arrangements that
were put in place during every phase. Specifically, three points contribute to the main thesis of
this dissertation.
First, informal developers were able to participate in the process of urban spatial
production by an intricate strategy of institution tapping and building in which they invoked
130
4 Interview with Faw'l H, op dt.
institutions transposed from rural areas (e.g. tribal amicable agreement), penetrated existing
social (e.g. family, village), public (e.g. planning agencies, municipality), private (e.g. banks,
broadcasting agencies), and political (e.g. voting) institutions in the city, and built new
institutions (e.g. political parties, neighborhood committees) that consolidated their businesses
and maintained their practices.
In this process of institution building and tapping, social networks occupied central
stage, connecting each actor to a thick web of others. Thus, social networks played
simultaneously two roles for the working of these markets. On the one hand, they provided
much of the necessary circulation of information and connections required by developers as a
basis for their businesses. On the other hand, they allowed the three generations of developers
to reposition (or position in the case of the last generation) themselves in the social hierarchies
of the neighborhood, as recipient of an important "social capital", and as a result, they enabled
them to play an important role in the operations of its land and housing market Social networks
per se and what they procure in terms of relations are thus only one part of the story. They need
to be complemented with a thorough understanding of how the accumulation of such social
networks in "social capital" (in economic and symbolic form) can alter an actor's social
positioning and facilitate his practices (Bourdieu 1986, 1994).
Through this description, it is clear that not everyone could be a developer, as
proponents of free-market theories would want us to believe. To the contrary, the position of
every developer in the existing social hierarchies and his ability to consolidate this position were
key in enabling him to participate in the production and organization of the housing market,
given what constituted important entry points at particular historical moments. This is the main
explanation why the first developer had to share geographic and social networks with
landowners who held the strong position in selling and buying land prior to the war. When the
civil war broke out, and these landowners worried about squatting, it was no more necessary to
know them closely to work with them: they were eager to sell their properties. Conversely, solid
networks with communities of potential clients became a necessary connection to enable a
developer to take charge of the market, in order to compensate for higher insecurities and the
absence of public agencies. Similarly, the last generation of developers had to be outsiders to the
neighborhood, since high land prices in the post-war era made it necessary to have social
networks within the banking sector in order to operate a land or housing sales business, given
prohibitive land costs at the time.
Furthermore, the activities of these developers indicated that they did not simply react to
the web of relational structures and established social practices. As active agents, they
transformed these structures while working within them, constantly seeking opportunities for
profit making while responding to the housing needs of new comers to the area. The constant
efforts that each developer had to put in building and maintaining social networks with public
and private agencies and actors created a continuous process of institution building that
extended throughout the fifty years of the neighborhood and determined penetration and
exclusion from the market. For example, the second generation of developers sustained its
practices by rallying political parties and forming a neighborhood committee (and several
subcommittees) that changed the social structures within the neighborhood. Other structures,
however, remain immutable. This is dearly one explanation for why none of the developers in all
three generations was a woman, and that none of them belonged to small families or to families
that were poorly represented in the area.
In sum, the actors-institutions relationship that emerges from this analysis is a reciprocal
or dialectic relation in which one's ability to intervene on the housing market is highly dependent
on the ability to tap on existing institutions that can sustain exchanges, while the institutional
map that is built over time is influenced by actors' own processes of institution building.
Second, all developers, and irrespective of the level of legality or illegality in their
practices, always relied on a mix of formal and informal institutions and regulations in order to
organize their operations. The chapter showed that it is virtually impossible to dissociate the
strategies that appeal to formal institutions from those that appeal to informal ones. Indeed, at
all phases of the development of the neighborhood and irrespective of their position in social
structures, of market conditions, or of the political environment at the time they worked, all
developers in Hayy el Sellom have relied on an array of formal and informal rules and
institutions that interacted together and informed each other considerably over time. In the logic
of these strategies, developers have appealed to public (formal) agencies in order to gain
credibility, increase transaction security, and prevent competition. Developers have also relied on
a web of social institutions (especially social networks) in order to inform clients, secure
transactions, and gain the ability to tap on public agencies.
To develop this point further, I will describe the example of one often-mentioned
informal institution (in the planning literature) that appeared as indeed useful for developers in
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Hayy el Sellom: "reputation". 'S A "good reputation", or the "general opinion of the
trustworthiness" of a developer (Klein 1997: 195), new institutional economists and
anthropologists tell us, is a central institution in the organization of a market, especially in the
absence of public securities. My findings confirm the role of "reputation" and indicate that
developers were well aware of its importance. For example, Abu Raymond invested time and
effort in accumulating social networks in order to build the image of a "respectable" man, and
many of the second generation of developers emulated this practice. However, Abu Raymond
and other developers' "good reputation" was build gradually and depended on a wide pattern of
social and political factors that did not necessarily result from market activities, nor were solely
invested back for market profits, as new institutional theorists suggest. To the contrary, Abu
Raymond's social standing, for example, was more important to him than the business itself, as
attested by his generosity towards clients. Furthermore, reliance on "reputation" was clearly not
sufficient for these developers to manage their business and all of them complemented heavily
"positive reputation" and "trust" by relying on public agencies or contractual agreement in order
to protect their transactions. Hence, Abu Raymond placed marks in public registries and Mr.
Darwish had his clients sign contracts in front of a notary. Their ability to do so was also part of
their efforts to create and strengthen a web of social networks with public agents, including
elected representatives, clerks in planning agencies, and police forces.
Third, the macro political environment (notably in the stability of the public sector, its
ability to impose its rule, and its attitude vis-a-vis informal settlements) and the citywide housing
market (prices of land, availability of affordable housing, level of integration of the settlement in
the city wide housing market, war) have dictated the effectiveness of these developers' strategies.
Thus, rising land prices or displaced urban populations in the post-war era directly impacted the
Hayy el Sellom developers by increasing demand for multiple forms of housing, creating further
competition in housing provision at the scale of the city, and hence directly excluding the small
5 The origins of the use of "reputation" in economic transactions should be traced to Adam Smith who argued that
the pursuit of economic self-interest (guided by the price system) will encourage people to adopt "good morals"
that would foster their business, such as punctuality or commitment to one's word. (Shearmur and Klein 1997: 29).
Reputation was also analyzed by Polanyi who saw in this and other informal mechanisms of market regulations
(trust, reciprocity) proof of the social embededness of markets and in the erosions of such mechanisms, proof of
important social transformations triggered by the industrial revolution (Polanyi 1944).
With the 1990s debates in legal pluralism and institutional economics, debates on "reputation" have become very
common. For example, among legal pluralists, Merry (1997) has argues that "reputation" is the outcome of
cognitive maps created by gossip in small-scale societies. Among New institutional sociologists, Granovetter has
shown market transactions are embedded in social relations (Granovetter 1985).
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scale developers of earlier generations from the production of urban spaces. Similarly, the
distribution of land ownership that was concentrated among members of one religious group
limited the development of the neighborhood to actors who possessed trust in this relatively
closed circle of landowners.
Before concluding this chapter, it is important to show how this representation of
developers contrasts with the many other descriptions in the current planning literature. As I
stated in this chapter's introduction, most descriptions of informal developers have described
under-socialized, self-interested, and profit motivated actors whose main concern is to choose
whether to sell or purchase legal versus illegal housing, based on cost-benefit analysis (Berner
2001a&b, De Soto 2000). These representations, I have shown in this chapter, suffer from many
limitations.
First, these descriptions cannot explain how informal developers are able to penetrate
the housing market and impose themselves as actors in a highly protected practice where access
to land is never easily obtained. This chapter has shown that one (important) explanation could
be provided by an investigation of these actors' institutional strategies and the dialectic relations
that exists between actors and their institutional environments.
Second, by limiting themselves to economic profit-maximizing assumptions and
explanations, such as choosing between formality and informality on the basis of cost reduction
(Bemer 2001a&b), these analyses fail to account for a proper understanding of the social and
political context in which economic choices are rooted (Bourdieu 2000). To the contrary, this
chapter showed that developers' strategies always reflected the types of opportunities accessible
to them, given their place and experiences in the city and the neighborhood. One can only recall
how the second generation of developers was trained in particular ways of city-making that were
developed by Abu Raymond and his partners earlier (landowner, topographers, and others). In
these practices, the issue of legality was not always a decisive factor, it was rather the knowledge
and experiences of friends and other members of their social networks that mattered. In fact,
these practices were designed before the urban regulations that made them illegal were issued,
and they can hardly be explained as the outcome of profit-maximizing actors choosing between
two realms (the illegal and the illegal) in order to maximize profits.
Furthermore, the first two generations of developers whose activities were tied to their
prominent social positions seemed to value this social standing more than any financial gain they
could gather, and they often defied the profit maximizing logic in order to enhance their social
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image. These developers often showed compassion and understanding vis-a-vis residents who
were late in their payments, lowered prices for widows and families in need, and at many
occasions displayed an attitude of social solidarity despite the costs they could incur individually.
Such "deviations" can be in part explained by the special kind of good they were trading: access
to land is a major source of pride and social standing in a society that despite its urbanization,
remained tightly attached to its rural practices.
Third, by positing an artificial choice between formal and informal spheres, these
descriptions perpetuate a legal dualistic understanding of the city that separates inaccurately
'legal' and 'illegal' spheres and fails to account for the multiple linkages that exist between the
two (Sanyal 1988, Benton 1994, Femandes and Varley 1998, Varley 2002). The descriptions of
the Hayy el Sellom developers provide yet one more example of the inadequacy of separating
between formal and informal markets. They showed that these developers tapped on public
institutions the same way they tapped on informal ones, and that the tight web of social
networks that connected them to public agents made the latter direct participants of these
practices, and not a separate body seeking to regulate it. A closer review of these public agencies'
activities shows how they directly and indirectly, sometimes unwittingly, participated in the
creation of illegality in Hayy el Sellom. The next chapter addresses this question.
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Chapter 4
The Informal
Public Sector
4.A INTRODUCTION
In reviewing the strategies of the three generations of developers, the previous chapter
unraveled a thick web of relations that connected these developers to actors within the state,
such as notaries, clerks in planning agencies, and policemen. It also pointed to the involvement
of state accredited actors, such as topographers and engineers in the production of illegality.
These findings echo research in other parts of the Third World which documented, for example,
the participation of public agents in the jnta, the informal institution entrusted with conflict
resolution in informal settlements in Caracas (Perdomo and Nikken 1980), the role of
government actors in providing protection for and reaping benefits from developers in the
supply of land in Karachi (Nientied et al 1990), or "porous bureaucracies" in India whose
members are tightly involved in the organization of informal industrial clusters (Benjamin 1996).
Others have also looked at the covert and overt involvement of public actors and elite members
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in the production of informal settlements, in order to widen their political basis or facilitate the
implementation of projects elsewhere in the city (Collier 1976).
These studies are important because they depart from most investigations of the role of
the state in informal settlements that either confine it to exclusion (Rolnik 1996, Yonder 1998)
or to after the fact management (Durand-Lasserve and Clerc 1996). They show that in some
cases, the "state", through some of its actors or agencies, actively collaborates in the production
of illegal settlements. In doing so, these studies provide a necessary departure from the widely
adopted dualistic formal/informal framework that portrays the state and so-called informal
actors as two opposite groups, the former producing laws or formal regulations and the latter
developing norms or informal regulations which defy them.
However, there is a need to learn more about the mechanisms through which public
agents as private actors participate in the production of illegality and the conditions under which
they are enabled to do so. We also need to widen the scope of investigation in order to inscribe
the practices of these agents within the realm of public planning regulations and include in this
analysis other urban regulations and public procedures that legislate the production of urban
spaces. There is finally a need to investigate how these practices change over time and how they
impact housing production and/or acquisition in the city. Given the leadership of public
agencies in all planning interventions, knowledge about the modalities of public involvement in
informal settlements and their impacts on processes of housing production are pre-requisites for
a better understanding of the ways in which cities work and the formulation of sound planning
policies.
This chapter investigates the involvement of several public agencies (local and central
planning agencies) and public actors (as private agents) through two channels: (i) the production
of urban regulations that legislated Hayy el Sellom's development and (ii) the involvement of
public actors in its production. The chapter is divided in three sections. The next section
presents a brief methodological note on studying "the state" followed by a presentation of the
main arguments. Section 4.B looks at the practice of public regulations, contrasting adopted legal
texts and exemptions issued simultaneously. Section 4.C looks at the trajectories of a number of
public actors who were involved in the operations of the land and housing market in Hayy el
Sellom. The chapter concludes on the necessity to re-conceptualize the role of the state in
informal settlements, to re-examine the effects of different modes of public involvement on the
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production of low-income housing, and to learn from the accumulated experiences of public
agents involved in informal settlements.
4.A.1 A Methodology for Studying the Role of the State in Hayy el Sellom
In contrast to the conceptualization of the "state" as a monolithic body defending a
coherent set of laws, a recent publication looking at states and illegal practices argued that the
state is a cluster of institutions of political and executive modes of control that are not
necessarily coordinated together (Heyman 1999). These authors proposed an analysis based on
observing what they called the "empirical state" (as opposed to the "ideal state'") (Heyman and
Smart 1999) and the "messy processes" in which governance occurs in order to account for the
internal complexities, the multiplicity of agents, as well as the complicated procedures of
enacting the law across posts, bureaucracies, justice systems, and regional groups (Smart 1999).
They suggested viewing states "from below", "from within", and "from above" (Heyman and
Smart 1999: 15).
These arguments echoed earlier methodological notes on studying the state. For
instance, in 1977 Philip Abrams noted that research was often hampered by the difficulty of
conceptualizing the "state" as an actor. In a seminal article in which he described the difficulty of
studying the state, Abrams argued that '"It [the state] is itself the mask which prevents our seeing
political practice as it is. [...] There is a state-system [...]; a palpable nexus of practice and
institutional structure centered in government and more or less extensive, unified, and dominant
in any given society. [...] There is too, a state-idea, projected, purveyed and variously believed in
different societies at different times" (Abrams 1988: 82). Rather than undertaking the impossible
task of studying the state, Abrams suggested that researchers should either investigate the
modes, effects, and variations of the state-idea or the sources, structures, and variations of the
state-system.
Taking the "state system" as their object of analysis, Heyman and Smart (1999) managed
to provide innovative accounts of illegal practices and showed how these practices were
intricately tied to the state. Rather than isolating illegal practices as deviant and separate from
everyday life, the authors introduced a number of ethnographies that looked at a variety of illegal
practices (e.g. bribes, drug trafficking, illegal fisheries, illegal migration, etc.) that were embedded
in "pieces of the state" in higher and lower income countries (Heyman and Smart 1999). They
also described how illegality moves between actors in unequal positions within the state
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(Heyman 1999). In the final analysis, their description of public actors' involvement in illegal
practices questioned the separation of legal and illegal realms, but also of state and society, in
line with other recent studies of informality (Nugent 1999, Varley 2002).
Following this approach, I have documented the processes that make up "state"
involvement in Hayy el Sellom. I first mapped a number of urban regulations initiated by public
sector actors and agencies and compared them to the formally sanctioned regulations issued by
the same agencies. I then documented the practices of public sector actors and their
involvement in this informal settlement. I therefore adopted a "processual analysis" of the state
as a regulator of urban space and attempted to reinterpret the "ideal image of the state" through
observations of its activities on the ground. These observations were based on interviews with
actors and archival searches in public agencies, as was described in detail in the methodology
section (Chapter 1).
4.A.2 Chapter Arguments
My findings in Hayy el Sellom lead to a number of points that I list briefly below and
detail throughout the chapter:
I argue that two parallel modes of public governance were simultaneously at work in
Hayy el Sellom. In fact, throughout the neighborhood's history, there is a clear clash between, on
the one hand, the regulations decreed by public planning agencies (especially the DGU) in their
effort to organize urban spaces and, on the other, how public agents and institutions actually
regulated this environment Two different mechanisms are at play here. First, there were two
modes of regulation, the rule and its exception, that constituted together the regulatory
environment of the neighborhood. While public urban regulations were decreed almost
continuously over the past 50 years (Table 2-4), it is possible to trace an array of "exceptional"
measures or "special" "one-time arrangements" that in reality legislated the production of space
in Hayy el Sellom, often in violation of public regulations decreed by the very same institutions.
In doing so, public planning agencies participated, along with other actors, in directly producing
the informal norms and regulations that organized the development of the neighborhood.
Second, many public actors played two roles concurrently: they were public agents
representing public institutions and at the same time informal developers participating in the
production of illegality. My mapping of public agents involved in the neighborhood produced an
impressive and diverse array of public institutions and actors involved in the making of Hayy el
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Sellom. These included elected officials and appointed public agents. Some of these actors,
notably low-level bureaucrats or policemen, were residents of the neighborhood and actors in its
production. Others saw the neighborhood as an impediment to the production of the urban
environment that they tried to foster and, to the contrary, actively participated in designing
alternatives for its eradication. Nonetheless, it is clear that an important component of the Hayy
el Sellom market went through a loop of public actors who were all key producers of this
informal settlement, as will be described throughout the chapter.
The motivation of the public agents involved in the production of illegality in Hayy el
Sellom did not correspond to stereotypes of such public. agents as corrupt politicians seeking
votes in exchange for favors or benefits (votes or bribes). To the contrary, many among them
were well-meaning and honest public agents who thought they were serving the "public good"
that they each defined according to their own understanding of the city. A few among them
showed concern about inclusion and the ability of low-income dwellers to find housing. Others
described severe political and social pressures. Many were concerned about retaining some level
of control over urban spaces and/or insuring the sustainability of public service agencies, in the
face of widespread illegalities. In addition, public actors who set out businesses selling legality in
the neighborhood justified their practices with concerns for low-income urban dwellers and a
critical outlook on the Lebanese state and its exclusive regulations.
The outcomes of these illegal practices also contradicted their usual characterization as
corruption. Although they circumvented public regulations, exceptional measures allowed public
agencies some flexibility in their practices that, in turn, limited the amount of illegality in the
informal settlement under study and kept open a channel of communication between residents
and public agencies. In fact, the fifty years traced in this chapter will show that during the phases
when public agencies limited these exceptional procedures and sought to crack down on
informal settldements, their ability to regulate these spaces was reduced while, conversely, when
they were willing to compromise with exceptional procedures, they encouraged residents to keep
illegality to a "regularizable" level.
Similarly, the practices of public agents sometimes allowed the circulation of information
about state regulations and facilitated their implementation for many residents who would have
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otherwise been unable to follow them.1 Chapter 3 showed that developers learned about and
adopted many elements of the formal building law (e.g. setbacks) through their interaction with
"public sector entrepreneurs", although they adapted the categories to their needs and ignored
many other legal requirements. In this chapter, I will show that many residents who acquired
formal papers also relied on the services of informal public actors who facilitated their task of
abiding by the law, even as they were themselves trespassing the boundaries of legality. These
stories illustrate how processes of "upholding law" do not necessarily follow the conception or
trajectory that was conceptualized by lawmakers, since formality is too clumsy to be the only way
things are done (Smart 2001).
These modes of governance and the balance between them directly impacted the
housing market throughout the neighborhood's history. Indeed, different modes of public
involvement in the regulation and the production of illegality corresponded to changes in the
forms of community mobilization, to different roles played by political parties, and to different
attitudes adopted by public actors vis-a-vis the neighborhood (Ward 1999). While they attest to a
flexibility on the part of public agencies, these forms of governance also eloquently illustrate the
inability of public agencies to revise their own regulations or to let go of ideals of the "good
city", even when these are clearly inapplicable. Furthermore, such exceptions are clearly
insufficient public interventions in these low income neighborhoods where more direct public
recognition and involvement in upgrading and consolidation is needed in order to prevent the
later day rapid degradation of living conditions.
In developing my arguments in the sections below, I have covered all three phases of the
development of Hayy el Sellom outlined in previous chapters (early, war, and post-war periods).
These correspond roughly to three forms of state involvement in this informal settlement (and
others) and three eras or periods of public policy: (i) A period of containment and control, in
which public agencies attempted to limit the development of the neighborhood (but did not
criminalize its residents) and during which residents maintained a faade of legality, (•) a phase
of de-facto management in which public agencies tried to impose after the fact regulations and
fees, while residents defied their rule and obtained services and built illegally, and (ihi) a postwar
phase that extended the de-facto public management, with harsher policing, and residents lost
I This is not to say that there were no reverse effects as well: many public agents also duped residents at times into
thinking they were obtaining formal papers when they were not, or forced them to pay large bribes, as we will see
below.
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some of the entitlements and benefits they had accessed before. These phases will be further
clarified as the chapter unfolds.
4.B THE LEGAL TEXT AND THE PUBLIC PRACTICE
According to the strict text of urban regulations, state agencies are legally required to
eradicate/ destroy all buildings that do not comply with their urban (land use and lot
subdivision) and construction regulations.
All bildings that do not compb y yplanning and construction codes or could conflict with the
planning or beaut)ifcation of a dcy has to be eradicated to bring back things to their onginal
forms at the expense of their owners. If an owner refrains from doing so within the deadline he
is gisen, the public administration is to implement this regulation at the owner's expenses and
reponsibiity.'
It implies that if urban regulations were strictly implemented, all informal settlements
(squatter settlements and informal land subdivision) should be eradicated, at the expense of their
residents, and without any compensation. This requirement is reiterated in the successive decrees
that allowed for the regularization of buildings in violation to construction codes in exchange of
financial fees.
These public regulations have important consequences for the residents of Hayy el
Sellom, since most constructions in this neighborhood are built in violation of construction and
urban codes. Moreover, the very high number of constructions built on squatted riverbanks, on
approved road enlargement trajectories, on highway and public project paths, and others should
also be destroyed, their residents fined and evicted with no compensations (figures 4-9).
2 This is the first: comprehensive building law adopted under the French Mandate, in 1940, Law 61/LE. The quoted
text above is section 7, article 79 of the Law, published in the official gazette in 1941 p. 7775. Translation is mine.
Note that similar texts have appeared in subsequent construction and regularization law. For example, Law 324,
issued in 1994 stipulated:
All buAi•igs or parts of buidings xunher d in iolaion of te fthllowg codes should be dtroned without
compensaiow to their obanpa and at their cost: [...] Buildings in vriation to propelrt htrs in prisate or publk
land, [...] bwildings thatfallin pprorwdprojet tart , on rier bankS, and other pubir domain, .. ]. Beginning
with the enfortmeent of this reglation and ntil its implementation, ridents will be finedyearj without considring
btheae•yyrfJir as equis•ent to the mrgulariation of thir status in any asre
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In practice, however, and despite a limited number of eviction attempts, public agencies
have throughout the fifty years and more of the development of informal settlements in Beirut
tolerated these illegalities. Furthermore, they have always found ways to renegotiate or
temporarily revise their regulations. In order to illustrate these processes, the next section
describes three common regulatory procedures internationally adopted in urban regulations and
implemented in Hayy el Sellom during the period under study: the provision of building permits
(4.B.1), servicing (4.B.2), and expropriation of land for public projects (4.B.3).
4.B.1 Building Permits: Procedures and Practices
(a) The 1960s: Attempting to control illegal developments
In 1940, under the French Mandate rule (1920-1943), the first comprehensive building
law was initiated in Lebanon (Law 61LE/1940). The law regulated the conditions for obtaining
building permits and made the latter mandatory prior to construction within municipal domains,
which includes Hayy el Sellom that already fell then within the jurisdiction of the Choueyfit and
Mrayjeh municipalities.
Date Type Legislaon
1940 Building Law; First comprehensive building law: regulates the conditions for obtaining
61LE/1940 building permits (issued by municipalities), introduces housing permits to
attest conformity of construction to permit as a pre-requisite for servicing.
1961 Building Law; Institutes building permit as mandatory in all areas (issued by
Decree 6709 municipalities and approved by the Order of Engineers); reiterates
housing permit as pre-requisite for servicing.
1971 Building Law, First amendment/ comprehensive building construction code to the 1964
Law 59/71 building code. Lists and details all building regulations (e.g. height, FAR)
in Lebanon. Reiterates housing permit as pre-requisite for servicing.
1983 Building Law, New amendments to the law with tighter regulations. Imposes the role of
Law 69/1983 the Directorate of Urban Planning in the building process.
1994 Refugee Permit Allows refugees to build and restore constructions with "refugee building
Legislation permits" that violate building law without official permit or fees. Law
322/94 renewed in 1996 and 1999.
Table 4-1: Building Permit Legislations in the Lebanese Code
Building permits were (and are still) obtained from municipal authorities (except in
municipal Beirut where they are attributed by the Govemrnor known as the Mohbfr.4 Law
There is no recorded eviction attempt in Hayy el Sellom.
4 As of 1961, and with decree No. 6709, building permits are mandatory everywhere.
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61LE/1940 also imposed the "residence permit5 ' that attests to the conformity of a
construction with the obtained building permit, which later became a prerequisite for a building
to be serviced, traded, rented, or inhabited. These building codes were later supplemented and
revised by several decrees (Table 4-1).
All codes acknowledged the building permit requirement and subsequently increased
conditions for its delivery, imposing new regulations such as compliance with the successive
zoning and land use plans (Table 4-2).
Date Type Legislation
1964 Master Plan The first comprehensive master plan of Beirut and its suburbs, delineated as
Decree 16 948 the municipal city and surrounding areas up to a 400m altitude.
The plan regulates constructions, zoning, and land uses in this area. It also
imposed land subdivision in compliance to a "subdivision project" that requires
approval from public agencies.
1970 Master Plan Amendment of the 1964 master plan. It dictates minimum lot areas and land
Decree 14313 uses, including industrial zones (Table 4-3).
1973 Master Plan, This master plan regulated construction heights and types in the airport
vicinity.
2003 Master Plan Proposed master plan for Choueyfit, it regulates areas bordering Hayy el
Proposal Sellom but does not go inside the neighborhood.
2003 Master Plan Proposed master plan to regulate construction in the airport vicinity.
Proposal
Table 4-2: Master Plans for Beirut and its Suburbs.
The first approved master plan to organize zoning and land use regulations in Beirut and
its suburbs was issued in 1964.6 The master plan regulated minimum lot areas, minimum lot on
which construction was allowed, maximum height, minimum longitudinal length of facades, and
other factors (Tables 4-2). This master plan was revised in 1971 (Tables 4-3, figure 4-1). In
addition, industrial land use regulations were issued in 1996, but did not amend the 1971 land
use plans.
s In Arabic, Rokhsat Iskin or "-6J L ".
6 The first "master plan" was however approved on September 14, 1953, through decree no 2 616. Known as Egli
Plan, this master plan was a revised version of a 1943 road plan proposed by the French planner Ecochard to the
Lebanese government and never approved (Verdeil 2002, Ghorayeb 2000). However, this master plan was only
dictated a road plan with regulations in the vicinities of the Khaldeh boulevard. It did not include planning
guidelines for Hayy el Sellom.
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The authors of these master plans considered the area in which Hayy el Sellorn fell to be
an agricultural zone, and, as a result, they sought to minimize construction in it. The ensuing
regulations restricted construction in most of the neighborhood to lots of 1,000m2 and above,
and allowed only 20% of the floor area to be built, with a maximum exploitation ratio of 0.8 of
the lot surface.7 Moreover, a minimum 2,000m2 lot area was required for new lot subdivisions
(Table 4-3). These were, in fact, the most stringent regulations applied in the entire suburbs of
the capital city.
Area Land Use MmnAength 
Mm~ Mm~ existing SetbackMin. existing
lot area (mZ)
to build
1,000
250
h 4= number
of floors
4
 se
Residential &
Commercial,
or Indusrial()
Residential &
Commercial,
or Indutrial(t)
M. faEade of
lot (m)
20
10
Table 4-3: Zoning regulations for Hayy el Sellom (1971 Master Plans)
MPAR: Floor Exploitation Ratio
YTER* Total Exploitation Ratio(t) See map in figure 4-1
These regulations restricted the neighborhood's residents' ability to build "legally",8 and
in fact, consecrated them as "illegal" from there on. Indeed, when they were adopted, these
regulations were already impossible to implement in the context of this low income
neighborhood where residents were purchasing small parcels as shares in larger lots, with areas
of around 100mZ and less sometimes, (some fifteen to twenty times smaller than the legislated
minimum lot size). However, these regulations have not been revised, and the last proposal for a
master plan to the area of Choueyfit, put through in 1999, went around the neighborhood and
7 Known as the FAR and TEhee  , these ae the essential components of Lebanese zoning regulations, along with land
use.
' Many residents in Hayy el Sellom in fact refer to the master plan as "as a•wbnrd' in reference to the name of the
French planner who had first designed it. Several residents (more educated than the average) also complained about
how ill adapted the work of the "French" planner was to their own context.
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Figure 4-1: Current zoning regulations in Hayy el Sellom, approved in 1970.
Guidelines on Table 4-3.
Source: DGU Archives, Beirut and base map from BTUTP.
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did not question regulations within it.9 Furthermore, by creating industrial zones within the
neighborhood, there seems to be a public effort to contain the development of Hayy el Sellom
by increasing land prices in the vicinity and encouraging other types of uses.10
In reality, the practice never followed these regulations directly. During the first phase of
development (1960s-1970s), while the 1964 legislation renewed in 1970 made the conditions for
obtaining a building permit more stringent, the Choueyfat Municipality and the Directorate
General of Urbanism (DGU) issued a number of "exemptions" or "administrative
arrangements". Known in the language of public officials as a tadbir iddri " (administrative
arrangement), these exemptions are written or oral decisions issued by high-ranking officials or
the Council of Ministers and applied over a determined period. The tadbir could be in violation
of one or several urban codes. Here is how three different interviewed DGU employees
described it:
A tadbir is an exceptional procedu that is adopted without having to go through all the
pubic and legal procedures of a law (stamps of approval fom the government and the
parirament), espedciall it is necessay to allow things that do not compl with the strict
texts of the law.."
The iadbir is essentially meant to cinument regulations when no legalproviion is possible.
It is usually an oral decision, taken by politicians who don't want to leave traces of their
acts. [...] It also can be revoked at any time."
The tadbir is their [high level public agents] prferred way of running things [in
reference to building permits and urban regulations here], exceptionalmeasures...
and there are so many of them! "
These statements indicate that "exceptional procedures" were and are still common in
DGU practices. The different positions and age groups of the interviewed actors quoted here (a
9 In fact, new planning guidelines are now being adopted with the Choueyiit master plan under study
(commissioned by the DGU) in order to bring them in line with the level of urbanization of the area. However, the
master plan for the area excludes Hayy el Sellom (see above).
10 According to a high-ranking public agent, since the 1960s, zoning an area as "industrial" immediately raised land
prices and encouraged land speculation. As a result, public planners might have well followed this strategy around
Hayy el Sellom (and other informal settlements, such as Za'aytriyyeh) and zoned as "industrial" the immediate
residential extensions of these neighborhoods, sometimes the neighborhood residential areas themselves.
1" In Arabic, it is spelled " gJ.A J ".
12 Interview with Y.D., high-level official in DGU, held on July 28, 1999. Y.D. has served in several posts in the
DGU. In 1999,, he was heading the Aley offices. However, in 2003, he was in charge of a unit in the Beirut central
offices. Further quotes are taken from this and another interview I conducted with him on April 14, 2003.
13 Interview with M.C., clerk at the DGU, held on May 2, 2003.
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high level official, an old clerk, and a young engineer) indicate that this is also no secret but a
process with 'which they were all familiar. Interviews and archival searches indicated that at least
two "exceptional procedures" or tadbir were adopted by public agencies in the mid 1960s and
1970s vis-a-vis the provision of building permits to applicants in Hayy el Sellom. In the local
DGU offices (Aley Branch) in charge of Choueyfat (and hence Hayy el Sellom), a tadbir allowed
all shareholders in a lot, and irrespective of the size of their shares or the maximum allowed
built-up area on a lot, to obtain a so-called "50m 2 building permit". This tadbfr therefore
provided a state-sanctioned (albeit illegal) procedure to bypass the urban and construction codes
that were being approved by the very same agency, around the same time. Soon after, another
tadbr used by the Choueyfait Municipality allowed municipal agents to extend Law 42/71 of
1971, a law that exempted small constructions (below 60mn) from building permits in areas
where no land use and urban regulations had been issued.ls Again, the tadbir publicly sanctioned
the (illegal) extension of this regulation to Hayy el Sellom, even though the neighborhood had
clearly approved planning guidelines.16
Whatever the exemption applied or the conditions of its application, it is certain that the
archives of the Choueyfit Municipality and the DGU-Aley branch both contained a substantial
number of 50m2 building permits dating back to this period (figures 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, and 4-5).
Furthermore, these permits were granted practically everywhere in Hay el Sellom, including in
areas zoned as "industrial".
The provision of the 50m 2 permit sometimes took additional measures. As the number
of migrants increased in the late 60s, initiatives were taken to limit the number of permits
granted on one lot. One such initiative was the so-called "masterplan" for a lotl7, a subdivision
map designed by an architect at the DGU (on the request of the head of the
14 A young engineer (MA.) at the DGU, commenting on the multiplicity of illegal procedures in the agency.
Interview held on April 5, 2003.
15 In these areas, the permit was replaced by a tmar, a requirement to inform the municipality.
16 Despite many efforts, I was not able to obtain the texts of the two tadkrb. According to some of the interviewed
public actors, it was never written but rather the subject of an oral agreement that remained in effect. Others,
notably the former head of the DGU in Aley insisted that they have seen this text, but none was able to provide me
with a copy.
17 This terminology was used by the DGU clerks who informed me of this procedure.
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DGU at the time), which organized the lot subdivision and the location of future 50m2 houses.
The plan was first developed when requests for building permits on lot 1400 began to be filed
(the largest lot in Hayy el Sellom, with an approximate area of 30,000m2). The public agency
sought a way to take over and duplicate the task of the informal developer, perhaps in more
"legal" form. The plan bore the signature of the head of the DGU, and clerks explained that
they provided permits on its basis. The implementation of the "masterplan" however proved to
be more difficult, when it became clear that developments did not comply with the proposed
guidelines, and that some developers were able to use these plans to their advantage (Chapter 3).
As a result, the experience was discontinued after three or four attempts.
How were these exceptions extracted? According to several actors involved in the DGU
and in the neighborhood during the late 1960s-1970s, exceptional building permits were issued
as a result of popular mobilization behind political social movements, notably Haraket al-
Mabroumin", the "Movement of the Deprived", a social justice movement that was lead in the
mid 1960s by the Shi'ite cleric Musa al-Sadr. This movement called for the enlargement of the
public sphere in order to include underprivileged groups (Shi'ites specifically) in the
administrative structures of the state and to improve their political representation and their
access to services and employment (Nasr 1985, Ajami 1986, Norton 1987). At the time, al-Sadr
was also in the process of founding the Higher Shi'ite Council (Al Milis Al Shi'i al A'la), an
official body representing Shi'ites in the country and legislating their matters19, and many of the
activities he conducted were geared towards reclaiming the rights of what he termed the
Mabrhumin, literarily the "deprived", those whose rights had been taken (Ajami 1986). Haraket al-
Mabroumin did not seek to provide backing to residents to build with no state oversight (the way
later political parties did). Instead, a popular
mobilization pressured public figures in planning agencies and municipalities to alter regulations
and provide permits to the Hayy el Sellom residents. 20
18 Haraket al Mahbremin or the 'Movement of the Deprived' was later to become Amal, a main political party in
Lebanon and an important militia during the civil war. For more on Amal, see Chapter 2.
19 The Higher Shi'ite Council made it through the parliament in 1967 and was finally instituted in 1969, with Al Sadr
as its chairman (Ajami 1986).
20 Although no documentation exists of other neighborhoods, the repeated visits of Al Sadr to other informal
settlements in the capital city, such as Nab'ah suggest that such measures were also issued for other informal
settlements in Beirut.
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Figure 4-2: Cover for 50m 2 building permit for lot # 1441, in 1970. The form carries
the signatures and fingerprints of all lot owners, certifying their agreement to the new
owner's right to build. The permit is signed and stamped by a civil engineer and
stamped by several DGU offices, the Order of Engineers and Architects, and the
Municipality of Choueyfat.
Source. Municialit of Chougyfdt archives.
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At the time, the DGU was the highest planning agency in the country. In 1967, it was
headed by Mitri al-Nammir who was known to have political and institutional leverage.21
Pressured by rising social movements that were requiring change, he and other members of the
planning agencies of the time, were able to use their leverage and reach a compromise. Here is
how a former head of DGU-Aley described it:
Think of thi legal arrangement (tadbir qdnoum) as the outcome of interventions from
politicians and clerkics, notabl Musa al-Sadr. [...] The political debate at the time was
about the inclusion of certain depried groups in state structur. [...] The decision was
taken by a number of public offidia, notab# the then head of the DGU, Mr. Mitnf e
Nammdr, to allow evey person who had purrbchased shares in a large lot to obtain a building
permit and build an area of 50 in. [... This was irrespefive of what the FAR dicated"
In another interview, he explained:
Miti el Nammdr was a vry influential person in the administration and his word was
widel rspected among the miniters. He was, ajkr a14 the cousin of Eliis Sarkis
[Lebanese President, 1976-1982], he also belonged to the clan of the Shebabs [a
political movement of the time named after President Fuad Shehab 1958-
1964]. As for al-Sadr, he was then instituting the Shi'ite Higher Councid and bad many
public relations and broad respct. Ift t hought it was a necessary measure, there was little
room not to implement it [. ..
There were other motivations for public agents to accept these exemptions. Several
officials acknowledged that the 50m2 allowed minimizing "irregularities". In addition,
exemptions had cascading implications, such as the 1964 decree that exempted 50m2 structures
and below from building a bomb shelter, another mandatory prerequisite for obtaining a
building permit.24 It also was meant to contain illegal constructions. In the words of this official,
"They hoped that these exemptions would limit the development".25
21 Mr. Metri el-Nammir, the head of the DGU between 1967 and 1973, was the cousin of the future Lebanese
president Eliis Sarkis (1976-1982). He was an architect by training and an influential member of the Lebanese
administration. He had also headed the Dirtion des Bdiment, a public agency entrusted with building public works,
prior to this post. Later on, he will be selected to head the reconstruction efforts of Beirut downtown in 1976
(Verdeil 2002: 99). Fore more on the institutionalization of elite families in planning agencies, see Ghandour (2002).
2 Interview held with Y. D., op eit.
2Ibid
2 Decree No 7563, September 9 1961.
2 Interview held with Y. D., op dit.
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Figure 4-3 (a): Floor plan and sections.
Figure 4-3: Typical 50m2 building permit
for lot # 1400, in 1970. The permit
includes floor plans and an (informal)
land subdivision plan. It is signed and
stamped by a civil engineer and stamped
by several DGU offices, the Order of
Engineers and Architects, and the
Municipality of Choueyf-t.
Source: DGU Archives, Aley.
Figure 4-3 (c): (informal) Subdivision
plan.
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Figure 4-3 (b): Cover sheet.
Moreover, all agents acknowledged that such permits were granted based on need rather
then regulations. It was a measure deemed by a number of public officials as "humanitarian":
This was a humanitarian decision: these poor people and they could not obtain housing
otherwise."
Logicall, thnm was no other means that the [the residents of Hayy el Sellom] could
obtain housing, and the administrators saw it.
Nonetheless, these exceptional permits and regularization laws did not alter the general
disposition of the public sector vis-i-vis the residents of this informal settlement. While planning
agencies were issuing exemptions in the late 1960s, they were simultaneously reiterating their
own regulations, with the 1970 zoning and urban regulations (Decree 14 313, Table 4-3, Figure
4-1) that came to affirm Hayy el Sellom as an "agricultural zone", with very large minimum lot
sizes. Furthermore, the failure of "master plans" developed for lots in Hayy el Sellom to control
illegal development encouraged public authorities to adopt more radical eradication measures.
They came in the form of a highway exchange, designed Cm 1973) explicitly to strike through the
center of the neighborhood and wipe away a very large section of it (see below).
(b) The 1980s: After the fact management
With the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, and the ensuing weakness of the
public sector, the ability of planning agencies to control building and restrict illegalities was
considerably reduced. Furthermore, the militia groups'2 who then controlled the area encouraged
newcomers to defy state authorities and build without permits, under their "protection". As a
result, the number of building permit applications dwindled during this
26 Interview held with Y. D., op dr.
27 Interview held on August 10, 1999 with WS., notary public who worked closely with several informal developers.
A By 1975, Hanrakt at-Malbriu a was formally known as Ama and turned into a militarized group that was part of
the Harakab al [Watabv:U (The National Bloc) in Lebanon that also comprised the communist party, various
factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) lead by Kamal Jumblat,
and others (Salibi 1976, El-Khazen 2000). It was the Harakeb al WU7 ab that was in control of the neighborhood
and other sections of what had then become West Beirut. After the late 1970s, and according to militias then on the
ground, Amal controlled the neighborhood solely until the "war of the suburbs" in 1989 that forced in Hio~bAllah
next to Afral.
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Figure 4-4 (a): Table of permit costs. Figure 4-4 (b): Cover Sheet.
Figure 4-4 (c): Floor plan and sections. Figure 4-4 (d): Subdivision plan.
Figure 4-4: Typical 50m2 building-permit for lot # 1441, in 1970. The permit includes
plans and the map of the informal land subdivision. It is signed and stamped by a civil
engineer and stamped by several DGU offices, the Order of Engineers and Architects, and
the Municipality of Choueyfat.
Source: Choueyfdt Muniapality archives.
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era,29 and so did the importance of tadbirs. Unable to impose their rule (here and elsewhere in the
city), and desperate to retain some control over the city, public planning agencies shifted to
increase their regulations, rendering the neighborhood "even more illegal" without managing to
control its rapid physical development.
The 1983 building law provides a good example of this process. In 1983, the DGU
developed and passed a revised version of the 1970 building law, Law 69/1983, which imposed
new pre-requisites for the acquisition of building permits. It came at the outset of a period of
relative calm, following the one-month Israeli invasion of the Lebanese capital (September
1982), and sought to respond to major urban changes, including the proliferation of squatter
settlements in the south-western suburbs of Beirut (Charafeddine 1991).
According to the former head of the DGU, one of the main authors of the 1983 building
law, the agency was very concerned with the spread of illegal constructions and sought, through
intensified regulations, to limit their development. Thus, several revised regulations were issued
in order to address existing legal loopholes that were identified as having "facilitated" illegal
practices. Noting, for example, that many residents had bought land on lots marked to be
expropriated for approved public projects (such as roads), the DGU required that land
registration or building permit applications be accompanied by a recent "certificate of planning"
(3 months old or less) that listed all approved projects on the lot Furthermore, the DGU issued
a regulation preventing the registration of land sales on lots where illegal constructions had been
built. This is how this well-meaning public actor explained the DGU perspective:
The developers were abusingpoorpeople coming frm rural areas. People didn't know about
plans and so the would sell them lots where the ar approved ahgnments and tbhy would
not know... Then, if they came to obtain permits, we cannot provide them with permits!
[...] ere m hoping to protectpeople from these illegal cooks [...
29 The archives of DGU Aley were flooded and partially destroyed during the civil war. However, assuming that an
equivalent number of building permits were lost for each era, the distribution of building permits issued in Hayy el
Sellom reflects this trend: 99 building permits were issued in the 1960s, 214 between 1970-1975, the heyday of
exemptions, and only 42 between 1976-1990. Thus, the number of permits issued during the first fifteen years
(1960-1975) was several folds higher than the second fifteen years (1976-1990).
m Interview conducted with M.F. in his office in July 27, 1999. M.F. has held several high-ranking positions in the
Lebanese public sector. Between 1999 and 2003, he has allowed me at least ten extensive interviews in which he
explained the details of urban regulations. Specifically, in 1999 he was answering my questions about urban
regulations, in 2002 he was answering to industrial zones, highway projects, and the 1983 building law, in 2003 we
were again talking on expropriation and public projects in detail. All further quotes refer to these interviews.
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Figure 4-5 (a): Subdivision plan. Figure 4-5 (b): Cover Sheet.
Figure 4-5 (c): Sections and elevations. Figure 4-5 (d): Sections and elevations.
Figure 4-5: Typical 50m 2 building-permit for lot # 1401, in 1969. The permit includes
plans and the map of the informal land subdivision. It is signed and stamped by a civil
engineer and stamped by several DGU offices, the Order of Engineers and Architects, and
the Municipality of Choueyf~t.
Source: Cboug~ft Municpality archives.
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These legal provisions had however strong repercussions for informal settlements. They
implied that no land transactions in informal settlements could be registered in the public Land
Registry or in notaries' registries. As a result, sales registrations in official records became subject
of bribes. They also implied that individuals wanting to register in public record a business, a
medical clinic, a school, or any other facility were unable to do so and were therefore encouraged
to operate without state accreditation (though many individuals preferred to get them, especially
doctors and others). They also rendered registration (even when legal) substantially more
difficult and complicated, especially during a period of war when it was not easy or safe to travel
between agencies in order to secure up to date forms, such as the three-month planning
certificate. Finally, while public records were well updated on existing conditions, they gradually
became poorer in information about sales and property rights (especially informal ones).
Eventually, circumventing these regulations became possible through facilities provided
by other public institutions, notably the Choueyfit Municipality. Acknowledging that applying
these regulations was impossible in Hayy el Sellom, the municipality began to provide in the
mid-1980s so-called "clearances" 3 in order to ease the acquisition of building permits and to
facilitate business registrations, which could then generate tax revenues for the municipality.32
"Clearances" were issued, for example, in Rlie of the certificate of planning required by the DGU
after 1983 (this facility was stopped in the late 1990s). They were also issued in order to attest
that no illegal constructions had been built on a lot, even when this was not the case. This was
important for residents who needed proof of the legality of their buildings in order to register
their businesses. "Clearance forms" continued to be disbursed until recently.
(c) The 1990s: A "special" construction permit for the "displaced"
During the post-war era, the municipal practice of issuing "clearances" remained in
effect. In addition, the municipality and planning agencies continued to turn a blind eye vis-A-vis
illegalities in building applications and to process applications, irrespective of "minor" illegalities.
Between 1994-1999, a new "exceptional" building permit was also in effect, the "special
construction permit for the displaced" that provided "exceptional facilities" and "exemptions"
31 In Arabic, this is referred to as bwat trbwwm " S' . ".
3 A facility is known in Arabic as TaswL It is unclear as to why the municipality would issue such "facilities", other
than most likely in exchange of favors/ bribes. It is a well-known fact that during the war, several actors in the
Choueyfait municipality enriched themselves considerably, especially after the death of the old mayor.
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to any Lebanese citizen who could prove that she/he had been displaced by the war. Law 322 of
1994, the Displaced Prmit Law, provided "citizens displaced by the war" with construction
permits for areas of 120m2 and smaller, even if constructions were in violation of building and
urban codes, as long as they were building in the "village" from which they had been evicted
(Article 1). The idea was to encourage people to move to their "areas of origin" after the war.
Permits were disbursed on the basis of a "certificate of displacement" issued by the
Ministry of Displaced. However, the Ministry of Displaced, whose illegal practices are well
known, has disbursed displacement certificates casually to anyone with "proper social networks"
or "good backing" (see Chapter 5). As a result, some informal settlements residents were able to
enlarge their houses with the help of the Displaced Permit that enabled them to build "legally"
additional sections on their houses (figure 4-6), despite the fact that they might not have been
displaced from the neighborhood and that they were building extensions to their houses and not
replacing destroyed homes.
In several ways, this building permit recalls the 1960s concessions given to rural
migrants: it is a conditional special exemption that allowed residents to build small additions in
this neighborhood (and elsewhere), provided they are identified as "displaced" by the war, and
hence the result of an exceptional situation rather than the normal course of urban development
Building permits were not the only way public institutions circumvented their
regulations. Another relevant example is the legal procedure for acquiring public services, such
as water, phone, and electricity.
4.B.2 Authorization for Services
According to a 1961 legal provision, Law 7279, "it is forbidden to connect property
owners or residents of a lot with phone, service, or electricity if s/he does not provide a
residency permit". 3 Suspended momentarily in 1967 (Law 53/67), this provision was reinstated
by the 1971 building code and reconfirmed in 1983. It applies to all public agencies providing
services, including the Water and Electricity Agencies. There is no large-scale private service
provision in the country.
U The residency permit, Rokbht Iskin or "~iClJ i•J, in Arabic attests, as pointed above, to the conformity of a
construction with the building permit provided for this construction.
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The implications of this regulation were severe for informal settlement dwellers since it
prevented them from accessing urban service legally. However, this regulation was never strictly
applied in practice, since residents in every phase found a way to defy it, as shown below.
(a) The First Phase: 1960-1975
Throughout this phase, most residents acquired services as "special favors" from
politicians who intervened on their behalf. Lebanese politics in these days were tightly organized
around patron-client networks of power (Khalaf 1968, Gilsenan 1986).- As a result, it was the
feudal political authorities of the community, by then ministers and/or parliamentary
representatives, who provided the political leverage to divert urban services towards the
neighborhood.3 They were eager to service the residents since mounting social mobilization
(especially among the Shi'ite populations and Hamket alMahmoami mentioned above) threatened
their until-then unchallenged authority over this community and they found providing urban
services a way of retaining their control w
The process was relatively simple. Once a lot was sold, and new residents began to build
their houses, they formed a committee that paid a "visit" to the politician in charge and asked
him to intervene in their favor. Here are some of the residents' accounts:
I cmea in 1967, obtaied a 50upmentvit and bshi a hbao ... but I awld sot gt d
semnia [...] We swnjart owing fiw the Soux. So w it to Kawd Beck al-As'ad
who ss our aperentati [then Member of Parliament and Minister of Water
and Electric resources.]. He h~b ed He gja Mery hsiding a swer waer. [...] He
then ga wA a crmtat in order to gt lectridy. The Ag ~ss va rLucdat and had toAp
there may riwe. I sas gtting angy and Ipiked up a hge fight at the aqan. [ong
story of how he broke the chair, etc.] Theb the dimtor mald up K=asl Beck and
ithin afew day sw had elecrieiy.
We# frst did a spall swuriool wherbn• v d mUled whAr but it wx my d•g&aJi In the early
1970s, sw wit and sisited Kamel Beck [Kamel Al As'ad] and he qgwd to send te
3 The specificity of patron-client relations in Lebanon is that they are stricdy constructed around sectarian lines
(Gilsenan 1986). As a result, the competition between feudal authorities and tring political movements at the time
remained confined within the sectarian boundaries of every group, in this case especially Shi'ites.
3s Among these, Kamel al-As'ad, the son of Ahmed al-As'ad and himself heavily involved in (feudal} politics, was
appointed Minister of Water and Electric resources, a privileged position for accessing service agencies.
36 On the As'ad- Al Sadr rivalry, see Ajami (1986), on Shi'ite authorities, see Mervin (2000).
37 In another informal settlements in Lebanon, known as Nab'ah, residents called the street names after the two
main feudal lords: Sabti Hamadeh (Biqa) and Kamel al-As'ad (South).
36Interview with Hassan, a developer of the second generation with limited practices in Hayy el Sellom, on July 30,
1999.
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water as long as we paidfor the poes, which we all did He just said that we needed to show
the property rights."
Services were gradually extended as neighborhoods developed and residents visited these
political leaders. These services were facilitated because residents did not violate property rights.
Feudal authority rested on the respect of property rights and no violators of these rights could
access services through them. Several interviewees reported that they were advised to go to the
Public Water Agency with their property titles in hand.
(b) The War Years
During the war era, residents acquired the services through illegal hook-ups (with the
help of militias). Unable to prevent this illegal process, public agencies recurrently attempted to
collect payments for de-facto obtained services. Since they were not entitled to collect fees from
areas where there were illegal constructions, public agencies needed an official cover to do so.
Records of ministerial meetings indicated that as of 1977, both Water and Electricity
(Public) Agencies put forth requests to the Council of Ministers in order to obtain permission to
charge for illegal service hooking, and, shortly after, for illegal buildings altogether.40 The
ministerial decisions that ensued suspended the law through an "exceptional decision" that had
no legal grounds. It was a de-facto response to the weakness of public institutions that
recognized the impossibility of preventing illegal hook-ups. These exemptions, first restricted to
a number of violations and limited to short periods of time, were gradually extended to include
other forms of illegalities and longer time spans.
The first of these ministerial decisions was issued in 1977, two years into the civil war, in
a period of relative calm. It stated that:
[...] in an exceptional manner, public [Water and Electricity] agencies are allowed to
collect fees fim water and electriy usages in buildings [...]that have either not secured
proper building permit or been built in violation to existing codes and urban regulations.
This decision was based on a proposal of the Minister of Water and Electric Resources
who, records indicated, was motivated by financial stress: the necessity to collect fees for already
acquired services. It applied only to violations of construction (and not property) codes and was
39 Interview conducted with Hajjeh Hanneh, in June 15, 1999.
40 Decision No. 2 of the Council of Ministers meeting held on June 30, 1977.
conditional to the regularization of these violations within a maximum period of three years. A
few months later, this decision was widened in scope in order to entitle a broader number of
agencies to benefit from this collection but reduced the delay for regulaization to one year
only.G
During another period of relative calm, in December of 1982, a similar decision was
taken by the Council of Ministers who by then had extended the permit to all forms of
violations without specifying the necessity to regularize these illegalities. However, the ministerial
decision specified that public authorities did not acknowledge any right to residents who paid
fees for services and were entitled to rescind this authorization anytime. It also limited the
application of the law to one year,ý though it was later extended for an additional year.4 4 In
October 1984, the Council of Ministers also allowed public agencies to extend their connections
to illegally built structures on the condition that these structures regularized their situation within
a period of three years or less. Citizens who requested such service connections were given 2
months to apply." Like the 1977 decision, the 1984 decision emerged from public agencies who
needed to recover costs and not residents' claims. Here is how the public official who proposed
this measure explained it:
In 1983, Midents did not quest semianpewitr. Th ha&d taken the seas yfs.
[...]It saM t Mi~iser of Watr d Elaric r uomnaS, on ay tmrq t (I xw t~s a
board msber at the WaIer Ag•g), who piet fot this prposal to t& Com i of
Miniras. The Publrc Agenies • loming a lot of money, it ma bharmimg
unsautinablo, and thl had to do soweting to collt t fs. ...] Of soars, thir
daCiion nas illgak it xas a minisrial deidsion tat rmtaead a lgal ext No law was
irsed to rpel the pF--nrequiuifor a meidba peait [...] It am naonethelus a desiron
takes forth. pabic interst."
Ministerial records indicated that after 1984, while this procedure was not legally
renewed by the Council of Ministers, a memo of the Minister of Water and Electric Resources
actually allowed its extension throughout the period of the civil war.v In 1991, the Council of
41 Ihai
a Decision No. 15 of the Council of Ministers meeting held on October 5, 1977.
I Decision No. 1 of the Council of Ministers meeting held on December 15, 1982.
44 Decision No. 22 of the Council of Ministers meeting held on January 28, 1984.
4 Decision No. I of the Council of Ministers meeting held on October 27,1984.
4' Interview with M.F., held on
7 See references in Decision 21 of the Council of Ministers meeting held on October 10, 1993 (in background
information).
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Ministers met to discuss the necessity to improve the performance of public agencies and
extended again a qualified permission for servicing illegal structures. In 1993, the Council of
Ministers again renewed this measure, excluding this time buildings in violation of property
rights, unless they were inhabited by "displaced individuals".* This decision has, since then,
been renewed yearly at least until 1999.*
(c) The Post War Years
As we have seen above, exemptions for services were still in vigor long after the end of
the civil war (1990). However, an important change happened as of 1996 when the Electricity
Agency began an actual survey of the neighborhood and numbered its streets and houses. The
agency installed meters that were locked and difficult to tamper with and they changed the
electricity lines in the neighborhood in order to reduce, if not prevent illegal hookups. Through
these measures, agencies finally managed to implement the informal regulations they had issued
in the late 1970s. However, the outcome of their intervention could have had unintended
negative impacts on the residents of the neighborhood: as the costs of services increased and the
economic recession loomed, many households who had until then accessed electricity illegally
shifted to private electric generation, relying on small neighborhood generators that considerably
increased street level pollution in a very congested neighborhood. This is also the case of small-
scale industries, for which the costs of public services were prohibitive.50
4.B.3 Expropriation procedures
A third and last example of contrasting legal provisions and state practices is
expropriation.5 The expropriation procedure is a legal provision that allows public planning
agencies to expropriate land at cost (irrespective of the will of owners) when this can be justified
in the name of the "public good". Projects that require expropriation are generally public
facilities, such as schools, hospitals, roads, and others.
4 Decision 21 of the Council of Ministers meeting held on October 10, 1993.
49Given limited access to public archives, I was not able to know whether this decision was renewed since 1999,
although we know that strucmt are still connected.
" This is not to say that illegal hook-ups have completely disappeared in the neighborhood. After a couple of years
of compliance, many households have managed to revert to the old system. However, the new cables are more
difficult to tamper with. Furthermore, strengthened policing has limited these processes to those who could claim
solid protection from political parties and/or policemen.
5st There are several legal texts for expropriation procedures. The founding text was Law 4 or November 30, 1954.
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The expropriation procedure requires public authorities to compensate property owners
for expropriated land and all legal construction built on it A clear procedure is dictated by the
law:. A designated expropiation commission (appointed per govemorae in the country and
delegated by the Ministry of Works) evaluates the value of the property to be expropriated.
Conflicting jurisprudences disagree on whether buildings in violation to construction codes
can/cannot be compensated, but it is generally agreed that no compensations should be paid for
illegal buildings. This practice is relevant to the study because it is one of the means by which
public agencies tried to control Hayy el Sellom's development
In practice, expropriation is a very political and contentions process: the trajectory of a
road and the location or a public facility are highly contested, since property owners attempt to
deviate projects away form their property, often in the hope that they eventually benefit from
the real estate rent generated by the project. Public planning agencies also politicize this tool
since they realize its potentials in providing a good cover for displacing undesired populations at
low political costs. These practices have been common in Lebanese planning history (Deboulet
and Fawaz 2004) and elsewhere (Yiftachel 2000). However, they do not always materialize the
way planners conceptualize them. In order to illustrate the discrepancy between the
exproprimtion text and its practice, I have taken two examples from Hayy el Sellom: the
Lebanese University School of Sciences project in 1968 and the highway project designed in
1973 and renewed several times (but never executed).
(a) Expropriating Land for the Lebanese Universityl
In 1965, as a result of a public decision to build a School of Sciences for the Lebanese
University in Hadath (East of Hayy cl Sellom), a legal decree was issued and the expropriation
committee in charge evaluated the costs of land. The site was partially occupied by a number of
families who had purchased shares in lots and built small houses without construction permits,
in a similar fashion to Hayy el Sellom. Following the texts of the law, public agencies issued an
evacuation order that provided indemnities covering the price of land for 97 families who owned
land in shares in that location. The prices estimated by the expropriation commission were, at
the time, considerably lower than what residents could have obtained if they tried to purchase
s This section is based on interviews with three residents in Hayy el Jame'a in April 2003, among which was one
held with the oldest resident of the area who had moved back to Ba'alback. I met him in his house in the village on
April 4, 2003. Two more houscholds were interviewed within this neighborhood, on April 18, 2004. I had originally
heard about this neighborhood from my interviews in 1999. Y.D. and M.C. at the DGU completed the story.
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land in a similar area.5 Furthermore, public agencies did not account for the costs of (illegal)
houses.
Families threatened by the displacement decision protested loudly and appealed to their
political representatives- and to other important political figures of the time." Support to these
families finally came, in the late days of 1968, from Imam Musa al-Sadr. The Imam used the
leverage of the Higher Shi'ite Council and his own political clout to secure a housing option for
the displaced families in neighboring areas.s' It is said that the interventions of the Lebanese
president and the governor of Beirut were necessary for this procedure. Nonetheless, at the end
of 1968, land was purchased from a family in Mrayjeh through the mediation of the Higher
Shi'ite Council who then appealed to the topographer working with Abu Raymond in order to
organize an informal land subdivision: lots were subdivided in 100-200m2 ars, boundaies were
marked with poured concrete, sales were registered first in notary registries and later, once the
entire lot was sold, in the Public Land Registry. Residents were given land in exchange of
expropriated land, and allowed to purchase additional area if they could afford to. They were
also granted an exceptional 3 month period to build houses without building permits, and
hooked to the public and electricity networks without residency permits, but never given legal
papers.5
: This was perhaps the most eloquent example of public sector agencies circumventing
their own regulations and adopting the practices of informal developers as a model for their
work. The neighborhood, Hayy el Jami'ah, is today one of the sub-neighborhoods of Hayy el
Sellom (figure 4-7). Furthermore, many of these displaced families commissioned the
construction of their houses to Hayy el Sellom builders. However, unlike other sub
neighborhoods of Hayy el Sellom that were initiated through the efforts of developers and
family early comers, Hayy elJami'ah was built on the initiative of a semi public agency and
3 It is estimated, as shown above, that informal developers sell land to residents in small shares for almost the
double of what they buy it in large portions: as a rule of thumb, they sell the dra' (9/16m2 at the price they purchase
one m2. This discrepancy explains the difference between the prices estimated by the expropriation commission and
what residents had in effect paid at the time.
4 They visited the Shi'ite leaders mentioned above, notably at the time Sabri Hamadeh and the As'ad family.
" Among these, these families went to the leader of the National Movement, KamalJumblat, who was operating on
a platform of social justice.
" As described previously in the chapter, the Higher Shi'ite Council was then in the making.
7 A few years later, when phone lines became available and residents went to reclaim them, their request was
rejected because their houses were "illegal".
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Figure 4-7: Hayy elJami'ah appears clearly on the 1978 aerial photograph. It is possible to see
the well-subdivided two lots, in the upper left corner.
Base photo: Georges Stephan et Fils.
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through the permission and patronage of public agencies and officials who allowed the head of a
semi-public agency to replicate the procedures developed by informal developers.
(b) Expropriating land for a highway
Since the early 1970s, a highway project looms over Hay el Sellom and threatens to wipe
out a large section of the neighborhood and to displace its population (figure 4-8). The adopted
scheme (developed by a French engineering firm, BCEOM) is a two ways, 4 lanes highway
scheme with an interchange crossing over Hayy el Sellom to form the main southern
entrance/exit of Beirut. The 80m wide highway design has no pedestrian overpasses.
Testimonies of high-ranking officials indicated that the expropriation tool was adopted
at the time as a relatively easy mechanism to wipe out the neighborhood. Indeed, the
expropriation law states that once a project is approved, the state appointed Governorate
(Mubhfathab) expropriation commission prepares a detailed expropriation file for every lot,
without any negotiation with landowners. This provides many advantages to a public actor that
wants to avoid negotiations with the displaced populations, and it seems that policymakers were
well aware of these advantages:
The hsgbshy allioed them to copmpriate the land with no disrcssion. [...] The
npriation law is dckar yo invi•e the cwnmission to wealuate the cost andyou pqy those
who ha rights. If the owers do not agree, thb can appel ons. There is not mchb room
for gis and tak&-5
Thus, the Hayy el Sellom highway had been explicitly designed to go through this
settlement, as a strategy to displace the population and dismantle the growing popular
mobilization that was gaining visibility by the early 1970s.9 By then, "security incidents" were
multiplying in several informal settlements in Beirut and the army had been deployed repeatedly
around them (El-Khazen 2000, Salibi 1976)." My investigations indicated that the highway's
location was directly dictated by a high ranking public official: '
-" Several political parties were then actively mobilizing the neighborhood populations: the Communist Party, the
Mourabitoun, and especially Amal were recurremndy mentioned by residents in interviews.
6o Newspapers in 1973-74 are full of daily incidents between informal settlers and police or military forces. This was
because the former were then mobilized by the National Block and close to the Palestinian Liberation Organization
while the army was close to right-wing militias who opposed these trends (el-Khazen 2000).
6t While I was able to verify closely this information, officials were promised secrecy on the name and position of
this authority.
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Figure 4-8: Highway trajectory as designed by BCEOM in 1973, laid over
Hayy el Sellom 1978 base map.
Source: Unknown.
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The idea of the bigbhway was a poklit dcision, not a technial one. It was in the ea~ry
1970s. Public atorfias wnted to erase Hy ea Sedlo. [...] When the French
conJdants [ BCEOM] anrri4 they m wqmtekd dirt •y  ..] to pa the inter•hange
owr Haq el Se/low. Then we aready many homes in the nghborbood, midents bad too
many daims, poia pares mm asciwy mobikiig for tbw, siedaly Mra al Sadr
[..I. t was not that tbe highays s not needag thie &COfrY, thV r paort of a
prgiedt and design to modemnim the cmnhry. [...] Hoxsw; yox an bcardha jmtf technbical
the wcessity to place a highagy eXhange owr a residental eIghborhood... espedally with
the jfm ofambaniaion at the liwe.62
This highway story could evoke an all-powerful Foucauldian image of the state in line
with analysis that characterizes planning as a rather violent process oriented to the vision and
advantage of ruling elites (Yichtafel 2000). Yet, if one looks at the implementation of the
highway, a contrasting image arises. The outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 interrupted
the highway implementation. Besides a short-lived period in 1983, during which the plans were
discussed again, it was only 20 years later, after the end of the civil war, that the highway plans
were revisited. A Lebanese consulting firm, Kbhadb e& AAm i, was assigned the task of designing
the details of the highway. The planned highway path was slightly modified, but it still cut the
neighborhood in half displacing approximately 800 households.e Over this period, the highway
trajectory was re-approved twice (1993, 1996) but never executed.
During the post war era (1990-to date), no road project was implemented in Lebanon
without paying compensations to the displaced population. While the official expropriation
commission evaluates the rights of legal owners, the Ministry of Displaced compensates
households who will be displaced, although they have no legal entitlement. The rates of
compensations have varied from project to project, but since 1999, a ministerial decision (and
not a legal text) has set prices for each type of compensation in order to reduce the negotiation
phase." There are no legal grounds for these compensations, and no clear criteria for who can be
considered "a displaced person", knowing that the majority of residents have no plans to "go
back to their areas of origin". Nonetheless, in the post-war era, these compensations began
"
2 Interview with M.F., op dt
63 Actually, none of the consultants working on the project counted the number of displaced household, arguing
that this will only factor in during the final execution phase. This figure was suggested by students in a course I co-
taught with Mona Harb and Isabelle Peillen at the Lebanese University, School of Urbanism, in 1999.
6Decision No. 32, issued by the Council of Ministers on July 12, 2001. The decision adopted a price list for
compensations, based on the quality of construction and the occupied surface area. There are no distinctions
between legal and illegal land occupation, since land is compensated separately by normal expropriation procedures.
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0 Approved highway and roads L Public domain, river and airport
Figure 4-9: Approved areas for expropriation in Hayy el Sellom in 2003.
Source: Information and base map from BTUTP.
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risings so much so that they sometimes made up, along with expropriation costs, the most
important component of a project's cost According to the head of a (now dissolved) public
agency, compensations and land prices made up to 75-90% of project costs in the capital by the
mid 1990s." These compensations therefore began to determine whether a public project would
be implemented or not. This is how, an illegal compensation, originally adopted to facilitate the
implementation of state projects, became a determinant of national transportation policy.67
In 1994, the Mount Lebanon Expropriation Commission sent engineers to Hayy el
Sellom and marked the houses located on the highway trajectory, causing serious ruckus in the
community. Landowners hurried to evict tenants (in order to accumulate all possible
compensations for themselves) and political parties were alerted to the possibility of a
confrontation with the state. However, the Commission was by then familiar with similar
problems in nearby neighborhoods where highways were being implemented. Here is how one
of the engineers on the commission described it:
Wie ont to fe site and saw the number of hosesr. There as rear no need to wwnt. It as
dekar at there d aald 14 no poheal pioribi to rewop all thee nrsideak: o~pessaionr
woakd be too high. [...] Of course, as a .rnam n, w do not cofPte ilgal
sovmPasations. Wejut loo at what is kga and what is lwal hxcluds al ha is bil It
aould therfore be the Ministry of Disrplead wbo xswed aenal#bva paid tdm, but tby
are ilkgal [...] We sent a epbort and ne knew it aix d not befollowd thAogh si6 a care
Then wa no need to negotit nat the paal pria L. The case wrs clear. Thy nerw
asked as to go .back.
It was the political mobilization of residents elsewhere in the city with the support, help,
and incitement of political parties that lead to modifying the expropriation measures, and,
eventually, the highway trajectory. Indeed, several failed attempts to cut other informal
's This is especially due to the backing of political parties to residents of informal settlements. In order to insure
their positions as brokers between the state and residents, political parties encourage residents to reclaim high
compensations. This strategy then forces public agencies to go through political parties in order to reach an
acceptable settlement with the population (Harb 2000).
" This figure could be exaggerated and others brought it down to 50%. However, all interviewed public actors
agreed that coapensations and expropriation costs were the single highest cost components in public projects and
that they provided the basis for decisions on project implementation over the last decade.
67 This is especially the case in the southern suburbs of the capital where the two main active political parties, Amal
and Hizb'Allah compete over residence allegiance by negotiating higher compensations. In order to implement
projects in the area, the approval of the political parties has become necessary since they had proven their capacity
to mobilize residents. Furthermore, the power of decision-making is not isolated from the state, since these parties
have penetrated state structures and participate in its decision. This is notably the case with Amal whose leader,
Nabih Berd, is also the head of the Lebanese parliament.
0 Interview held in June 2003 with Mr. Z.S. in the Ministry of Public Works.
171
.-. .._ ...... -: .. . L_....... - - _·- ·(W ý
,Ui : J~J
Figure 4-10 (a): Proposed zoning for the area between
The planning goes around the neighborhood.
Source: Councilfor Reconstruction and Development.
the Airport and Hayy el Sellom.
Figure 4-10 (b): Projected highway plan over Hayy el Sellom. This is the proposed (and
rejected) 2003 revised version that sought to narrow down the highway trajectory over the
neighborhood.
Source: Councilfor Reconstruction and Development.
172
3*lu J-JJ l-1 ..........
r~-n-uurr-abm--r~i-a~r~·. · SJ;u~4:~·-~~;-n~i~ L~~LJa-  ~ S
settlements in the southern suburbs of Beirut had lead to violent outbreaks'" and/or strong
political mobilization that coerced state agencies into paying large indemnities to residents who
were being displaced. Here is how the engineer in charge of the project in the Council for
Development and Reconstruction describes the situation:
Given the kind of mobifgiadon that we encountcring to move 10 houses in [the
informal settlement of] Raml [also in the southern suburbs of Beirut] on the
bighway before reahing Hqay el Selom, it was clear that something bad to be done to
deiate the trajectoty. We did not really get into the negotiations of the bighway. It was
pointles. 0
Accordingly, the highway plans have been considerably modified over the past decade.
An alternative 2+2 lane highway was designed to cut through the airport domain, in order to
avoid expropriation and compensation costs. Later, in 2003, another consulting firm, Dar el
Handassab, proposed to narrow down the current highway trajectory to a 2+2 lane "urban
boulevard". The main political players, the Ministry of Works and the DGU, have however
rejected it7. This rejection, according to this engineer and all others interviewed, is a political
rather than technical issue:
When we studied the southern entrances of the capital d, we knew that we vould still need
the two lanes that were not executed in the airport. So technically, the problem was clear, the
higbhway is needed [...] The problem is boweverpoitical We will not be able to implement
the highway because of political opposition. [...] Neither my cbildren nor I will see this
bighoway but, we owe it to our children to at kleatpstpenv itspath. [... It is not scientflc; it
is Hi.~b Allah and Amal•7
69 The most famous such incident is the Ouzfi Highway design. Faced with the impossibility of executing a highway
and displacing populations, public authorities resort to the design of a 16m wide bridge that would run over the
existing road. Violent protests of residents and shop owners on the existing South Lebanon road lead to the beating
of the personal advisor of the Prime Minister who was coming to the area in order to place the project's first stone.
The plan has since then been suspended (An Nahar and As Safir dailies in June 2002).
o Interview held with Engineer A. A. in the CDR in June 27, 2003.
71 It was the Prime Minister, a relentless entrepreneur, who proposed himself this alternative pathway. He saw the
necessity of implementing the highways as a pillar of his NERP plan but also feared the accumulating costs of
compensations. Here is how one of his closest advisors describes it in a meeting held in his office in June XX:
Wle mr faing out to Paris and the issue of the Soutern exist of Beirut aws gy much of te Prime
Minisxr's mind We ma graing tied with untbkeabkl comperaion cartr [...]. The politial partin
w wnorgingtsplok to ask for higherprias... As the plane took qif h be ga to see the congesion
in the ne•gbborhood and then the spac in the airport domain so be said to me: '~hy don't wujustgo
thbrogh the aiqpot". He calkd up the CDR and that was it. The bigbAwy w•nt through the aipot.
7 Interview held with Mr. A.A., engineer at the CDR on June 27, 2003 in his office. This was followed up with an
interview in November 12, 2003, in which he explained that the 2+2 lanes highway had been rejected.
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4.B.4 The Practice and the Law
The review of expropriation procedures, building permit provisions, and service delivery
indicates that while public agencies dictated a dear set of laws in order to regulate the process of
construction, servicing, and expropriation, these laws were not systematically implemented.
Instead, public agencies resorted to ad-hoc regulations, thereby circumvented their own urban
regulations that were impossible to implement, especially given the particular social and political
contexts in which they were imposed.
It is interesting to contrast the conditions under which different exemptions were issued
and how these conditions changed over time. The provision of building permits in the 1960s-
70s, even if in the form of exceptional building permits, implied de-facto recognition of the right
to build in the: city, which was sealed by public officials and state accredited actors. Although it
was delivered under somewhat exceptional procedures, this type of permit recognized the
presence of new urban dwellers in the city and their right to build and occupy its (albeit
marginal) spaces. These permits, or the recognition of a right to build in the city, were the result
of a political mobilization challenging exclusive modes of urban governance and reclaiming
recognition for rural migrants as urban dwellers. Similarly, the 1969 expropriation procedures
that entitled displaced households to rebuild their houses and access services elsewhere
recognized their long-term presence in the city and their right to continue to live there. In
contrast, urban services such as water and electricity were "granted" during the same period as
"favors" from feudal powers that allowed the extension of their patron-client networks without
questioning the "public order". Threatened by rising political movements, we have seen above
that these political figures fought, through such favors, in order to maintain popular allegiance to
their rule (Ajarni 1986).
Furthermore, none of these exceptions resulted from political mobilization alone. The
necessities for public agencies to control urban development, limit illegal growth, and insure
their own sustainability and legitimacy in the city were also main factors for these practices. It is
in fact possible to describe exceptions as modified versions of the building law that were still
acceptable to the powers that be. Similarly, elected representatives were only willing to provide
"favors" to those who could show their ownership title, for their authority rested on property,
but not the respect of building codes. Even within the municipality, which had given in to
political pressures and paved a few roads within the neighborhood, heated debates occurred
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among a number of politicians and municipal engineers who called for the regularization of the
area in order to contain its growth.73
However, authorities maintained this conciliatory attitude only as long as they thought
they could contain Hayy el Sellom's development. The sequence of events that lead the DGU to
move from engaging informal developers with master plans and 50m2 permits to commissioning
a highway to cut through the neighborhood eloquently illustrates the frustration of public agents
in containing this development, and their unwillingness to negotiate its growth outside of their
own terms. This antagonistic public attitude was not limited to highway plans. At the time, the
Mayor of Choueyfit also began to exert pressure on Abu Raymond whom he summoned on
several occasions to his office and urged to stop his business. The Mayor also continued to be
adamantly opposed to the idea of a regularization policy that was beyond the scope of
concessions the municipality was willing to make.7 This general antagonism vis--vis Hayy el
Sellom coincided with a broader change in the outlook of public officials vis-i-vis informal
settlements in the city-: with mounting political mobilization everywhere, they began to see in
informal settlements a threat to public security and they therefore increased their attempts at
curtailing their development'.
By the early 1970s, militias began to take control of this neighborhood and they actively
recruited members among its populations. These militias encouraged residents to disrespect
public regulations and offered their "protection" to cover for illegal practices. As a result, most
residents shifted strategies from seeking to engage authorities and gain public recognition to
relying on militias in order to acquire services through illegal hook-ups, build without regard to
construction codes, and rely on a militia to face the threat of displacement posed by public
projects.
7 An important (and missing) piece of this puzzle is the sectarian dimension of these negotiations, which goes a
long way in explaining the development and outcomes of these processes. Indeed, in the early 1970s, the
competition between political parties (especially Al-Sadr) and feudal lords in the State was strictly limited in Hayy cl
Sellom within the confines of the Shi'ite community. Furthermore, the reluctance of the Mayor of Choueyfat to give
in to popular resistance and regularize the neighborhood must have also resulted from the religious denomination
of this community (Muslim Shiite), while his Druze and Christian constituency was reluctant to recognize the
penetration and permanence of other religious groups in this area. Further investigations would however be
required before the scale and implications of this sectarian play are fully developed.
74 Here too the religious/sectarian dimension should be recalled, along with their visions and aspirations of the
"good city".
7 In informal settements where the presence of militia groups was dearer and more direct, armed forces were
recurrently sent with failed attempts at eviction (Chapter 2).
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The outbreak of the civil war drastically changed the position of the state. In 1976, a
considerably weakened public sector faced the residents of Hayy el Sellom who were now less
troubled by the legality of their construction. Concerned about their financial sustainability,
public service agencies were themselves requesting that exceptions be made to entitle them to
formally service illegal areas (while in the previous phase it was residents who had sought
recognition). Moreover, unable to ignore the scale of widespread illegal urban developments and
incapable of preventing them, planning agencies went through extra measures to render "illegal"
practices even more illegal, requesting even more paperwork and imposing ever more stringent
regulations on illegal construction. These measures however only resulted in higher levels of
illegality and lower state-society interaction. They also never halted the process of exceptional
regulations that continued to be issued for years to come.
It should be noted that exemptions were not only introduced for poor urban dwellers.
To the contrary, many exemptions were issued for upper income developments, such as
exclusive beaches that dosed-off public lands for the rich in the 1960s (Verdeil 2002). The
mastery of Al Sadr was to force similar exemptions in favor of poorer urban dwellers.
Furthermore, violations to urban regulations seemed to have been widespread throughout the
city since in 1971, the first (of three) regularization law was issued, allowing owners of
constructions built in violation to particular construction codes to adjust their legal status in
exchange of a fee. Designed to increase state revenues, according to their authors, these
regulations are also the acknowledgment that public agencies were no more capable of
containing irregularities in the city and had to resort to after the fact management
Despite its prevalence, the practice of "exceptional regulations" was however never
recognized by public agencies as a pattern of ruling. Instead, even as they issued exceptional
procedures, planning agencies continued to legislate exclusive urban regulations that did not take
into account the neighborhood's urbanization. This has been true since the pre-war era, when,
for example, the DGU simultaneously designed "special master plans" for individual lots in
Hayy el Sellom and approved land-use and zoning regulations that dictated large lots and limited
constructions in the neighborhood. Furthermore, planning agencies have not let go of their ideal
scenario of totally eradicating Hayy el Sellom. The highway plans that were put forth for as of
1973 explicitly proposed a (disguised) large-scale eviction plan for the neighborhood. Despite a
recognized inability to implement such a policy, and several suggestions by engineers to deviate
the trajectory of this highway, public agents have continued to hold on to this decision.
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Rather than questioning this approach to governance, the dominant post-war
reconstruction came to reassert it. The war provided the opportunity to re-label all informal
settlers as "war refugees" and describe them as "temporarily displaced populations" to whom
"special refugee permits" should be granted. Furthermore, as new land use and zoning
regulations were developed for the areas surrounding the neighborhood (south and south-west),
in order to account for its new
urbanization, these plans
systematically stopped at the fringes
of the neighborhood which continues
to be legislated with the previously
inadequate master plans. In order to
reassert their rule, public agencies
increased policing over the area,
opening a police station at the edge of
Hayy el Sellom for surveillance.
Conversely, and well in line with
earlier practices, public agencies
continued to issue refugee building
pennits and special clearances.
Public Actors Role
Mhkhbir Facilitates "trust" by acting as an
identifier of community
members.
Dqay i Abe Intervened in favor of residents
Parmaot for services.
DGU Curk Issues illegal papers, processes
e permits, facilities.
Na.tay Pxbki Registers land sales, even when
lots are illegally subdivided.SAauijbal Can issue exemptions and
.. facilities or tum a blind eye to
S Pekanaaa Allowed illegal building in
Sexch for bribes.
Stak Avadiad Organizes and secures processes
T.pgr*bhr of lot subdivision.
j Enupru, aarudiad Signs building permits and
ly tA OrAr facilitates processing.
Table 4-4: Public Actors in Hayy cl Sellom
4.C ACTORS WTrHIN AND OUTSIDE THE STATE
Not only did public actors produce exceptional regulations that circumvented their own
rule, but a group of them also participated in the production of illegal spaces over Hayy el
Sellom's various phases of development. Far from the normally ascribed roles of state actors as
processing requests, insuring compliance with urban regulations, and (when all is in order)
issuing legal authorizations, a number of public agents participated in the production of illegality
and used laws as the basis of a private informal enterprise sustained and protected by public
agencies.
As shown in Chapter 3, part of the network of informal developers in Hayy el Sellom
consisted of public sector agents. Some agents were involved in registering informal transactions
(makhtdr and notary public), while others were involved in accrediting informal developments
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(state-accredited topographer, engineers). There are also lower level clerks in the Municipality
and the DGU, and policemen in the local or central police stations. Some of these actors were
elected officials, going from the lowest level neighborhood authorities, such as the wmkbtir or
municipal council members,7 all the way to elected representatives in the country's parliament.n
These also included appointed officials, such as notaries,m policemen, and other street-level
bureaucrats in charge of urban regulations (e.g. Directorate General of Urbanism, DGU), record
keeping (e.g. notary, Land Registry), and service provision (e.g. public water and electricity
authorities).
In parallel to the generations of developers, it is possible to trace generations of "public
entrepreneurs" in the neighborhood, those who managed to make legality their business and
eventually passed it along to their children or apprentices. Many of those who work in Hayy el
Sellom today were trained under the first generation of "public entrepreneurs". These include
the state accredited topographer, the notary public, the municipal clerks, and others.
A detailed investigation of Hayy el Sellom's development showed that one family, the H
family, lead a strategy of state penetration as of the 1960s, providing mediation between the state
and the residents of Hayy el Sellom, and developing a business of selling legality. In total, five H
family members have been public servants. Mohamad H was an employee in the Ministry of
Public Works in the 1960s. His brother Fawzi was and remains a DGU clerk. Fawzis two
children and nephew are employed at the Municipality- two as policemen and the third as a clerk.
Finally, Mansour (Faw2z and Mohamed's brother) has attempted to take up the position of
mukbtdr." This section follows the trajectories of two brothers, Mohammad and Fawzi H, the
nephews of Hajj Hamad H (refer to Chapter 3). Fawzi is also married to Hajj Hamad's daughter.
76 We have seen in Chapter 2, Plical Or~aniatiaon in Hatr d Sdeso, that local elected representatives such as the
municipal council members are almost completely unaccountable to the residents of Hayy el Sellom who in vast
majority continued to vote in their areas of origin rather than in the capital city.
77 These are, as shown below, elected representatives from the areas of origin of the population (South Lebanon and
Biqa).
78 As described in Chapter 2, notaries play a key role in Hay el Sellom since registration of property titles in their
records is an important market guarantee. Around five notaries have played important roles in the area. The notary
registers land sales, in shares, and become after 1983 the only legal way to register transactions. They are in fact
illegal, but some notaries have not abided by the law.
9 The MUAkbhr (or _P" in Arabic) is an elected representative, entrusted with the identification of populations and
the certification of papers for the state.
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The H Brothers
When they arrived to Hayy el Sellom in 1955, the H brothers were children. Their
families had fled the Biqa', following their uncle, after tribal rifts intensified. The children of a
Lebanese army soldier, the brothers soon began to look into public sector employment in order
to earn a living. As an early comer of the H family, their father briefly worked as an intermediary
in the land business of Abu Raymond, along with his brother, Hajj Hamad, and the two young
men quickly understood the benefits that could accrue from their participation in the
construction sector (Chapter 3).
In the early 1960s, Mohammad H, the older of the two brothers, found employment in
the Ministry of Public Works and obtained a low level clerk position where he was paid a meager
salary. At the time, the DGU -where permits were processed (but not granted) - fell under the
jurisdiction of this Ministry of Works and many engineers and architects came to the ministry to
follow through their applications. Mohammad had therefore many opportunities to meet
engineers and architects who were sometimes willing to sign 50m2 standard building permits.
Over time, Mohammad had strong enough relations with some of these engineers that they were
willing to sell him their whole quota, the maximum allocated yearly constmruction quota that every
engineer had from the Syndicate of Engineers and Architects. Here is how he described the
process: N
I first b•gan to work in the provision of buidingpr itr. A building perait woud cost a
clint betwen 250-300LP. At the time, I wsed to work with one engineer mosty, [...], but
then there en other aas sell [...]. The ngineer wold sign the permit and then I wulddfollow up on the prcdure in the Order of nginers and at the Munic~alic . Therem s
times an engineer [...] xuld sell me bis whole qota.
At the tisme, I ws a clerk in the Ministrj of Pubic Work. [...] The DGU as under thejunrrdidion of tbir Minir, which facitated my task sonsiderabb. I aadd rent the right
people, learn the procedures, andfollow up frm within on requests.
Oer tim, I learned bow to make the plans and became known to may rsidents as a
Mouhbandss' (Engineer) yse• . [...]I x•o d f•i the entire ppliron fmru, do the
drawings and gather the information. That iould limit fy reliance on the engineers to the
sigature. It became cheaper
8 All four quotes are taken from interviews with M.H., op ds
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Sometimes, the engineer muld make us sign aform attting that he was not raponible for
the constrution itseF It was fine with us. [...] We trally didn't need their expertise. We
built high and never saw anything crumbfng.
So next to being a public agent, Mohamad developed his own private business: the
provision of "building permits" for residents to build their houses in Hay el Sellom but also, he
explained, in Laylaki, Ouzi, Raml, and other informal settlements in the vicinity, in exchange for
a fee (figure 2-3).
Over time, Mohammad had met enough architects and developed enough social
relations that he did not need his public sector position anymore. Furthermore, he had formed a
construction work team and bought some construction equipment, and this growing
construction business was requiring his attention and time. He was also beginning to consider
subdividing lots on his own. By 1969, he was so overworked that he decided to resign his job in
the public sector.
As for Fawzi, he has been a full-time employee at the DGU since the late 1960s, moving
between positions. For most of his carrier, Fawzi has been a moudarmb,I a clerk entrusted with
verifying building permits and insuring their compliance to urban regulations in several branches
of the DGU..- At times, he has also played the role of "escort" ' to the director". Next to this
public position, Fawzi has also kept a private business in Hayy el Sellom, where he has held an
office specialized in the provision of building permits. Faw2i has also assisted his brother with
land sales, contracting (especially connections to public services), and construction.
Fawzv's private business rested on his public sector employment. As an employee of the
DGU, Fawzi was able to build good connections with engineers and architects, the same way his
brother did before him. Furthermore, as an employee of the DGU, Fawzi was able to insure the
circumvention of regulations from within, when it was impossible to insure their formal
compliance from without. He explained that in the phases when exemptions from maximum
built area could not be insured, and hence other clerks refused to deliver permits (for a reason
that he always believes was "political'", he went directly to the DGU archives where he hid
previously delivered permits, confusing public records and allowing for the provision of a larger
number of building permits than was legally sanctioned. Here is how he described the process to
me:
*1 There is no direct translation to this position, known as Madamb or "Y.~~" in Arabic.
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I rwed to go in the arcnbi and bide the oldpermits. [..] So sayit porible topmde
50 pemit, onc 50 permits had been deiw4r All I had to do wa go in the ahrhiws
(wheM Ineded to for my xrk anyw y) and hide 25 of thue 50 permitv, so that more
permts could be deliad without pleading or bibdr! s
He also sold this service to people who wanted to review their old permits:
One of the semiC I provided ws biding twords inside t arcbies so people could ick
other pubic agsent in the DGU. [...] Ona I bid an oriuald permit in the anmbhi, the
onxy rwaining rtnna as the cop of the permi tat was lft )i the building's onwer..
[...] If that building oxwer had a*tred his permi it vould be dffil for the public agent:
to know ... [.. sina the agent who looks for the oinal doament sill not fnd it ... and
all be can do is trust the doctment krougt by the appliante, n !fit had bemn modi~s M
Over time, as Hayy el Sellom became more established, Fawi became bolder in his
violation of state regulations. He struck a deal with the police station to replace, whenever
necessary, the building permit with a personal permit he delivered, which was then approved by
the police station. Hence, he used the legal requirement to create a private business from which,
eventually, the state was excluded. At times, the choice of processing a legal permit turned to
basic economics:
Then wre still semral reasons to app for a legal buik'ng permit Somrstmes, the 'rice"
of the pol got too penDver, even ptrohbitij, so it s cu haper to get a legal prmi. .. ]
Also, sonmstins clents needed regitrt ionpapersfo t the mun&c4ial~ y to ablek to rgister
a businwsfor exampk, and so we knew it asprfeimble to be legal
During the war, less and less people believed in state capacity to implement its
regulations and as a result, the business of permit provision declined. However, since the return
of the state in the post-war era, Fawi picked up his practice again, aided by his son, Ali who has
been employed as a municipal clerk since 1993. Fawzi continued to follow-up on procedures and
help developers obtain permits. He assisted, for example, Mr. Darwish, Mr. Barakit, and other
large-scale developers of the last generation in obtaining legal permits and a quick look at
2 The escort is mormfq or "CdOiL" n Arabic.
3 Interview held with Mr. Fawza H, op dt.
a Ibid
'Ibid.
records indicated that these permits have a number of illegalities that were somehow
overlooked.6
From his position as a public sector servant, Fawz also attempted to encourage residents
to regularize their legal status when the first regularization law was issued in 1971. He then
invited a number of engineers he knew to help groups of lot owners build a regularization case,
and provided his own services to follow-up the procedures through:
In 1971, thenrs a a rea guwition hn that A s rpaad for al Lebaon. We did t& mx s
fir afiw lots, and ten s= began to loby to obtain a aiwflr the frs. Howwr,; by te
tiAe t DGU sent someons to ins~wsga & tsi, it s• a yar and a bhaflatr and many
peopl had ilt ma d won so tbe bolx pro•s amr sta d [...] This wus h ae for lot
1400, 1401, and lot 1371. On 1371, tbrn r m 19 houms that ws msuid to yvlarigNfir the Hannon., Nable• , or Hameb families [the lot, he says, was 17000sq.m]. I
brought a drc a and a DGU doe [he names them], and s deweloped afkle bard
on th uatiomw (eploitaon ratido a vwd). As it *sed ouwt, wald bas had to pay
4 millons! The rainjalil aijwd to let s pay tktar in insta~ k trbut nsoooboypaidd
Nonetheless, Fawz2 declared he was far from convinced that the "state" cared for the
residents of the neighborhood. He believed all public institutions were extremely biased and
disinterested in the fate of low-income residents, especially the Muslim Shi'ite among them.= As
someone in charge of implementing the law, he is far from convinced of its fairness:
You, the Stae, are foindg me to do ilgal th s, I am not rriong.. All I ho is a ewo
anda donkt and I a t to send a kidto sAool and pay te fees and I o ow a small
piec oflmd [...]The stat has barrh ngulaonrs... and thy do it on purpase to show &at
sw an bad peopl. I cam giwyou many exauapls bmen imporLant Chisidan ocpials stewd
to posew Aribk nga•u io on sus so e cannot build [...] Thy chaged te nVldion in
all of Labaon expt for Ha el Selom: 2000, Pbat a jake?! [...] Thisr Vning it
toal setaria... otbh ire, wby wod Ha' h•as 2000o and searx y MhrM bh and
Hadai [Christian towns] be rxned B. 1.1 [600m2 lots] and thr rside;k allowed to
bihd mon on smaller lots? "
SThere are clearly some irregularities in the permits of these large projects, and I believe that Mr. H and his son
have been able to process these permits with irregularities in them. For instance, the 'Abbis Complex was granted a
building permit in 1994 for a residential complex while the lot is parially zoned for industrial usage since 19701
What raised my suspicion more towards the legality of these permits and the role of the H family was the
disappearance of the building permits for the 'Abbis and Baraki complexes the same day I was granted permission
to access the municipal records (in front of Mr. 'Ali H). Mr. 'Ali H had just mentioned to me that "these permits are
full of ilegalitics", and I unwittingly responded by saying I was precisely interested in those.
' bid
0 Until the 1990 Ta'ef agreements that ended the Lebanese civil war, Shi'ites were considered traditionally as
excluded of public institutions and maginalized in political decision-making (Ajami 1986, Norton 1988, Salibi 1988,EI-Khazen 2000).
JIbid
182
Aside from public employment, members of the H. family have sought involvement in
public elections and some of them ran for public offices. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Hs had
transferred their family's legal registration to Choueyfit and they were thus able to participate in
local elections. It was unusual for rural migrants to follow these steps because they usually
derived their political strength from connections to political representatives (deputies in
parliament) in their areas of origin. However, the Hs (and several other families) saw advantages
in this transfer. "When we moved here", explained Mohamad Hassan H, "we were ostracized
from our village (tha'er), so we had little hope of going back to our area of origin. While others
appealed to politicians or feudal lords, we put all our resources and lives here and decided to
transfer our voting power here". Based on this transfer, the H brothers tried to take up officially
elected positions. One of them, Mansour, sought the position of mukhtrk, a locally elected
representative whose main task consists of certifying information about registered residents of a
neighborhood for public records. This position does not formally benefit a developer in his
practice, but it was common among developers in the neighborhood to appeal to a mxkbtir for
"official" representation upon an agreement on land sales. This position also provides important
social relations and prestige that can indirectly serve the purposes of a developer. "We were
hoping to have my brother Mansour instituted as a mxkbtir [...], but we have so far not
succeeded. We will try in the next round (election every four years in theory). [...] Everybody in
the family already refers to him as the makbhti9' explained Mohammad H. His other brother,
Fawzi, already an employee of the DGU, also ran for a seat in the Choueyfat municipal council
in the 1998 municipal elections but did not win either. Nonetheless, Fawrn H who had already
succeeded in appointing his son 'Ali as a municipal clerk in 1993, succeeded in placing his
younger son and his nephew as municipal policemen after the elections. Here is how he
described the process:
I ran against his [current mayors'] list in the [1998] municipal eleions to etabrish that
a Sbhite can preent bimaselin Chongfit and win. I know that I onn in the elediou, we
an from this area and many people know s. 1We hav important social elations. I know
that I "broke in their rst" [...]. They ten delayed the dtion nrsts for a wholk week and
after that eek, thy said that ir irt won enrey [..] that was te lit of Mir Mq
[Arslan, important feudal family in the area] and dare was an agryment nth his
rival [MP Walid, another feudal family in the area with a long history of
involvement in the war] Jmbli that his list wrould be entiry voted in ... later they
employed nmy son and um nmphew in the Mueniqpalky as a sign of regnition. 9091
90 The results of the elections being extremely politicized and muddled with corruption, it is impossible to verify
whether Fawzrs claim that he had won enough votes to be on the municipal council but was nonetheless excluded
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Today, 'Ali plays an important role in the municipality where the Mayor has appointed
him representative of Hayy el Sellom to follow up on the neighborhood issues: he collects
complaints in the neighborhood, processes permits if need be, follows up on procedures, etc.
According to the Mayor, the scale of the problems that emerged daily from this neighborhood
convinced him of the necessity to appoint a full-time employee on this task.
The H brothers were not the only actors crossing between roles inside and outside the
state. Many other low-level public servants played similar roles in the neighborhood, making a
business out of legality but, simultaneously, facilitating the circulation of regulations from and to
the residents and the application of the law, often in distorted ways. In fact, it is impossible to
imagine the development of this neighborhood without the circulation of these actors and the
services and securities they provided. In Chapter 3, it was clear that various public actors, in their
capacity as "state accredited actors" and hence part of the "ideal state", played a central role in
the production of illegality or informal housing development in subdividing land, securing land
sales, or providing credentials as "engineers" for residents. This was, for instance, the case of the
notaries who systematically registered transactions and hence provided the necessary security for
a well-functicning land market, even when regulations prevented them to do so after 1983. Most
of them felt close to the people and understood their prerogatives enough to violate regulations
they thought were not fair, albeit always at a profit for themselves. Here is how Wa'el, the
notary, described this practice:
The nraidents of Hay el Sellow are fom the most popular dasses, thy don't bave much
mony. In ty opinion, ay project that tries to abikde l frsal rgulaonr snch as kgal
subdivisions and some of the construction codes is bound to fail because it does not account
fbr the priority of this population grou that is vr strapped for cash. [... Thy would
ratber pay 50 thousand dollars for shars in a lot when they can build sevral stories and
house their cbildren's families than buy one legally subdivided apartment for the same priace.
[...] This waalready theproblm in the 1960s, before I started rwking, and it contines
to be tbe same issue.n
is correct, especially because conflicting claims (in the municipality) insist that he barely collected any votes. The
results of the 1998 Municipal elections in Choueyfiat, the first elections since the 1960s, were withheld for a few days
because of political pressures before the entire list of Talil Arslin, one of two feudal leaders in the area, was entirely
announced victorious over the municipal council.
91 Interview with Fawzi H, op sit
92 Interview held with W.S., notary in the area, August 10, 1999.
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Nabib, a state accredited topographer who had trained under the first topographer who
worked with Abu Raymond and continued the practice with the second generation of developers
echoed this opinion:
We played a rok in bhbing low inome people in this ama acwss homuing and prot their
igpbhts ~arrd, when the state did not can to do so. [...] There are no adapted
gulatios for low-income areas but the cPital dc sbould not be the cumi right for
cetain popation gomps or ldas. [...] llegald land sadruii ons an the mruk of uivn
regulations that enable the subdiion of small lots; poor public rguations got as wbsre w
are."
Furthermore, the notary explained that he truly believed public regulations to be
counterproductive and was therefore willing to circumvent them anytime he was provided with a
legal cover.
In ordr to rgiter a lot, needed prof that there was no ilUlay on the lot. So I aapted
the erljfisate of the muiipaly, en I knew it uws not copiant xit reaiy. The
mu'xipa , in trin, xss relying on the pola force to pride ds dth infotriation on
what was ocamring on the ground and they knew it was fiawd... so it was enough for the
resident to bribe be poliaman hvbo uld write a qpowt and atet that tben rwas nothing
built on a lot to enable us to regiser a salek.
The notary was also confident that informal agreements were valid and widely respected,
and that, if need be, they could well be enforced in courts:
An amicable cotraat, once writt, is an ofuial donument ndit all the galpnegatiLs. It
can be enfomd in court [...] Given the scale of the consttion that ocaurmad in the ara,
we had oy few conflic, ey close to nothing."
Here too, the topographer held the same discourse:
We always kept a otcy of subditsiion maps but ranl had to rsort to them. People rcpected
the guideknes and there as little rooms to solat them anywy: roads wen ore u ted on the
lot before idents began to build [..] No one em needed a jdge,; omr plans mm
sufii•ent."
3 Interview held with the topographer in his office in Mrayjeh on August 17,1999.
94 Interview with W.S., notary in the area, op. dit
6 Inbid.
9 Interview held with the topographer in his office in Mrayjeh, op sit
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As for potentially enforcing agreements that would disfavor clients, such as registering
land sales for clients on lots allocated for expropriation, thee notary was firm that no one bought
a land without knowing:.
We did baos dimts whbo ~fied to by xiAin he pmrinmte of a plarned project and wa
ilnkt to pay mwr to be smw thV wn not ix tis condionL. No one k•agt land on a lot to
kbe exprpiatr d a&Wowst knosiqg Ma.yjut didn't bdkelee the• sta ould evr iwpmkamt
the prejeat, espedallwhips baplen m teidon ss wpending fornaay year."
The narratives of these public actors indicate that Hayy el Sellom could not have been
created without the help, support, and partnership of an array of public sector actors who were
and are still willing to cross the boundaries across the two spheres (state/ non-state) in order to
circulate regulations, facilitate compliance, and articulate more flexible regulations. They also
show that these actors were not simply taking, bribes, but also had some sympathy for the
residents to whom they felt accountable.
4.D DIscussioN oF FINDINGS
The confrontation of state laws to processes of state ruling in this chapter attests to the
necessity of unpacking the "state" from its monolithic representation as an urban regulator. The
chapter described an array of actors whose activities, taken together, provide a rich picture of the
multiplicity of roles played by public agents in the organization of the city and the diversity of
regulatory practices that did not conform to the one dimensional "state idea" one can get from
just looking at official urban regulations. Furthermore, the chapter described the diversity of
motivations that encouraged actors to engage in informal practices, be they high status regulators
or low-level bureaucrats.
Two peculiarities of the Lebanese state structures are worth mentioning before
discussing the main chapter findings. First, none of the housing agencies figures on the list of
public agencies involved in the production of Hayy el Sellom or its regulation." This is because
Lebanese authorities have never conceptualized informal settlements as a "housing problem"
and, as a result, housing officials have always considered these neighborhoods to be outside their
" Interview with W.S., notary in the area, op. ct.
" One could expect that any of the Ministry of Housing (now dissolved), the Public Corporation for Housing
(currently the highest housing agency, under the Ministry of Social Affairs), or the Housing Bank (recently
privatized) be present or have a role in the management of a housing problem of this scale.
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jurisdiction." Second, the structures of the Lebanese voting system (described in Chapter 2) that
attach voting rights to area of origin rather than place of residence have important repercussions
on the citizen-state relationships since locally elected officials such as the mwkbtdr or municipal
authorities are not accountable to these large populations of rural migrants. To the contrary,
these elected officials are accountable to a minority of old-time residents who view informal
settlers unfavorably and are reluctant to see any services disbursed to them. These two
peculiarities of the Lebanese system might go a long way to explain why local authorities did not
play the role that the current decentralization literature expects them to, and why, conversely, it
was planning agencies that consistently emerged as major players in the making of Hayy el
Sellom.
Based on this complex picture of the public sector, it is possible to derive an alternative
understanding of the organization of urban issues in Hayy el Sellom for the past 50 years.
Neither the product of the shady practices of informal developers, nor the outcome of public
planning policies, the neighborhood was organized by a combination of tightly interconnected
formal and informal regulations. At a time when many practitioners and policymakers still talk of
the necessity to regularize informal settlements and bring them to the "legal realm", the evidence
of public agencies' involvement in the production of illegality provides yet one mor example of
why it is important to drop the dualistic understanding of the city (Benton 1994, Razzaz 1998,
Varley 2002).
The form of development that Hayy el Sellom took could be read as the result of a
process of state-society negotiations that dictated, during different phases, dissimilar practices of
space management that always diverged from the declared intentions of public policies at the
time they were issued. Public urban management was particularly influenced by the form that
political mobilization took at a particular period, especially whether this mobilization sought the
acceptance of state agencies or challenged their authority. The form of management also resulted
from planning agencies' needs to control urban growth and to provide urban services in
sustainable form. The negotiations were however always limited by the ceiling on concessions
that public agencies imposed, notably their consistent refusal, throughout the fifty years of
development of the neighborhood, to recognize informal dwellers' legitimate claims to the city.
" To be fair, foreign consultants invited to evaluate the housing conditions in the country have not abided by this
stand. For example, both Doxiadis housing evaluations (1959 and 1999) included sections on "illegal settlements".
However, public agencies have never considered acting on such recommendations that both called for the
eradication of informal settlement and their replacement by modem housing policies.
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Thus, even when back-door permits were disbursed or residents were forgiven through
exceptional procedures, there was no attempt at changing existing policies to formally include
them.
This refusal to recognize informal dwellers opens interesting scopes of analysis for the
students of state-society relations. In a recent publication, Chatterjee (2004) described what he
called "popular politics in most of the world". In contrast to the widely held vision of a
homogenous national conception of citizenship put forth during independence days in many
Third World cities, Chatterjee argued that governmental administrations have dealt with
populations as multiple groups to be addressed with multiple and flexible policies. One of the
main distinctions between these groups is between "populations" and "citizens". Populations are
the subjects of public policies to whom benefits were distributed (often as a result of popular
mobilization) but entitlement was never recognized. Citizens are expected to share in the
sovereignty of the state and as a result, they have recognized authority over the city. Since
policies Cin "'most of the world") systematically dealt with low-income dwellers as populations
and not citizens, it was possible for current neo-liberal trends to withhold services and facilities
that had been granted earlier, given that these services were favors and not entitlements
(Chatterjee 2004). In many ways, my findings echoed Chatterjee's analysis. Clearly, the 1960s
represented a special period where breakthroughs in public governance did occur and public
agencies began to recognize the rights of urban dwellers to "build" in the city. However, this
recognition never materialized in a revision of the modes of governance that would make public
authorities accountable to low income population groups, or recognize their "full-fledge
citizenship" along Chatterjee's conception of the term. To the contrary, access to citizenship
remained beyond the reach of these populations whose arrival in the city had to be confined to a
limited set of facilities and practices that, once transgressed, triggered public agents' open
hostility. Within this conceptual framework, it is possible to understand public planning
regulations as a result of a particular set of parameters that were unquestionable because they
responded to the visions or needs of recognized citizen groups, even as they excluded others
whose entitlement to the city was and continues to be unrecognized.
Within the limitations imposed by this context, it is however possible to suggest that it
was during the phases when public agencies were issuing the highest numbers of exceptions and
when the largest number of public agents were directly engaged in the production of illegalities
that residents abided the most by legal urban regulations. For example, the highest number of
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permits disbursed in Hayy el Sellom, according to DGU records, coincided with the first period
of its development As of the early 1970s, when public agencies began to change their attitude
vis-i-vis the neighborhood (prior to the war), the number of permits dwindled in public records.
Similarly, many residents who built their houses during this phase explained that they had
learned about many public regulations, such as setbacks and maximum building height, from
their interactions with "public engineers", often the H brothers, who had delivered their
"building permits". There are also many indications that even illegal permits (delivered by Fawzi
H. and sanctioned by the local police station) managed to devise an applicable ceiling for
illegality by which residents abided. In fact, there are several recorded attempts by resident
groups during this phase to file for regularization, notably when the 1971 regularization law was
first issued. Many residents attested that they had learned about this procedure from local public
agents and attempted to apply for regularization through them. Compliance to public regulations
(as well as milder pressures on urbanization) had managed to preserve the neighborhood's
physical space, which residents described to have been an "adequate housing option" for them
during this early period.
Conversely, antagonistic positions taken by public officials and stringent urban
regulations reduced public agencies' capacity to implement their own plans or control illegal
urban developments. As public agencies began to deliberately impose higher sanctions on those
who violated their regulations, they encouraged residents to resort to militias' protection. When
they prevented informal sales registration in notary's records, they lost the detailed information
they possessed about land transactions and property titles in the neighborhood. The most
striking example is the 1983 Building Law that came out of public agencies' frustration vis-i-vis
the widespread illegal urban developments but which, indirectly, also prevented residents from
registering sales, creating more confusion in public records and larger opportunities for
unscrupulous developers to abuse uninformed clients, precisely the problems the law sought to
address. Furthermore, when the door for such exceptional procedures was closed, it became
more difficult for public sector entrepreneurs to encourage residents to apply for regularization
or learn and respect public records.
The post-war era corresponds to the lowest level of state-society negotiations. Indeed,
threats of displacement and poor information have increased residents' reliance on political
parties to represent them before public agencies. Today, the only link with the state for the
residents of Hayy el Sellom is 'Ali H, Fawz's son and the grandson of Hajj Hamad H. who is
189
employed at the municipality to follow-up on the affairs of the neighborhood. The sheer size
and visibility of the neighborhood have forced the municipality to provide some minimal
services but in no public quarter is anyone discussing strategies of upgrading the neighborhood.
In many ways, public policy in fact contributes to the deterioration of the informal settlements.
By policing the neighborhoods and allowing only large-scale developers to build huge structures,
public agencies have allowed a rapid densification of the area. Furthermore, by imposing the
costs of electricity, they have encouraged reliance on cheaper locally generated electricity. Both
of these practices have contributed to the deterioration of the neighborhood environment
considerably.
In short, the willingness of public agencies to disburse exceptional permits and the direct
involvement of public agents in illegal practices should not be dismissed as malpractice or
corruption. To the contrary, these procedures attested to the flexibility of these public agencies,
the ingeniousness of its agents, and an unsuspected ability to negotiate its regulations. These
findings could be specific to the Lebanese context, especially with the exceptional weakness of
the state during the war. They however provide important insights for further research.
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Chapter 5
Buying a
Home in
Hayy el Sellom
5.A INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters described important changes in the Hayy el Sellom housing
market over the past fifty years. Most importantly, they indicated a gradual shift towards formal
channels of housing production (e.g. credit from banks, obtaining building permits for buildings,
formal channels of advertising), growing presence and policing of public agencies since the mid
1990s, and large-scale urban changes in Beirut with significant impacts on the relation of the
neighborhood to the city.
This chapter explores the impact of changing market conditions from the perspective of
low-income urban dwellers who arrived to Hayy el Sellom looking for housing in the suburbs of
Beirut over the past fifty years, with focus on three particular processes:
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(i) Accessing the bari nwamsy roavr for purchasing housing in the city, such as
information about the housing product (e.g. price and quality), credit in order to
finance the purchase, and protection from the police;
(ii) Insuring a mriinwm ksI ofsncrrii in the transaction: terms of the deal, knowing that
the developer would not default;
(ii) Building rutadiaox ca*ad~ in case the developer defaults.
The chapter shows that like developers, residents systematically relied on a mix of formal
and informal channels throughout these three processes of housing acquisition Nonetheless,
interviews with residents indicated that it was primarily on social networks, and the access they
provided to both formal (e.g. planning agencies) and informal institutions (e.g. reputation), that
homebuyers in all phases relied in the process of housing acquisition. My investigation in Hayy el
Sellom shows that as the housing production mechanisms shifted towards stronger reliance on
formal institutions (such as banks for credit, advertisement for information, or public agencies
for security), the settlement gained more security of tenure, given its sheer population size and
its de-facto integration in the "suburbs" of Beirut or Ddhjyab, but its residents became
considerably more (and not less) vulnerable to market default (i.e. developer not complying with
the terms of the agreement). In large part because of the difficulty of complying with the costs
of legal housing production, the last generation of developers (Chapter 3) defaulted more often
on its agreements with clients than previous generations. In addition, their clients were left with
weaker opportunities for recourse than their predecessors, when default occurred, because
market (e.g. contracts) and public institutions (e.g. court of law) remained inaccessible to them.
They were therefore willing to settle on less favorable terms.
These findings contradict dominant trends in the economics and urban planning
literature, which have argued that higher reliance on formal market mechanisms and institutions
on the part of developers and greater integration in the citywide housing market create better
market conditions for low-income dwellers looking for shelter. In particular, it is theorized that
the shift to formality brings with it better access to information in more transparent channels,
higher levels of security in transactions, and -perhaps most important- better retaliation capacity
in case the developer defaults through formal public agencies (notably courts of law). It is also
theorized that formality provides clients with better sales conditions (our concemrn here), since
they can rely on formal, reliable, and all-inclusive public agencies rather than informal
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institutions.' This chapter shows that the purported enlargement of market opportunities by the
de-facto legalization on balance worsened rather than improved the conditions of low-income
urban dwellers looking for housing in Beirut
The questions raised in this chapter limit the scope of this investigation to residents who
purchased housing in the neighborhood over the course of the three phases of its development.2
My research therefore covers land purchases (and construction material and labor) in the first
two phases, and apartment sales in the last The interviewed sample includes a continued flow of
rural migrants since the 1950s3, waves of populations displaced by the war in the 1970s and
1980s4, several population groups displaced by post-war reconstruction projects (especially the
rebuilding of downtown) in the 1990s, as well as young couples (coming from various
neighborhoods of the southern suburbs of the city, including Hayy el Sellom, and from low-
income neighborhoods of Municipal Beirut) looking for affordable housing in the suburbs of the
Lebanese capital city. De facto, therefore, the "community" studied in this chapter excludes the
poorest residents of Hayy el Sellom who generally access housing (or a room) through rent (such
as recent rural migrants or international migrant workers). It also excludes the limited number of
squatter residents who have occupied public or religious (WaO5 land in the neighborhood.5
' This claim is generally supported by economists who have emphasized the necessity to formalize informal markets
in order to expand their economic opportunities (Barr 1996, De Soto 2000). Also, the imposing body of literature
that argues for "regularizing" informal markets and informal setdtlements builds on the implicit assumption that
"formalization" is better.
2 For methodological details and sample size and selection, refer to the methods section in Chapter 1.
3 My interviews in Hayy el Sellom indicate that rural migrants arriving to the neighborhood during the last decade
are relatively poorer than earlier migrants, these families therefore rent apartments because they are unable to
purchase. For migration to Beirut, see Chapter 2 and Faour (1981).
4 See chapter 2 for details.
s Squatting in the neighborhood was always very limited. It is concentrated in time especially in the first years of the
civil war and extends to the Ghadir river sides, the railway trail (North-East of the neighborhood), and a couple of
terrains owned by the Orthodox religious authorities (IVaqland). See Chapter 2 for more.
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5.B A HOME IN HAYY EL-SELLOM: INFORMATION, MOBILITY, AND
LEGALITY
5.B.1 The Early Days: 1950-1975
News would sp"ad in the vilage that them is a new lot to be inaugurated [..., and
those who want to purchase a unit would huny to get in touch dith the developer and/or
his mdiatr and seure theirplace.
The above comments of a long-time resident of Hayy el Sellom illustrate social
networks' efficiency as channels of communication during the first years of the neighborhood's
development. Kinship or geographic social networks carried the news about a lot to be
subdivided to potential clients in their villages. All interviewed residents who purchased lots in
Hayy el Sellom over the 1950s-1970s period, whether they arrived to the neighborhood directly
or via other suburbs of the city, described processes of information gathering that relied on
relatives and neighbors (including mediators) in order to learn about lots for sale. They also
relied on these networks in order to meet the developer, gain his trust, and secure appropriate
sales conditions. Those who rented units for a few years before they decided -or were able- to
purchase a lot described patterns of information gathering that were engrained in the web of
social relations within the neighborhood itself, including relatives, new neighbors in Hayy el
Sellom, neighborhood stores and bakeries in which news and gossip was shared, as well as their
own observations of the developers' practices.
This process of information sharing fit well the pattern of migration to Hayy el Sellom
during its early days. Until the mid 1970s, the majority of residents arrived to Hayy el Sellom in
family or village groupings. The choice of home ownership, as opposed to rertal, reflected an
old agrarian ideal that valued land over any other investment. This choice however already
forced them in the informal settlements of the capital city, because of affordability issues,
although they often had no clear understanding of the deficient legal status they were acquiring.
At the time, Hayy el Sellom was one of several informal settlements built on illegally subdivided
lots in the far suburbs of Beirut, in proximity to industrial developments (Chapter 2, Figure 2-
3).' Newcomers often chose Hayy el Sellom over other similar informal developments because
6 Interview held with an early comer to Hayy el Sellom, Hajjeh Khadijeh, in her house, on June 4, 1999.
7 I have described in Chapter 2 that Hayy el-Sellom was one of four neighborhoods in the far suburbs of the capital
city, along with al-Za'aytiyyeh, Rouways4t, and Hayy el-'Ayn in the eastern suburbs, that were subdivided in
informal land lots during the later phase of urban development of the capital city. See Chapter 2 for more details.
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of the presence of co-village and/or family members in the neighborhood. Hayy el Sellom was
attractive because of its calm environment and green landscapes and its proximity to
employment opportunities in nearby factories and agricultural fields.
During this first phase, the need for accurate information about transaction security was
relatively limited. This was in part because choices were restricted: once a client set out to
purchase land via Abu Raymond or one of his mediators, the developers' monopoly over land
sales and the relative stability of land prices during this period' reduced the necessity to learn
about real prices and devise bargaining methods. Moreover, despite the complexity of the
housing product at the time (land, labor, and construction materials instead of a finished
apartment), the tight control that Abu Raymond held on the process of housing production and
its various linkages (materials, labor, financing) considerably reduced the need for data gathering.
Residents who purchased land from Abu Raymond were forced to use specific channels of
housing production (labor and materials) since the developer often imposed how and where
materials will be purchased (from his and Hajj Hamad's sons), who will build the house
(mediators), and himself provided the financing scheme. In short, Abu Raymond's clients
benefited from their social networks to access information and loan guarantees but they were
simultaneously trapped by these networks in the process of housing production; since they relied
on a family or village mediator to introduce them to the old developer (and guarantee their sale),
they were often forced to resort to the particular builder (generally the mediator) whose
commission from Abu Raymond consisted in part or whole of the construction tights.9
Furthermore, the need for information about the legality of the transaction was limited
because most newcomers during the 1950s-1970s period had poor knowledge of urban and
construction codes and did not appreciate the implications of violating these regulations.
Although they were aware and respectful of property rights, they were poorly informed about
urban guidelines (e.g. minimum lot sizes, allowable land use) and construction codes (e.g.
mandatory building permits, maximum allowable built-up area, the 1983 prohibition to purchase
or build a lot once an illegal construction had been reported) (Chapter 4). To date, many refer to
their "lot" as the sub-lot area that was subdivided and numbered by Abu Raymond, rather than
B A review of Abu Raymond's books confirms the stability of land prices described by residents. Furthermore, both
the developers' son, residents, and mediators confirm that a formula was adopted to determine land prices: Abu
Raymond charged the dra' of land to residents the same price he purchased the square meters from owners, making
profit with the difference in measurement since a dra' is 9/16 of a square meter.
9 See Chapter 3 for more details.
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the actual lot registration numbers of the official cadastral. Furthermore, most of them
considered that they were entitled to services and security since they had legal property rights
and did not realize that public agencies provided services on the basis of residency permits.
Many were also poorly informed of the possibility of public projects threatening to expropriate
their land (such as highway or road trajectory) without compensating their constructions, since
the latter were considered illegal. 0 This is not to say that residents were altogether ignorant of
the illegality of their transaction or that they did not care about this illegality. To the contrary,
most of the 1960s-1970s clients went through extra measures to insure some elements of legality
in their housing and several attempted to regularize their lots when the 1971 regularization law
was issued. However, to most of these residents, the boundaries between the legal and illegal
realms were not clear, and they were not always aware of the legality (or illegality) of their
constructions or the implications of this legal status on their tenure security or their ability to sell
their lot"
Over the years, the repeated official dismissals of the neighborhood as "illegal", and their
refusal to service the neighborhood on these grounds, have attuned residents' perception to their
illegal status. Over fifty percent of residents who arrived prior to 1975, and who responded to
the survey on perceptions of illegality I conducted in 1999 in the neighborhood (Chapter 1 and
Appendices 1) admitted wholeheartedly that they had built their houses in violation to
construction and urban regulations, but were not able to describe which regulations they had
violated. Almost all of them also recognized that there would be some advantage to legalizing
their status: 25% mentioned security of tenure, 5% services, and a little less than 20% better
prices and access to credit.
10 It was generally only at the last step of the land sale, when they went to register their lots in the property registry
that buyers realized that some planning project was designed to go through the lot where they had purchased By
that time, they had generally paid all the price of their lot and had lost much negotiation power. Developers also
went through extra effort to convince them that such public regulations were irrelevant and would not be
implemented This however was no negligible threat. The increasing number of public projects planned in the
neighborhood and never executed that began with a few inner mroad enlargments and culminated with the
enlargement of the Ghadlr river banks and especially with the main highway interchange wiping out a large portion
of the westem section of the neighborhood after 1973 quickly became a serious source of insecurity in transactions
that new buyers would have had to account for if any of these projects was executed (figure 4-10).
1 In fact, none of the residents was planning to sell the lot they had just purchased. These new urban dwellers were
purchasing housing to establish themselves in the city.
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5.B.2 Phase Two: The War Years
The civil war years altered the conditions of housing acquisition in Hayy el Sellom, as
they altered the process of housing production in the neighborhood (Chapter 3). This housing
market was then controlled by mediators turned developers who were often tied to their
potential clients through kinship or geographic networks, and newcomers continued to rely on
social networks in order to gather information about housing opportunities and adequate sales
conditions. They also continued to follow earlier family and village migration patterns. However,
the civil war quickly brought new sources of insecurity that triggered changes in the strategies of
information gathering. Unlike their predecessors, newcomers began to prioritize proximity to
members of the same religious group over proximity to employment Furthermore, as a result of
the division of the city in two belligerent sections (Chapter 2), low-income rural migrants (mostly
Muslims Shi'ite) looking for housing in Beirut were faced with higher restrictions on potential
housing opportunities, since most of the old industrial suburb (eastern suburb) was now closed
to them. As a result, housing demand increased considerably in Hayy el Sellom during these
years, fuelled by continuing rural to urban migration and several waves of war related population
displacements (figures 2-9, 2-10).12
Heightened demand, combined with relatively limited land supply increased the
possibility of default. Stories about developers and builders cheating in land measurements or
reducing the number of steel bars in their constructions began to circulate in the
neighborhood. 13 Several Hayy el Sellom residents who had purchased housing during this phase
explained that the population size had reduced the capacity of social networks to provide secure
information, at a time when public agencies were unable to play their pre-war role. These
changes increased insecurity in transactions and lead potential buyers to take more time in
selecting a housing option. Many preferred to rent for years before they decided to purchase
housing. These newcomers (especially those coming from other neighborhoods with no prior
relations in the Hayy) "incrementalized" their relationship with the developer; they took the time
to learn more about his practices before they committed to a transaction."
12 Most of these lacked the financial means to purchase housing and resorted to renting apartments in the buildings
of the earlier phase that gradually expended vertically, creating an important rental market in Hayy el Sellom.
13 Cheating in the measurement processes occurred by allocating smaller lots to clients who had little room to verify
measurements. This was especially possible with the reliance of official records on metric measurements, while the
practice of the neighborhood was to rely on the dra' (agrarian measure).
14 This is also not an unusual mechanism in relatively insecure markets: in his investigation of consumers' strategies
to cope with ignorance, Klein described similar patterns in many spheres of market interaction, referring particularly
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Given the weakness of the public sector and the rising power of militias in the
neighborhood during the civil war, people were encouraged to dismiss legality and to rely on
militias' protection for illegal construction and service hook-ups. Thus, information about
legality became less relevant. This was all the more the case when, in the late 1970s, service
agencies allowed legal service provisions to all lots, irrespective of their legal status, and in the
1980s, in an effort to prevent illegal land sales, planning agencies made it illegal to register land
sales for lots that had any illegal construction (Chapter 4). These legal measures had a reverse
effect on the neighborhood's residents who began to perceive legality as irrelevant since they
could obtain services anyway and were not able to register their sales in public records, whatever
they did. During this phase, the weakness of the public sector also left little qualms to the
neighborhood's residents about the possibility of a public project going through their lots,
reducing expropriation threats, and therefore their concern about a public project designed to go
over their lot.
This attitude is translated in the actions and perceptions of legality among the population
of the neighborhood who arrived during this period. I have shown in the previous chapter that
few among these residents applied for building law, or went through the legal procedure, in
contrast to residents of the earlier period (Chapter 4). Responses to the survey on perceptions of
illegality showed somewhat similar answers to their predecessors: Many recognized their illegal
status but were not sure which regulations they had violated. As for advantages of regularization,
25% mentioned security of tenure, 2% services, and 15% access to credit and ability to sell at a
higher price. Other answers provided by the respondents also attested to the fact that they did
not really understand why their constructions were illegal and what were the implications of
regularization. For example, four respondents mentioned "the ability to build more" as an
advantage of regularization, others expressed surprise at the opportunity for regularization, many
simply answered that they were "like everybody else in the neighborhood".
5.B3 Phase Three: The Post-War Era
As the urbanization of the settlement increased and a new generation of developers and
clients arrived to Hayy el Sellom, information channels were modified to include, next to social
to "incremental choices" where "trusters" take the time to observe and gain information in order to reassess their
relationship with a developer (Klein 1997: 102).
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networks, formal market advertisements such as mass media, pamphlets (figure 3-9) and
billboards.
These changes should be understood in the background of the rapid transformations
that were happening in the capital city by the end of the civil war. During the post-war era, large
waves of population displacements were triggered by so-called reconstruction projects (e.g.
reconstruction of Beirut downtown, highway projects, etc.). In the mid 1990s, these population
groups began to look for housing in the city, often with the limited budget of US $5,000-10,000
that they had obtained as displacement compensations. They were faced with an exclusive Beirut
housing market with few housing opportunities given the lifting of rent control, soaring real
estate prices, and no credit targeting low income groups (Samaha 2000, Fawaz 2003).
In this context, Hayy el Sellom provided one of the cheapest options to purchase a
house in Beirut. Several interviewees among the neighborhoods' last generation of residents
explained that they moved to Hayy el Sellom (whether individually or in family groupings)
because of its "cheapness" or "the lack of another option". Coerced by competitive market
choices and the limitation of affordable places in the city, these new comers often arrived to
Hayy el Sellom with little hope to find housing elsewhere in the city. Here is how one
interviewee described her decision-making process: "The reason we came here is very simple: it's
all cheap [...]. Food, rent, clothes, you name it. Everything is cheaper here [...]. We used to rent
an apartment nearby, in Ouzri [squatter settlement in the southwestern suburb], and we came
here regularly for the sosq (the market). Then we had problems in Ouzit and we had to move
out, so we came here [...]. My mother and sisters followed, they all rented places elsewhere, here
they could buy an apartment".' s Others described a prohibitive market elsewhere that forced
them to the Hayy: "It is well-known", explained one resident of the 'Abbis Complex, "that an
apartment in Bchimoune [formal, middle-income suburb of Beirut] would be better built and
provide higher security, [...] but how am I to afford it? [...] My brother purchased an apartment
there and he paid the double amount of money". 6 Other latecomers echoed her words. They
described a newfound attractiveness of Hayy el Sellom based on its affordability, strengthened
by the lack of choice elsewhere, rather than the neighborhoods' own attraction or the presence
of one's kin or village group members.
1s Interview held with three sisters and their mothers, in front of the mother's house in Hayy el Sellom (Hayy ez-
Zahra') on June 18, 2003. The three sisters and the mother had moved in the neighborhood over the course of the
year preceding the interview.
" Interview held with 'Abla, in the 'Abbis Complex, in June 2003.
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An eloquent proof of the lack of a better housing choice is the poor construction quality
of the apartments that these clients were purchasing. Many interviewees complained about
physical services in the building, the dangers generated by poorly insulated electric wires, and
especially the quality of piping and plumbing in the building; typically five years after
construction, almost all residents had already changed the plumbing system in their apartment,
often at a cost equivalent to 10% of the apartment purchasing price. Others also worried about
the structural instability of the building, especially after several large complexes in the suburbs of
Beirut (but outside the Hayy) crumbled because of poor construction quality, killing many of
their residents."7 Asked if they were unaware of these conditions when they purchased the house,
many acknowledged that they had suspected or known about them, but that they had no better
alternative.
Apart from affordability, another factor that influenced migration to Hayy el Sellom
during the 1990s is the position of the neighborhood in the city, especially its integration in
D•ibab, Beirut's Shi'ite suburb (see Chapter 2, Harb 2003). To be incorporated in Ddhrab has
meant that, now, only Shi'ite Muslims look for housing in the neighborhood, in line with the
overall patterns of human settlement in the capital city since 1975.'8 This is in continuity with the
patterns of early settlement in this neighborhood, when it also predominantly attracted Muslims
(Shiites and some Sunnis). Early settlement patterns can be explained through movements of
urban migration in Lebanon and the divergence in socio-economic backgrounds across religious
groups: migration to the capital city from Jabal 'Amel and the Biqa' (predominantly but not
exclusively Shi'ite areas of Lebanon) was one of the later waves of migration towards the capital
and it corresponded to its later phase of industrialization, at the time when Hayy el Sellom grew
to be an informal settlement (Nasr and Nasr 1974, Faour 1981, Nasr 1985). However, the
proximity of Hayy el Sellom to Mrayjeh and Tahwtat al-Ghadi!, predominantly Christian villages
of pre-war Lebanon, preserved somewhat a proximity to families of different religious groups.
This situation was reversed by the civil war that transformed most of Beirut into religiously
homogeneous enclaves, and made of Hayy el Sellom and the entire southern suburbs of Beirut
an almost exclusively Muslim Shi'ite zone.
Within these powerful urban forces, people located in the post-war city following
opportunities announced by advertisement channels. While all interviewees highly valued living
17 See for example A,-Nahar daily newspaper, Nov 13, 2000.
"
t Renting is different for migrant workers who escape the sectarian categories of the Lebanese society.
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near their family, many reported increasingly individualized processes that responded to tight
economic conditions and strict religious lines. For example, a low-income Shi'ite Muslim family
or individual looking for relatively legal and affordable housing to purchase in the city (this time
in the form of apartments) has few choices outside of Hayy el Sellom, the eastern suburbs
remaining largely closed due to communal tensions and a painful recent history of evacuation
(despite some easing noticed recently with the return of some of the pre-war displaced residents
to their old neighborhoods). As a result, many new residents of the neighborhood reported
having reluctantly moved away from their relatives and individualized the housing search
because of affordability constraints. This was especially the case for many lower middle income
young couples, who had to settle on living in Hayy el Sellom's housing complexes because they
could not afford to live near their parents and families in the city. Others reported that they
chose Hayy el Sellom because it allowed them to maintain their family networks and live in
proximity to each other. These include the populations displaced from the old city core who had
developed strong communal ties over the fifteen years of civil war and sought to reproduce their
proximity to each other, in their new housing. For example, around 30% of the apartments in
the 'Abbis Complex were purchased by families coming from Wadi Abu Jmil (evacuated
neighborhood of the old city core) who had shared information about this housing
opportunity." Similarly, the last floor of Block 1 in the Jawid Complex (6 apartments) was
bought and occupied simultaneously by a group of households belonging to the same extended
family.
As for the circulation of information, interviews indicated that information about the
housing product circulated through formal channels of advertisement that described the
availability, type, and costs of housing. The developer then completed these ads with details
about sales conditions, including credit. In Chapter 3, I described how during the 1990s,
elaborate pamphlets and billboards promised potential clients exceptional amenities and services.
Such ads attracted potential buyers: eight of the forty residents I interviewed in large housing
complexes explained that they had learned about their apartments through radio or TV
advertisements. Many others saw billboards posted in front of construction sites within the
neighborhood, while they were looking for housing in the area. Through these advertisements,
19 Based on the figure provided by the assistant of Mr. Darwish, in an interview on June 10, 2004 in his office.
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many developers attempted to distance themselves from the image of the "old" and "poor"
Hayy el Sellom. °
Another information channel mentioned by several interviewees are grocery store
owners. Over the last decade, several grocery store owners in Hayy el Sellom have taken up the
practice of advertising apartments for sale or rental and organizing the sale in exchange of a fee,
often 5% commission on the transaction, paid by the seller. These grocery owners transformed
their shop-windows into advertisement panels that informed potential clients of housing
opportunities. As insiders to the neighborhood, they were able to provide their clients with
sufficient anchoring, history, and knowledge of the housing product and therefore to provide a
minimum level of security for clients who were otherwise strangers to Hayy el Sellom.
None of the newcomers to Hayy el Sellom however relied solely on ads to choose an
apartment. Instead, more than half the interviewed clients of the last generation reported relying
on friends and relatives to verify information about the housing product and learn about going
prices. Social networks thus considerably amplified the power of ads. This was the case, for
example, of populations displaced in the mid 1990s from downtown Beirut; several family
groupings described how information about a housing opportunity often began with someone
hearing a radio announcement, following through, and informing everyone of the opportunity.
A new type of information also circulated through social networks during this last phase;
interviewees reported that information acquired through friends and family was often used to
calibrate their expectations about what to anticipate in terms of the quality of their future
apartments in a prohibitively expensive city, with no government control on construction
quality. Therefore, this information was useful to know, prior to purchasing an apartment, that
the developer would never deliver the promised amenities and that one should accept it since
this was "the way things happen in Beirut". It was common during interviews for residents to
declare they had recommended friends and family to select the same apartments about which
they were themselves complaining. While almost all the residents of the last generation described
themselves as "cheated" by the developer who promised more than he delivered, they also, in
the course of the interview, signaled that they were at least partially aware, at the time of the
20 This was especially the case of the 'Abbis Complex whose developer managed to create an image of high
standing among the neighborhood's residents. During the first period of its construction, the 'Abbis Complex was
recognized by many residents of Hayy el Sellom as a "superior" housing option that provided "legality of tenure",
and "higher quality services" without leaving Hayy el Sellom.
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purchase, that the quality of the housing product sold did not live up to the advertisement
claims.
As for information about legality, its relevance and importance is dubious and fluctuates
with the threat of public projects in the neighborhood. This is because few residents still believe
in the possibility of obtaining legal individual property titles and/or resident permits, rendering
full information about the legal status of a purchase almost irrelevant. If the-large complexes,
especially the 'Abbis Complex, maintained an aura of legality over a short period, most of their
residents declared that this was a trap some of them had fallen for. As one resident put it, "there
is no legal individual property ownership in the neighborhood... Hayy el Sellom was bought and
sold in shares, and whoever tells you they thought they would be legal is a lying".2? Another
resident explained that "the price tells you about the legality, why is a house in Hayy el Sellom
half the price of a house in Bchimoune?"2
Furthermore, wherever people were displaced for a highway or urban renewal project,
state compensation was disbursed to legal and illegal residents alike, rendering relative 'legality"
of tenure vis-a-vis squatters almost irrelevant (Chapter 2). To the contrary, the example of
evicted downtown squatters who were paid relatively high indemnities and relocated to better
housing complexes in Hayy el Sellom created a hope for better days, if one was evicted. The
dwindling physical and living conditions in Hayy el Sellom, especially because of high population
density and poor environmental conditions (Chapter 2), pushed many of its residents (old and
especially newcomers) to hope to be displaced, for example by the execution of the projected
highway (Chapter 4). Even most newcomers to the Hayy declared they would be happy to be
paid indemnities and displaced again. Some even explained that the developers who sold them
their apartments promised them entitlement to all public indemnities for displacement, if they
had completed their payments.
Nonetheless, most Hayy el Sellom residents have given up on the hope of being forcibly
displaced by public planning projects in the books since the 1960s, especially that plans were
changed several times but never executed. This is how one local school director put it:
The plans lw changed a million times, so peok hpl ba no faith in th; thy ham
decided to ignon them and adopted a posidon that tky don't exist or at last, that
thy mil ner  ibe plmenteAd2
21 Interview held with Rosy in front of her house in Hayy el Sellom on June 18, 2003.
2 Interview held with 'Abla on in Al 'Abbis Complex in Hayy el Sellom on June 5, 2003.
2 Interview with Mustafa, director in one of the neighborhood's schools, held in the school on July 30, 1999.
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Finally, I should point out that residents' attitude are unsure about the neighborhood's
future. In fact, almost all 100 interviewees in the neighborhood were convinced that some public
project was already designed to wipe out their house." In times when highway projects are
implemented in the vicinity of the neighborhood, belief in the possibility of displacement is
momentarily revived and people actively discuss strategies of securing appropriate
compensations, political parties organize residents' meetings, and after a short period when
nothing happens, things go back to normal.s
5.C TRANSACTION SECURITIES
The second task in the process of housing acquisition is the insurance of a minimum
level of transaction security in order to avoid the risk of the developer defaulting on his sale
promises. Several default scenarios were described throughout the three generations, such as
swapping between lots or apartments, selling the same apartment to different buyers, defective
construction quality, selling smaller lots, delay in handing over the house, and others. The
practice of multiple sales was especially recurrent during the last phase of the neighborhood
development since many developers, in an effort to compensate for the inability of their clients
to pay installments on time, sold more housing units than they actually had built. However, since
buyers are generally only entitled in the apartment once they had made most payments, many
families paid most of their installments before they realized that the developer had defaulted and
they lost their money to the developer.
2 Rumors about public projects transcend these roads, to sometimes include large scale international conspiracies
that aim at wiping out the neighborhood, such as the often repeated theory that claims that the neighborhood is to
be transformed into either a military base -a project that would be done with the consensus/help of the American
government- or a high-end hotel area near the airport for transit visitors -"like in Europe" - to stay for a few
nights without having to go to the city. None of these projects is grounded in reality and, despite efforts; I could not
detect any newspaper article or official reference to any of them. Nonetheless, their wide acceptance among the
residents of Hayy illustrates well the level of insecurity that they feel vis-i-vis their living arrangements.
2 I was lucky to witness such an upheaval in October-November 2003. As a result of a public decision to slightly
widen a number of narrow streets in Hayy el Sellom and displace a few families, the rumor spread in the
neighborhood that the highway was to be executed. Everyone in the neighborhood was actively looking for
information, panicking about the strategy to adopt in order to make sure that proper compensations would be paid.
Few residents seemed actually anxious about their displacement, a few old people thought they would go back to
their villages and build houses there. Others who were not to be displaced were relieved of a potential lower density
in the neighborhood. For more on this issue, see Deboulet and Fawaz 2004.
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My investigations showed that in order to reduce transaction costs, residents relied on a
mix of formal and informal institutions. In this section, I describe two main forms of
"securities" recurrently mentioned by Hayy el Sellom's residents: reputation and contracts.
5.C.1 Reputation
The investigation of developers' strategy in Chapter 3 showed how the "positive"
reputation of a developer, that is general opinion of his trustworthiness, proved to be a valuable
asset to establish himself on the market, and that such positive reputation was built over the
course of the decades through elaborate strategies and alliances.2' Seen from the residents'
perspective, it is undeniable that a developer's good reputation played an essential role in
securing market transactions in Hayy el Sellom, especially during phases when the neighborhood
was small and social networks tight. More than a dual or symmetric system binding the
developer to his clients, "positive reputation" is inscribed in vast social nettings connecting a
variety of actors extensively dealing together. To use Klein's terminology, it is a "reputational
nexus", or "a constellation of extended dealing"' that is formed in the neighborhood, in which an
economic agent (here the developer) finds incentives to enhance his trustworthiness in dealings,
even if his dealings with each individual actor is limited, because of multiple triangular relations
that connect every actor to potential clients (Klein 1997: 125). In this case, and although few
clients purchased more than one lot in their lifetime, their relation to the developer still extended
over time through the dealings of friends and family who constitute potential clients to the
developer. Residents' descriptions of their process of housing acquisition confirmed the
importance of "reputation" throughout all three generations; most of them appealed to
"reputation" in order to explain how they secured their transactions. Reputation might not be a
sufficient condition for the transaction to occur, it is nonetheless a necessary pre-requisite
outside of which a client rarely engaged in a transaction.
Reputation was a powerful mechanism during the settlement's early days. Of the thirty
first-generation residents I interviewed (arrived 1950-1975), twenty-nine expressed surprise when
I inquired about "securities", or the "possibility that Abu Raymond defaulted" on the sale.
Asked why they thought Abu Raymond would not default, most attested that "he was an honest
man", or "he was the father of the poor". Several also explained that he was "respectable" and
26For more on reputation, refer to Chapter 3.
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"well visited" and that they felt they could "trust him". This is not to say that the developer
never defaulted. The thirtieth person interviewed was not surprised by my questions because
Abu Raymond had violated his agreement with her. The sale was organized in the early days of
the civil war, right before he left, and Abu Raymond took the money, never paid back
landowners nor registered the sale." This was, however, the only occasion I found in which Abu
Raymond defaulted on a land sale this way. Other cases of default committed by the developer
were limited to swaps between lots and were easily settled.
What explains the "good reputation" of a developer in the eyes of his clients? In
Chapter 3, I described how Abu Raymond's reputation was in large part the result of the
developer's efforts to create and sustain his social standing by building an image and maintaining
a solid network of social relations. Describing the developer's positive "reputation", many of his
clients recalled his standing and respectability in the neighborhood. In addition, all of the thirty
interviewed clients mentioned his extensive dealings as a source of respectability; Abu Raymond
was "selling houses to everybody". This perception was strengthened by the pattems of
migration towards the neighborhood that followed kinship and regional ties, many of Abu
Raymond's clients were able to list several family members or fellow village members who had
purchased a lot from the developer before and after them. In short, the sheer size of the
developer's business had established the ground for his positive reputation. This was also true of
the next two generations of residents who explained that they trusted a developer's reputation
on the basis of the scale of his practices.
Another condition for a developer to earn and maintain a positive reputation is his ability
to secure at least some level of legality in the transaction. In fact, developers who could secure
actual property titles achieved the ultimate standing. However, since 1983, this has been
impossible. s As a result, residents have settled for certified subdivision plans, building permits,
registration in notary's offices, and other elements of legality. During the last phase of
development, most of the large-scale complexes' residents insisted that they trusted the
2 It was also a time when Abu Raymond became addicted to gambling and lost a lot of money as a result.
s As seen in Chapter 4, registration at the official Land Registry became impossible after 1983, when new urban
regulations imposed a clearance on the legal status of all constructions on the lot before final registration can be
processed in notary's or public record. In practice, these regulations have implied that registration occurs now at the
notary public, in the form of sales contracts (and not property title transfer) and they therefore reduce the security
of the transaction legally for clients.
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developer when they saw that he had secured a building permit prior to construction and, as a
result, felt they could encourage others to purchase apartments in the building.
One more condition for a developer to achieve a positive reputation is the "professional
management" of his business. In the early days, "professional management" implied that the
developer involved "state accredited" actors, especially an "engineer" (topographer) who
organized lot subdivision and supervised their distribution on the ground, reducing the potential
for fraud. References to "professionalism" in these early days were also made in relation to the
developer's accountability and his willingness to act as a mediator if conflicts arose over property
boundaries. Latecomers described "professional management" in very different terms; they
expected an office within the vicinity of the neighborhood where they could follow up on
construction and discuss issues with the developer. or any of his representatives. They also
expected the developer to keep some regular personnel in the office and to be accountable for
defective services.
Reputation however does not systematicaly mean "trust" or "faith" in the honesty of
the developer. Based on my conversations with the neighborhood's residents, it was clear that
residents (in all three generations) equated a developer's "good reputation" to his ability to
access a wide array of social networks that connect him to public agencies and/or political
parties and figures, and who could therefore secure his own illegal practices and those of his
clients. Many long-time residents dwelled on Abu Raymond's "connections" with public agents,
going from the police station to high-ranking public actors, such as Michel Khouri, the son of
the first Lebanese president. This connection could be interpreted to signify (for some) that such
a "respectable man" would not act like a crook. But to those who are more versed in the history
of local politics in the neighborhood, it especially entails that the developer was "protected" and
so was his business, and that they could therefore trust that the transaction will be well
concluded, that policemen will not prevent them from building their houses once they acquired
the lot, that public agents will not arrive requiring taxes as soon as they moved in. This
"protected reputation" gained importance especially during the early 1970s, when public
planning agencies lost control over the neighborhood to the advantage of political parties and
the local police station, who both sought to extort bribes from residents building their housing.
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Thus, boasting about the good reputation of Hajj Hamad H, an old woman exclaimed: "Hajj
Hamad controlled the police station around his little finger!""
The same argument, with a similar conception of reputation, was recurrent in
descriptions of the reputations of the last generation of developers. In chapter 3, I described
how these developers were known as "crooks" and "thieves", rather than respectable
community members. Yet, these developers secured the necessary "good reputation" of strong
"backing" that was necessary for them to conduct their business. Their reputation was essentially
derived from the visibility of the projects they built, which was interpreted in the neighborhood
as a sign of "acceptance" from public agencies that would have otherwise prevented their
construction. Thus, when asked how they "trusted" the developer was not selling them an
"illegal good", several residents of the large housing projects whose houses were threatened by
highway projects (e.g. Jawid Complex) responded with statements such as "a building this size
could not have been built at night"," that "this building is not a piece of jewelry you can hide",31
that eloquently explained that in their view, even if the building was not entirely legal, it was
"safe enough" since its developer was "protected" and therefore "capable" of building.
In short, whether it is the result of "good backing", "professional management", the
ability to claim legality, the capacity to build extensively, or faith in good intentions, "reputation"
was steadily evoked by many residents who did not ascribe the same meaning to it. In fact, the
component of respect and trust seemed to have been dropped over time, reducing "good
reputation" to the insurance of a "well protected" developer whose product was acceptable to
the forces that be. As for "reputation" preventing a developer from defaulting on a transaction,
interviews indicated that its prevalence in early days was gradually reduced. Most residents of the
last generation explained that the risk of the developer defaulting could be reduced, as I will
show below, but could not be eliminated.
5.C.2 Contracts: Written or Oral
Another method of securing transactions over the course of the fifty years of
investigation was contracts. A survey of the different types of sales agreements or contracts
2 Interview held with an old resident, Hajjeh Basmah, in her house in Hayy el Sellom on June 14, 1999.
O Interview held in the Jawid Complex with Radwin, a young man who had purchased a small apartment in the
complex, on June 17, 2003.
31 Interview held in the Sharour Complex with Saniyyah, a single mother of three who had purchased a small
apartment in the complex, on June 13, 2003.
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between developers and residents showed that these were almost always done in writing but that
over the course of the fifty years, they were increasingly formalized, requiring interventions from
specialists such as a lawyer to draft their terms and the signature or presence of a notary and/or
other witnesses, sometimes public agents (notably a Mkhbtii). They also indicated that the terms
of the contracts prepared by the last generation of developers and their lawyers placed clients in
vulnerable legal standing vis-i-vis developers, since they tended to impose asymmetric terms on
parties, as will be described below.
The clients of the first two generations of developers relied essentially on oral contracts,
wherein the period of payment and the location of the lot mutually agreed and held in good faith
by both parties. Abu Raymond and later his mediators turned developers only exchanged
payment receipts or "cawbial' in writing with their clients. Upon agreement on payments, Abu
Raymond issued these payment receipts, one for each installment to be paid by a client, which
only in the late phase began to include pre-set payment dates (figure 5-1).32 These receipts were
held by the developer who returned them to client upon payments. Once all payments were
made, the client could present the receipts to the developer and expect formal registration of the
sale -provided all other lots were also sold. If, for any reason, payments were delayed, Abu
Raymond could choose whether he would register the shares in the lot in the buyer's name
before full payment was made or alternatively, register the lot in the name of any of his children,
who would later transfer the shares, once full payment was made. A review of Abu Raymond's
records indicated that installments were generally made regularly.
The receipts drafted by Abu Raymond were in two forms. Sometimes, the developer
used simple hand-written forms on unofficial white paper (figure 5-1). At other times, he used
printed forms purchased from stationary stores to make his receipts (figure 5-2). Most receipts
indicated the number of the lot that was being subdivided, the size of the purchased plot, the
agreed payment per square meter (sometimes also listed in dra), and a summary of paid and
outstanding installments. These receipts were generally signed by the developer and his client,
sometimes in the presence of a witness (especially the mediator). According to residents, these
receipts were widely adopted during the first phases of land sales in the neighborhood, although
I was unable to obtain copies of such contracts other than Abu Raymond's personal records.
Most residents explained that once they had registered the lot, there was little interest in keeping
32 This too is a replication of a formal market mechanism. However, unlike formal emabiaa, informal ones were
rarely stamped and never sanctioned by public agents.
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Figure 5-1 (a): Receipt for transaction
between Abu Raymond and a wasit, Abu
Mehdi, in 1974.. The receipt includes the lot
number, the area (or hara), the lot size, what
the mediator has paid and what is due. It is
signed by the two men.
Source: Abu Raymondpersonal records, courtey of
his family
Figure 5-1 (b): Receipt for transaction
between Abu Raymond and another wasit,
mostly known as a builder in the area. It lists
in 1974 what has been paid and the next two
payments to be made.
Source: Abu Raymondpersonal records, courteg of
his fami!y
Figure 5-1 (c) and (d): Sample receipts
between Abu Raymond and two members of
the same family, signed by both parties. The
receipts indicate the lot number, the area,
paid and outstanding installments.
Source: Abu Raymondpersonal records, courtesy of
his family
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such unofficial records, the property title being the only official record that was valued by this
generation of clients.
The contracts that legislated the client-developer relation during the last period were very
different from earlier ones. Although most of the interviewees explained that their agreement
with the developer was "oral" and that the written document came only as a final seal, the terms
of the written contracts appeared rather exhaustive, especially when compared to Abu
Raymond's payment receipts. These contracts were often drafted by lawyers and approved by
the two parties, sometimes in the presence of a lawyer, a notary public, and/or other witnesses
(figure 5-3, 5-4).33
Many clients explained that practice of resorting to formal contracts was the choice of
developers and they declared that they had worked with the developer's preferences. It is also
clear that many (if not most) clients were ignorant of the terms of the contracts they had signed.
Many interviewees showed me the contracts and asked if I could explain to them some of the
terms on which they now disagreed with the developer, especially the process of sales
registration and who of the two parties was to pay registration fees. As a result, contracts
imposed an asymmetric relation that favored developers and entitled them to penal provisions in
case their clients defaulted, but seldom provided similar protection to clients.
It is worth noting that these contracts were not drafted in the form of property transfers
but rather in the form of regular sales contracts (drafted by notaries) that could be used for any
other commodity, such as a car. Therefore, these contracts bounded the developer, not the
property, to his clients. The form of the contracts therefore already substantially weakened their
claim over property vis-a-vis a defaulting developer. 34
Another reason for clients' vulnerability was the terms of contracts. I will briefly review
the terms of the contracts that I was able to consult below 35 (see figures 5-3 and 5-4).
All contracts contained a description of the housing product: its location in the
neighborhood (lot number, legal jurisdiction) and in the building (apartment floor, etc.) and size
Cin square meters). Contracts also specified the final price agreed upon between the two parties,
3 A number of developers required "trusted" witnesses, such as a m•kbtdr (local public representative) or an old
family member. Others require the presence of specific notary publics, and refused to deal with others, suggesting
mutual trust and permissiveness on the side of these notaries.
I am indebted Lebanese Attorney, Karim Kobeissi, for this legal explanation.
3 I was able to consult several contracts for four large-scale housing complexes in the neighborhood: Madinat al-
'Abbis, Barakit, Al-Shahrour, and Al-Jawid.
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Figure 5-2 (a): "Sanad" or certified payment receipt made
by the notary to Abu Raymond in 1973.
Figure 5-2 (b): "Sanad" or certified payment receipt, made
to Abu Raymond in 1968.
Figure 5-2 (c) : payment receipt, made
Figure 5-2 (c): "Sanad" or certified payment receipt, made
by an illiterate resident (signed in fingerprints) to Abu
Raymond in 1973.
Figure 5-2: Samples of "Sanads" or certified payments.
Source: Abu Raymondpersonal records, courtesy of his famiy.
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including first down payment, installments (amounts and increments), and a benchmark
payment (generally half the installments) after which the client was entitled to move into his/her
new apartment, provided it was completed. Finally, contracts listed the duties of the two parties
vis-a-vis each other. The terms of these agreements differed from one contract to the other.
However, the terms binding the developer were generally limited and vague, rarely including any
penalty provisions in case he defaulted. For example, sales contracts in the Barakit Complex
committed the developer to "submit the sales product subject of this contract to the second
party [i.e. the client] when works are finished and a resident permit is provided".36 It also
committed the developer to register the transaction in the official land registry, once all
installments were paid. However, the contract did not stipulate any time limit for the project
termination, providing the developer with open leeway for delays. As for the 'Abbis Complex,
the time binding clause that initially appeared in the contracts (1994) and required the developer
to finish his project in four years was dropped in later contracts (1996, 1998) and replaced by the
vague terminology of "upon project completion" which was then conditioned by "full-payment
of all dues prior to taking possession of the apartment". 3
One clear duty imposed on all developers in sales contracts was the final property
registration, once the sale was completed. The type of registration depended on the legality of
the building: if the apartment was sold as "entirely legal", which means that it could be legally
subdivided in order to create independent property titles for each apartment, the developer
committed to proper registration in the Public Land Registry, once all installments were paid and
construction terminated. Alternatively, developers committed to registering units at the notary
public in shares, if the complexes they built could not be legally subdivided for one or another
reason (see chapter 4). One developer (Jawid Complex) even revised his registration
commitments in later versions of the contracts he delivered. He had only realized later that it
would be impossible to legalize and register apartments. As a result, latecomers to the Jawid
Complex had handwritten revisions on their contracts amending the original commitment to
registration with a new clause that stipulated that registration would be processed "in case the
1993 expropriation mark on the lot is lifted".
36 Commitment to a Salers Apgrment, The Barakit Real Estate Company, p.1. Source: records of the Choueyfat
Municipality. See figure 5-3.
"3 Commitment to a Saleks Agreement, The Darwish Real Estates Project, Source: records of the Choueyfat Municipality.
See figure 5-4.
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Conversely, the terms of the contracts for the client were always clearly defined: they
often required on-time payment, stipulated harsh penalty provisions for defaulting clients, and
sought to limit their ability to resort to the legal system for retaliation in case the developer
defaulted. Looking first at contract provisions for clients who do not pay their installments on
time, all reviewed contracts provided no leeway to clients who were to lose their right to the
apartment and sometimes all their paid installments upon one defaulting payment. For example,
the Barakit Complex contract specified that clients committed to "on time payments with no
delay or procrastination" and "if any payment is overdue [...], all the remaining sum is
considered judicially and legally over standing, without any need for prior notification or
warning, the second party [the client] loses his rights in this contract, which are all nullified, and
the first party [the developer] is entitled to deal with the object of sale in this contract as he
wishes, the way any property owner can take deal with his own property [...]". The Barakit
contract did not leave any space for a client to default since one overdue payment was sufficient
(if the contact was literarily implemented) to annul all the clients' rights, force him/her to
complete all payment, and anyway lose access to the apartment. The terms of sale for the Jawid
Complex reiterated the same conditions exactly, as if the contract was drafted by the same
lawyer or directly borrowed its format. As for the various versions of the 'Abbis Complex
contracts, they stipulated that if the client defaulted on a payment, "the contract is annulled, with
no possible legal or judicial recourse" and "all payments are kept by the first party", that is the
developer. In the Shahrouir Complex, conditions appeared a little milder: a defaulting client lost
immediately his first down payment, as well as the apartment, but he/she was not forced to
complete all future installments.3 s
Contracts also sought to limit the ability of a client to resort to legal measures that could
protect his/her rights in public records. All reviewed contracts dictated that clients were not
allowed to place any mark in public records to indicate that they were in the process of acquiring
the apartment before they completed all payments and were allowed to do so by the developer.
Contracts also dictated that clients were not entitled to resort to the court of law if, upon a late
payment, the developer took back possession of the apartment. These clauses indicate that the
lawyers who drafted such contracts were well aware of a number of relatively cheap and
38 I was able to read and copy the terms of a contract from Ghidah, one of its residents. I was however not able to
get a copy of the contract. Despite this more forgiving clause, the developer had registered a higher down payment
than the actual agreement on the contract, a measure that Ghidah interpreted as "generous", but which could also
expose her to losing more money had the developer accused her of default.
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accessible legal measures that buyers could otherwise have relied on. Conversely, residents
appeared to be rarely aware of their rights or of the potential recourse they could find in the
formal legal system. It should be noted that the loose contractual terms (e.g. no apartment
delivery date) binding developers made them immune to defaulting on their contracts while their
clients were bound to timely monthly installments.
Before dosing, it is worth pointing out that despite asymmetric contract terms, my
observations dearly indicated that contracts were never enforced according to these terms. In
fact, residents did not acknowledge "developers' rights" as they were stipulated in the contract.
For example, even if the contract entitled the developer to take back an apartment when his
clients defaulted on their payments, none of the clients recognized this right. Instead, developers
who tried to implement these terms (after several months of defaulting payments) were labeled
as "crooks". Similarly, developers did not implement their contracts as is, always giving residents
more time and facilities to pay their installments than the contract stipulated. This was partly due
to the residents' mutual recognition of retaliation capacity. The last section of this chapter
describes this concept further.
5.D RETALIATION POWER
Next to reducing the risks involved in a transaction, potential buyers and residents also
relied on their rtlia#ion cpadsy when the developer didn't abide by the terms of agreements." I
use retaliation capacity to refer to the capacity of residents to respond to a developer seen as
defaulting on the terms of agreement, either by forcing compliance or by achieving a more
favorable compromise. The first concept that comes to mind when discussing retaliation is the
court of law that legally provides the space for an aggrieved client to sue a defaulting developer.
This section investigates the ability (or lack thereof) of courts of law to play a role in case of
default It then investigates an informal practice, "social backing", that proved to play a more
powerful role to this end in the informal settlement under study.
3 Retaliamon capacity is also important in cases where neighbors don't abide by the rule of the game, trespassing on
a lot, either physically or by opening windows that can overlook private areas, etc. In later phases, trespassing on
public passages (agreed on in the terms of contracts) also becomes recurrent.
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5.D.1 Legal Retaliation or The Court
In the language of the law, retaliation entails legal recourse, which implies that the
aggrieved party, attempts to recover his/her rights by taking the developer to court where public
authorities can force compliance to the terms of an agreement; detailed contracts with elaborate
provisions bind transacting actors and make them accountable to a legal public authority.
Previous research showed that in some cases, courts have been able to arbitrate such conflicts
even when access to property was illegal, such as in Jordan (Razzaz 1998) or India (Chatterjee
2004). We also know from previous research that economic actors (including-formal businesses)
generally prefer to resolve conflicts directly, rather than resort to long and (economically and
socially) costly legal cases. More often than not, aggrieved parties prefer more flexible and
advantageous agreements that they can reach informally to the terms of contract or the words of
the law (Macaulay 1963). In Hayy el Sellom, I will show that it was clearly the latter scenario that
was at work and that legal institutions were unable to arbitrate conflicts or help aggrieved clients
retaliate when developers defaulted.
Threatening to resort to the court of law only entered the web of possible retaliation
strategies for the neighborhoods' residents during the last decade. It accompanied the gradual
shift towards reliance on written sales contracts drafted with the participation of public notaries
and lawyers. However, the formalization of sales contracts and the potential of suing a defaulting
developer did not materialize in necessarily make the court of law a reliable institution for clients
seeking retaliation against a defaulting developer. This is attested by the low number of lawsuits
brought against any defaulting developer in the neighborhood, despite a high rate of sales default
and the dissatisfaction of new clients with the apartments they had purchased. While most
interviewed residents in large scale housing complexes complained about the legal status of their
newly purchased housing (inability to regularize the status of the construction despite the
promise to do so and therefore no individual legal property titles), the poor quality of their
building (e.g. water leaks, poor electric wiring, sometimes unreliable structure of construction),
unsatisfactory terms of contracts (e.g. parking space unavailable, no pool, mosque, or playground
despite the promise), and others issues, they exhibited no hope that these complaints could be
solved in court (and often no where else). Of the 535 housing units of the 'Abbis Complex, only
eight court cases had been brought, all by Lebanese expatriates who had purchased units as long
term investmenrts rather than in response to an immediate housing need, and non of them
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actually residing in the complex. According to public records, there were no other lawsuits in
other large-scale housing complexes in the neighborhood.4'
Why are courts unable to solve the problems of otherwise legal property owners in Hayy
el Sellom, when the literature tells us that elsewhere (n Jordan or India, for example), it is
possible for courts to settle cases even in the absence of ownership rights? I found several
answers to this question.
First, most of Hayy el Sellom's residents declared that they distrusted the public sector in
general and courts in particular. This distrust can be explained by the absence of information in
the neighborhood (and among members of the networks of social relations of these residents)
about a positive legal precedent where aggrieved clients successfully sued a developer. In other
cases, such as in the settlement of Yajouz in Jordan, a favorable court decision encouraged
aggrieved clients to take their property disputes to court, even without legal property rights
(Razzaz 1998). In Lebanon generally, and in Hayy el Sellom in particular, low-income residents
have no recollection of a legal settlement that favored an aggrieved client over a defaulting
developer. To the contrary, informants often quickly dismissed the legal system as a possible
recourse and described legal cases as unpromising, even when they did not doubt the legality of
their transactions or their entitlement to a better settlement.
This is well illustrated in the case of Feryil, a 25-year-old woman who had moved to the
neighborhood four months prior to the interview date.4 Feryil explained that she and her
-husband had been engaged for six years and paying installments on an apartment (located
elsewhere in the suburbs of the city) for two years when a disagreement broke out between them
and the developer, the construction of the building had been stalled for months and although
they had already paid US $19,000, it seemed that they would not be able to recover their money
or access their apartment in the near future.4 Hence, when the developer suggested an
alternative apartment in a housing complex he had built earlier in Hayy el Sellom, they jumped
on the occasion. Feryil explained that they were worried about losing their money and ending
up with no apartment at all. Under these conditions, settling the case (even unfavorably) was a
40 This was until May 28, 2003, when I last went to the land registry.
41 This section (Including all quotes) is based on two interviews held with Feryil, in the Jawid Complex in Hayy el
Sellom on June 17 and 22, 2003.
4 Feryll and her husband had paid the developer a first down payment of US $10,000 and monthly installments of
US $375 for two years when the iisagreement between them broke out Because Feryil's fianc6 worked in the Gulf
at the time, he did not have the opportunity to check the construction progress. Feryil did not possess a car and
was not able to check on the construction either.
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preferable option. Nonetheless, the apartment did not correspond to her expectations: she
disliked the location, which was too busy and far from the city, and she complained that none of
the promised services (such as parking and gardens) were available. Although she recognized
that as a latecomer to the complex, she had been warned by neighbors about the defective
housing quality and the developer's false promises, she still believed she had no alternatives.
When I inquired about the possibility of suing the developer, Feryil dismissed the opportunity
altogether:
My husband's cousin who is a iayer strongly advised us to settle outside the court and
not to spend our last pennies on aourt opernses. He said that i a h meb better q•f
we could get any apartment in order to rgain at least some of our mong.
In the course of the interview, Feryil also recalled stories of misfortunate friends who
were caught in similar binds and unable to force a developer to comply:
Myfrliend ad purbased an aparment like us in Mrageh and she ended up dging
the demloper to court. Honvew, she has still not cruicwd a settlment fouryears later
[...J We didn't want to go to a ten yea long court ase, wa needed to get married
and settl, so this is how it ended
Second, the legal process was often dismissed as too expensive, but more importantly, as
in conflict with individual housing (and life) projects, given its long-term inscription in time.
Indeed, law cases can extend over several years, while the housing project is often urgent, either
because it is tied to other important life projects, such as getting married or having children,43 or
because it results from a sudden forced displacement, such as families evicted from Beirut
downtown by its "reconstruction" project in 1996 and needing an immediate affordable housing
solution. The urgency for the family to find housing is reinforced by the mismatch between
housing prices and household income, forcing many couples to wait for years before they can
gather the necessary down payment to purchase a house (and hence get matdied)."
The centrality of marriage in women's experiences in today's Lebanon (Wehbi 2002)
should be noted here as one of the clients' main vulnerabilities that exacerbates the mismatch in
time scales of court cases and housing needs. As long as the couple is only engaged, a woman
43 For description of housing trajectories and their connection with social trajectories, see Brun (1993) and Deboulet
(1993).
44 To give the reader an idea about the mismatch between the price of an apartment and low-income dwellers'
incomes, it is sufficient to know that the minimum wage in Lebanon for a full-time employment is US $225, while
the cheapest new house in a complex in Hayy el Sellom was sold for US $12,000 in buildings that would not be
formally subdivided.
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risks losing her opporunity to get married in a society where marriage hold a central place in
women's lives. As a result, FeryMl and her female friends described their compromise on the
quality if housing to be a necessary step if they were to preserve their couple, which was socially
and personally more important to them than the "good" house.4s However, seen objectively,
Feryil's settlement had no reason to fail in court: she possessed a written sales contract signed
by the developer which included a penalty provision that insured an additional US $5,000
payment to any of the two parties, if the other defaulted. Instead, she and her husband agreed to
pay an additional fee for switching apartments and continued to pay the developer monthly
installments in order to complete the full price of the apartment (US $30,000), despite the fact
that most of their neighbors paid less for their houses.
The third reason why aggrieved buyers don't appeal to court in Hayy el Sellom is because
direct knowledge of the developer's story and economic conditions make them believe that the
developer was unable to solve the physical and legal problems of their housing complex. Their
opinion was substantiated by the fact that many of these developers were on the run and/or had
already been to jail because they defaulted on bank loans repayments. The fact that banks failed
to collect their investments although they forced the developers to jail (because the developers
were genuinely bankrupt) convinced them that a lawsuit was unprofitable. Under these
conditions, the positive potentials of a lawsuit against a defendant who is not in a position to
provide a better settlement seemed superfluous. Many dissatisfied clients explained that the
developer who had defaulted was not a wealthy person and that he had defaulted, in large part,
because he lacked the financial and professional capacity to run the project. Others blamed their
neighbors for not paying their full dues and pushing the developer towards bankruptcy, rather
then blaming the developer.
For example, Ghidah, a young mother who had moved in the Chahrour Complex
almost eight years prior to the interviews I conducted with her," oscillated between blaming the
developer for her misery:
I am so woried about the q4ral of the com•trction, what a dilwma! [...] I am in
imh pains about it, and no one lirtens. How aould be do this to us?
and sympathizing with him:
45s This points actually to the necessity for further research to "gender" the housing project, given these conditions.
46 I conducted two interviews with Ghidah, on June 13 and 22, 2003, in her apartment in the Shahrour housing
complex. Her stories and quotes are taken from these two interviews.
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[...] My neighbors blame himr frm not installing the buiding's ebkvat, but most qf
them have enlarged their kitchen by bilding inside the eleator shaft... what do you
expect him to do? He couldn't deliver even be tied
Ghidah had been evicted (with her parents) from Downtown Beirut and she had used
the US $5,000 she was paid as displacement compensation as a first down payment for the
apartment where she moved with her husband. In many ways, the apartment did not correspond
to Ghidah's aspirations or the developers' promises: the "three room" apartment had only two,
the construction quality was poor, many of the services -especially the elevator- were missing,
etc. However, Ghidah did not consider a lawsuit at all:
A klawsuit, poor man! He was ablady in jail for a year... The poor man, he has
never urt me! I don't want to sue him. He was nice to us from the beginning but...
xv need to register this sale.
Similar sentiments were abundant among informants.
Others did not credit the developer with good intentions, but still believed it impossible
for him to solve any problem, given the legal and financial trouble he was in. To them, the case
clearly needed a public sector intervention that would settle outstanding legal issues and allow
for the regularization of the building complexes. For example, Malik who had purchased along
with his brothers apartments in the 'Abbis Complex, dismissed his brother's attempt to sue the
developer as ineffective:
My brother li&s in Belgium anyway, so he is not following up his case. [...] Besides,
whbat can a lawsuit do? Fore him to subdivide the building into individual apark*ents
and gie us individual rights? The law anyway MANDATES him to do so; he
doesn't do it because he cannot do it befo• he tmndies all the illegaities in the
building, which is cost4y. [...] I could go tbrough the pain of plauing a mark on his
legal record and payingfees to the Minirtry of Finance in order to protect my rights
legall, jflfek that I needed to, but I would ne sue Darnfsh! 7
A fourth reason for not suing the developer emerged out of the widespread sense of
disempowerment among residents, coupled with a feeling that they had no other housing choice
anyway and that rather than risking to lose their money, they were better off settling with
anything. Feryil's story is not unique. Many others echoed her experience, complaining about
prices of apartments, poor economic conditions, and the absence of public social policies to help
them. While all 40 interviewed residents in large scale complexes described in length unfulfilled
47 Interview held with Malik and his family, in their apartment in the 'Abbis Complex on June 12, 2003.
222
promises and defective housing, often accompanied with horror stories, such as the doorman
who died electrocuted because of poor electricity insulation in the 'Abbis Complex, the US
$3,000 paid to reinstall piping in the apartment in almost every unit, the flooded (illegal) seven
story basement of the Barakit Complex that threatened the building's stability, or the shaky
building foundations in the Shahrour Complex, none viewed their case as exceptional. Instead,
they explained that most people who were purchasing apartments nowadays were subjected to
the same vulnerabilities. This is how Sandra summed it up:
Ifyou want to perrase a b•re, yom base to be my caWf Peop now almost
prfer to rnt, b use thfy know thby can ikm fthey don't like it! 4
Rather than blaming the developer or considering a lawsuit, many residents identified
(rightfully) the soaring housing market of the 1990s as the source of their housing problems; a
new apartment in an informal settlement cost at least 50 times the minimum monthly wage and
housing loans from public agencies were well beyond their reach.4
However, once they had taken possession of the apartment, buyers lost all their
bargaining power vis--vis the developer who would not undertake any improvement, once he
had handed over the keys. Some of the developers even entered contract clauses to this effect,
such as Mr. Darwish ('Abbis Complex), whose contract stated that complaints about
construction would not be entertained after the client had taken possession of the apartment
Thus, their clients were cornered by the risk of losing their investment or establishing possession
of an unsatisfactory apartment.
This situation is eloquently illustrated by the case of Zoheirt, an employee of the private
bank that had financed the construction of the 'Abbis Complex. Zoheir was first advised by his
employer to purchase a unit in the 'Abbis Complex and agreement was made on a small unit
with street view for which he placed a US $4,000 down payment and regular monthly
installments thereafter. A few months before Zoheir was to take possession of his apartment, he
48 Interview held in the Jawid Complex with Sandra and 6 other families that went in and out the apartment. They
were the above-mentioned families who came together to Hayy el Sellom and bought the roof of Block 6. They all
agreed to her comments.
49 A quick comparison of the minimum required salary by the Public Housing Corporation (PHC), the only public
agency providing housing credit to "lower income groups" with the distribution of incomes in society according to
the National Agency for Statistics (ACS) indicated that publicly subsidized PHC loans were limited to the 30%
richest section of society (Fawaz 2003).
50 I interviewed Zoheir and his wife Rani twice in their apartment, on June 6 and 12, 2003. All quotes are taken
from this interview.
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found out that another family had already moved in. Zoheir appealed to the bank director and a
compromise was reached with Mr. Darwish over a larger and more expensive apartment. Zoheir
clenched but accepted since he was frightened to lose his lifetime savings. Like Feryal, Zoheir
never considered legal recourse, in part because he was by then engaged and ready to get
married, and in part because he did not want to risk losing his money and the apartment:
I felt compelhed to take poss.esion of the apartment and mow in. [...] I was able to
seOue an a &erati&w , many others wn not... and once I moved in, it was too late. I
could not ask anymon forproperplumbing orparking spac. I bad tofind for mtyse#
Having finally taken possession of their new apartments, Zoheir and many others felt
they had been lucky since many others had lost payments and installments with no hope of
recovering money or apartment The threat of these scenarios provided a dissuasive incentive to
retaliate, even if taking possession of the apartment signified the loss of all bargaining power.
One last reason why residents did not sue the developer is that many among them
benefited from the blurred legal situation and the flexibility it introduced to their relation with
the developer. The developer's defaulting allowed them to behave in ways that otherwise would
be considered morally unacceptable and legally exposing. Instead, clear evidence of the
developer defaulting on earlier agreements, especially a written contract, allowed them to make
late payments, refrain from paying settlements for several months, occupy additional space, and
other similar practices. Many among them acknowledged that with the current economic
downturn, they would have been unable to complete their monthly installments and they were
somewhat relieved by the flexibility gained from this legally fuzzy situation. They therefore
withheld their last payments, claiming that they would not complete payments before the
complex was properly registered, but admitted that they did not have the money to pay these
installments anyway.
Perceptions and implications of these legally blurred conditions were however far from
equal. Those who rented their apartment, and this had become common among residents in the
last decade, suffered from the spatial encroachments of owners who felt entitled to expand their
hold on the complex. Similarly, those who were relatively better off and had managed to pay all
their installments on time blamed those who did not for the legal status of the compounds.
However, the vast majority of residents, after loudly condemning the developer for not settling
the contract appropriately, admitted in the course of the interview that they also took advantage
of this situation. Thus, when the private bank that had financed the construction of the 'Abbis
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Complex stepped in to take possession of the complex, resolve legal disputes, and recover some
of its losses, many residents refused, arguing that the bank was imposing higher 0egularization
fees or other unfavorable conditions.s
5.D.2 Informal Retaliation or Securing One's "Backing"
The most common form of "retaliation" mentioned by my informants was "good
backing '". In the language of Hayy el Sellom, a "well-backed" client is one who, by virtue of the
social networks he accesses (or his social capital), can secure a better deal, display enough
deterrence for the developer not to default, and retaliate if the developer defaults.
To this end, social networks connecting actors to any sufficiently powerful entity or
actors such as public agents, political parties, influential families, or a large social group that
includes potential clients are valuable. The relative importance of each of these sources of
support changed considerably over time, depending on several factors, such as the
neighborhood's size, the relative strength of political parties vis-i-vis the state, or the availability
of housing alternatives elsewhere. This section focuses on three forms of "backing" that were
often mentioned in Hayy el Sellom: family networks, political parties, and public agents and/or
agencies.
(a) Backing through family and co-villagers' networks
Historically, the first source of "backing" in the neighborhood was derived from family
and co-villagers' support. Members of large family or village groupings who could show large
social support had sufficient power to change a transaction's terms and coerce a defaulting
developer to alter his behavior. This was achieved through several mechanisms such as the
threat of recourse to physical violence and gossip, or the ability to circulate negative information
about a developer.
5 In fact, the bank had not even declared its clear conditions to residents and it seemed that it was going to charge
residents for registration and the costs of regularizing any illegalities they had committed. However, many residents
did not have the money to pay regularization or registration fees. Many also claimed that they did not realize when
they had signed contracts that they were responsible for registration fees while they still withheld US $2,000-3,000
as final payment upon registration.
U In Arabic, lambr £bahr or "*1m 43 ".
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Thrt of or Riwr to Pysirl/ Vioktw
The threat of recourse to physical violence was often mentioned as a retaliation strategy
among members of tight family and geographic networks, notably tribal ones, and appeared as
mostly effective during the first twenty years of the life of this neighborhood. Whether in
retaliation to default or as deterrence power, members of large social groups can physically
threaten "an outsider", in this case a developer, and manage to alter his behavior. While violence
is not more predominant in Hayy el Sellom compared to other areas of the city, the tribal legacy
of many of its families (especially early comers) allowed tribal judicial concepts to be operative in
the area, including the practice of saibab or community rulings in resolving conflicts between
community members, but also thabr or revenge, which can go as far as endorsing the murder of
a violater.3 These practices allowed a solid role in conflict resolution, particularly for elderly
and/or respectable community members who have relatively high social standing. However,
when respectable voices in the community cannot be heard, physical threat can also be a serious
deterrence.
This is the case of 'ssam J.," an old resident of Hayy el Sellom who described how he
was able to forcibly access his son's apartment in the 'Abbis Complex, after they had paid over
half the installments and found out that their apartment had been occupied by another client.
"We had an agreement about an apartment, and were paying our dues regularly. [...] When
stories of multiple sales became common in the neighborhood, I got worried [...]; I asked the
developer to let my son in the apartment before all payments are made, but he refused. He said
he had many financial difficulties, and. stood strong by the policy of not letting anyone in unless
they pay their full dues. [...] A couple of months later, someone told me that they had seen a
family move into 'our' apartment. I went to check and sure enough, there was a whole familyl
They said they had an agreement with the developer too. [...] My cousins advised me not to talk
to Darwish. Instead, we went there, a group of twenty men, and we broke into an empty
apartment and took it over. We then changed the lock".5' The developer knew better than to
retaliate. The Js are not a large tribe, and he had, until then, thought he could "mess with them".
3 There are however no cases in the neighborhood where such bloody revenge was imposed on a developer.
4 Accounted collected in three interviews with two members of the J family in Hayy el Sellom, in front of their
house, in July 1999.
55 This main narrative was collected in the first interview, on July 27, 1999.
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However, their ability to organize twenty men and impose their viewpoint instructed him
otherwise. Issam now established his status as a "well backed" person.
Another example of the power of tribal networks is illustrated in the case of Tareq Z., a
member of one of the most powerful tribes of the Biqa'. The Zs were traditionally poorly
represented in Hayy el Sellom until the mid 1970s because they had established themselves in
the easternm suburbs of Beirut where one of the largest informal settlements carries their name (to
date). Tariq arrived to Hayy el Sellom in 1994, attracted by a Radio announcement advertising
the 'Abbis Complex, where he purchased an apartment and a store. As of 2001, and next to the
supermarket he runs in the 'Abbis Complex, Tariq has been acting as a mediator, helping
dissatisfied homeowners resell their apartments in the complex. At the time of the interview,
Tariq had already sold 15 apartments, all in the complex. Asked how he secured his practice,
Tariq laughed and said: "I am a Z. No one messes with a Z".s
Physical violence is however the simplest form of "backing" that has lost a lot of ground
in the later days of the settlement, especially when political parties circulated weapons and
monopolized violence in the area. It is also restricted to the few members of large families and
tribes. A more intricate and democratic form of "backing" that operates though family networks
is gossip.
Goss
Gossip, the "informal, private communication between an individual and a small,
selected audience, concerning the conduct of absent persons or events" (Merry 1997: 51), has
been consistently another powerful sources of retaliation power for members of large social
groups in Hayy el Sellom. Because of its ability to travel quickly through close social groups,
gossip provides an aggrieved party with the capacity to respond to a defaulting developer by
ruining one of his most important assets: his reputation in the community. As a result, gossip
allows direct retaliation by reducing the pool of a developer's potential clients in the
neighborhood. Furthermore, gossip exposes a developer publicly to retaliation (since he has
cheated) and therefore allows aggrieved parties to retaliate with otherwise socially unacceptable
behavior (e.g. defaulting on payments).
56 Interview held with Tareq Z. in front of his "supermnnrket" in Hayy el Sellom, on June 6, 2004.
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In her seminal article on gossip and scandals, Merry argued that gossip contributes in
small societies "to processes of information sharing" and helps "create or destroy the reputation
of actors within this community" (Merry 1997: 52). Furthermore, gossip acts like a "database of
information" that guides the activities of members of tight social groups and can thus "impose
strong social, political, and economic sanctions in particular social contexts, such as stable,
morally homogenous, and close-knit societies where escape is realistically difficult" (Merry 1997:
69). Thus, such informal social controls weaken in the transition from small, face-to-face
societies to large and complex settings.
Two points of this argument are relevant to explain the ability of gossip to realistically
act as a deterrence force in favor of an aggrieved client in Hayy el Sellom. First, gossip is only
effective when close social ties connect members of the society in which it circulates and
weakens when societies move from small, face-to face contact, to larger and more complex
settings. Evidence from Hayy el Sellom showed that as long as newcomers arrived following
family or village groupings and relied for access to information and interaction with the
developer on the mediation of kinsmen and fellow villagers, family and/or co-village
membership provided solid backing for a newcomer. It secured her/his position vis-a-vis the
developer or the mediator who would be weary of her/his potential capacity to threaten his
reputation.
Karimeh K., a member of a large K family that counted several mediators and one
important developer in the neighborhood, explained how she could rely on family networks and
the threat of gossip to secure her transaction:
W•ben e anivsd, the fami4 ras na ll establisbed in the nsghborbood I wnt to see Abu
Raymond ith my brother whbo had punhased a lot beofn me, and a mediator of the K
famitv. [...] With an intromdction like this, Abu Raymond received us gry weL [...]
After all, the Kr habv a strong prence and he would not want to rian his rnputation itb
us. He suOld lose to many clients! [...] He also gave me spcial lebsay: y bhusband is
blind and I as wxorking in ''ýorain" in the Laceco factory nearby] so be saw that I
bad a bard time make endr meet. I was gimen a longer time to ake m e payments. [...] It
beoed me to have manyfatmiiy embers here.n
S57 Interview conducted with Karimeh in her apartment in Hayy el Sellom on June 16, 2003. Ironically, Karimeh
lived on the one land that Abu Raymond defaulted with, hence her feeling of empowerment was not well placed in
this case.
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Her story was echoed by many other members of the first two generations of residents
who also referred to their ability to marshal large groups and threaten the developer's reputation
with gossip if he defaulted.
The second precondition for gossip to be an effective means of retaliation, also
proposed by Merry, is the necessity for a "difficult realistic escape". This precondition applied to
the first two generations of developers who had no escape out of the neighborhood and were
therefore accountable to its gossip networks. All these developers were multi-trades men who
ran an array of economic activities that included land sales, along with a grocery store in the
cases of Abu Raymond and Abu 'Ali, a gas station for Abu Mehdi, a small school for Hajj
Hasan, etc. All their economic activities were rooted in Hayy el Sellom and they derived a living
from projects in the neighborhood; they cut across economic specializations but not geographic
location. These developers were therefore particularly vulnerable to rumors, which they
attenuated through relations with important families. These developers also actively nurtured a
reputation of "trustfulness" and "straightforwardness", insisting that they immensely valued
their "good reputation" in the neighborhood (Chapter 3).
This is one of the points that distinguished them from the last generation of developers
who were not professional developers either (see chapter 3), but who conducted businesses
outside the neighborhood and appealed to a web of clients that were not confined to Hayy el
Sellom. These developers were therefore less vulnerable to gossip as a form of pressure. This
explains why gossip has lost its power in Hayy el Sellom. A developer who had ruined his
reputation in the neighborhood could still initiate projects elsewhere in the city and attract other
clients."
This is not to say that gossip lost all power during this last phase. Gossip retains an
important role by allowing clients, themselves engrained in tight social networks, to retaliate
against the developer (by defaulting on payments, refusing to fulfill all requirements) without
threatening their own reputation and social standing within their social groups. Indeed, unlike
developers, clients had life projects in the neighborhood and they generally feared social
sanctions if they were perceived to be the defaulting party. They therefore needed to justify in
58 All the third generation of developers actually initiated other projects as their projects in Hayy cl Sellom were
being severely criticized. Those who had lost everything in the Hayy, such as Darwish, had already sold dozens of
housing units elsewhere in the city by the time the bank took hold of the two projects. Others, such as the
developers of the Chahrour and Jawid complexes are now initiating projects elsewhere in South Lebanon,
capitalizing on demand generated by the Israeli withdrawal from this part of the country.
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the eyes of the local community the retaliation strategies they adopted when they refrained from
paying installments or called on a political party or a public agent for help. By attacking a
developer's reputation, gossip entitled them to do so without being socially stigmatized in their
community. The circulation of gossip was therefore a pre-requisite for all other forms of
retaliation in the neighborhood. It would otherwise be impossible to publicly justify, in a context
of tight social relations and relatively high claims of morality (strengthened by rampant religious
morals), the retaliation strategies that residents openly described in the interviews.
(b) Backing from/ Backing by the State
Another source of "backing" that was recalled in the collected narratives of residents in
Hayy el Sellom was their ability to appeal, through social networks, to various echelons public
agents to force a defaulting developer back in line or to alter the terms of the agreement to their
advantage. In Chapter 3, I1 described how developers relied on networks with public agents to
facilitate their business and obtain wasta or special services from these public agencies. I also
showed how social linkages to the state bestowed on developers better social standing and a
stronger ability to overly defy regulations. Similar advantages could be listed for residents who
were well backed by a public agent (whether in the form of a cousin working as a policeman or a
nephew employed in a planning agency). This state backing allowed residents not only to defy
public regulations, the way developers did, but also to improve their bargaining power vis-a-vis
the developer and therefore alter the asymmetric terms of agreement that tied them together. I
however found examples of this form of backing in the neighborhood only during its last phase
of development, once social pressures failed to convince developers to stand by their word or
provide further payment facilities and when other, perhaps more orthodox appeals to the public
sector (such as court cases), did not succeed. The story below provides a typical example of how
such backing operates.
Latifah" first met the developer of the Charhour Complex in 1993, when she and her
husband were looking for housing in the neighborhood. They quickly made a deal: the price was
affordable (US $10,500), the option legally acceptable (they would obtain property in shares),
and the credit comfortably extended over five years. Their interaction was positive; the
developer agreed to let the family move in one year after they began to pay installments,
9 Information collected in two interviews with Ms. LatXfah in her grocery store in Hayy el Sellom, on June 13 and
22,2003. All quotes are taken from these two interviews.
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although the original agreement was for three, and they finished their payments in three years,
instead of five. In short, it was a "mutual agreement", and, according to Ladfah, "a humanitarian
interaction, not really contractual". In her words, they had become "friends", although they did
not interact socially outside of the economic exchange.
Since then, however, things have deteriorated. Once all installments were paid, Ladfah
and her husband agreed to purchase a store at the entrance of the complex, where they opened a
grocery store. An oral deal was made; the couple paid its first down payment and was allowed in
the store. However, a few months later, the developer changed his mind and reclaimed the
space, calling off the deal The parties had not signed any contracts, but Latffih and her husband
refused to take back the three thousand dollars down payment they had made. Instead, she
explained, "after many discussions with him [the developer], he would not change his position
[...]. So we called a relative of my husband's who works in the Ministry of Finance, and he
registered the store in our name in the tax records. [...] Now, the store is "officially" ours and
registered in public records, [...] although we have to pay taxes, we know that we have proof of
ownership". Much of this transaction is in fact illegal, since the ministry cannot legally register a
store without proper ownership title and a legal rent contract (if need be). However, Ladfah
explained: "In this country, you have to be backed. My husband's relative backed us in this case,
so we won". At the time of the interview, the developer had not regained possession of the
property, and Latifah refused to pay installments for the store so long as he did not draft a sales
contract. She had then run the store for seven years, based on her "good backing" from a low-
level clerk in the public sector who managed to inscribe her 'legality" in public records. The
developer, on the other hand, was wary of further intervention from the Ministry of Finance and
refrained from making more noise. He was, by then, considerably weakened by a few months
spent in jail for defaulting on the repayment of his bank loans. Ladfah did not feel guilty at all
vis-i-vis the developer, he had defaulted on their deal, he had also defaulted on their housing
agreement repeatedly: the promised elevator was never installed in the building, the lobby was
not finished, and the building gate had not been mounted.
The case illustrates the easy shift from "mutual trust" to "retaliation" in the context of
poor social ties and a developer's ruined reputation that entitled clients to get back at him. It also
shows that "backing" in this case was secured by a good connection in the public sector, but also
circumstantial conditions: the attempts of the Ministry of Finance to increase registered stores at
the time made it easier for Latfah to register her store and obtain some form of legality.
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Latifah's ability to appeal to a public agent is not exceptional. Several store owners in the
neighborhood described similar strategies, which included registering their stores either for
municipal taxes or at the ministry's records in order to gain some level of legitimacy vis-i-vis the
developer and sometimes withhold their monthly installments. The public agencies' policies to
"facilitate the process of registration" in order to encourage "some level of legality", a municipal
engineer explained, allowed the registration of stores that were otherwise illegal, but also created
a new way of being "backed" in the neighborhood." During this phase, the municipality issued
many "clearances" that were often facilitated by members of the H family (chapter 4) who
processed applications for store registrations. But it is not only storeowners who are "backed" in
the transactions with the developer. I have also heard residents employed in the public sector,
especially soldiers in the army, recurrently threatening to bring weight of their connections to the
public sector to bear, if the developer did not provide them leeway in their payments.
It is worth parenthetically noting that backing from public agencies was not limited to
client-developer relations, but also extended to state-resident relations, especially the relation
between residents building illegally and policemen imposing prohibitive bribes. In some cases,
well-backed residents were able to reduce or eliminate bribes by appealing to other policemen
who could provide their protection or backing. This, however, is also relatively recent in the
history of Hayy el Sellom, since residents of the first two phases of the neighborhood's
development heavily relied on developers for state backing and rarely struck their own deals with
the police station. However, as the neighborhood expanded and these developers' influence
shrank, many residents had to develop their own connections with the police station in order to
build what they wanted. Today, all those who had already begun to build their houses
incrementally in earlier eras need "strong backing" in the police station in order to continue
construction.
This is the case of Hajjeh Mariam,61 who arrived with her family to Hayy el Sellom in
1980. After renting a unit for six years, Hajjeh Mariam purchased a lot from Hajj Hamad H
where she built two stories and opened a vegetable store on the ground floor. When she first
built her house, in the mid 1980s, Mariam explained that "it was the war, you could build what
you wanted". However, when her eldest son was to get married in the early 1990s, Mariam
60 Information collected in an interview held with Mr. Hassan in the Choucifat Municipality on July 1, 2003.
61 Interview held with Hajjeh Matiam in her vegetable store in Hayy el-Zahra (Hayy el-Sellom) on June 18, 2003 in
the presence of her daughters. All quotes are taken from this interview.
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attempted to build an additional floor above her house but was stopped by the police. At the
time, Madam could appeal to her cousin: "He was a friend of the previous head of the police
station. [...] So they came to see us and granted us a month to finish all works [...]. And we
did". Since then, however, the head of the police station was changed. When Mariam attempted
to add another floor for her second son in 1996, she could not do so. The police patrol arrived
and, she said, 'They asked for US $8,000. [...] They said the situation was very difficult and they
could be jailed themselves [...] so they wanted proper compensationsl [...] We attempted to
negotiate but couldn't reach an acceptable compromise. [...] My son rented a house nearby. We
have not been able to build".
These cases illustrate the types of connections that are required for "good backing"
through the public sector. Generally, residents could not appeal to an important politician for
backing. Instead, "state backing" in Hayy el Sellom implied one's ability to appeal to a low-level
bureaucrat who could intervene on one's behalf to alter the conditions for a limited period.
These were ephemeral and reversible changes (such as the case of Lafffah who has protected her
supermarketfor nos). They nonetheless allowed residents to change their negotiation power vis-
i-vis the developer.
(c) Backing from political parties
The last source of "good backing" I identified sprang from connections to political
parties (or parties with military presence in the neighborhood). As of the late 1960s, political
parties (first non-militarized and later militias) invaded the neighborhood and have continued, to
this date, with new political parties gaining control The initial monopoly of A~al (that was to
become the Shi'ite militia during the war) was challenged by several other parties (many of which
have now disappeared) and gradually ceded to Hizb'Allah. Today, as part of Dibyab , Hayy el
Sellom is controlled jointly by the two Shi'ite forces, Amal and Hizb'Allah, along with the Syrian
secret services.'2
The presence of these political parties supported the developers' practices and enabled
them to strengthen their control over the market (Chapter 3). Simultaneously, members of Amal,
Hizb'Allah, and the Syrian Secret Services had strong backing and as a result, they were able to
62 In Chapter 2, I explained the significance of Dihiyah as the Shi'ite suburb of Beirut (Harb 2003), and introduced
these political parties. A proper explanation of the presence of the Syrian Secret Services is too long and outside the
scope of this study. However, it is important to know that in this neighborhood, my investigation indicated that as
far as housing exchanges and backing are concerned, their role is equal to other political parties on the ground.
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influence their interaction with the developer, sometimes coercing him into more flexible
payment schedule or lower prices. Backing from political parties has gradually trumped backing
from the state in Hayy el Scllom, since the war period, and has enabled a number of residents to
build without bribes altogether. Several residents attested that they had appealed to members of
the Amal party in the early 1980s and built without paying any bribes to the police. Here is how
Hajjeh Ftizeh described her story
When I paid for b piria of Ia4 I did not bane ay m ,ony skft We dj for maon in a
small mod shack, so rsen I wfin4l abk to biU a caplke of r•ws, I mu not goig to
was my amony ox •iu poeiaparol [...] The daloper who had sold e the lad as a
meaber ~Amwa and be taoed to h& po•iaewe They use back sawm l ~war, ht ewy
we, the daeloper uwld sand im drm ay [...]. By ths, ab of ay sor had also joined
Aaaa4 so thepa did notW m t A to ss sd hem anym~r. '3
Over time, militia members were able to help residents in case developers defaulted.
However, since local developers were in some cases members of these political parties, the
ability of these parties to provide backing against them was relatively limited (Chapter 3).
Nonetheless, when Abu Raymond (by then an outsider to the neighborhood's political
structures) defaulted in the mid 1970s, right before his departure, it was members of the Amal
militia in 1981-82 who forced him into compliance. According to a number of residents and to
the developer's records, Abu Raymond sold one lot (1300) to 10-12 families in the mid 1970s,
without paying property owners their dues. The latter, taking advantage of a short period of
relative calm in 1983, came to inspect their lands and evict the "squatters". The "squatters"
appealed to Amal who helped them establish contact with the property owner's lawyer. Amal
members eventually took charge of the case and were able to come to a settlement with Abu
Raymond. According to residents, it was the local militia's help that forced the developer into
compliance."
The story of Hasan, an old time resident of the neighborhood who had rented an
apartment in the 'Abbis Complex for four years at the time of the interview, provides a more
recent example of political backing in the post-war era.Y Hasan contrasted his situation to his
landlord's and recurrently referred to "good backing" in order to explain, somewhat bitterly, why
31 Interviewed Hajjeh Ftlreh twice, inJune 10, 1999 and again in June 13, 2003.
6 This story is based on three interviews with residents on lot 1300. I also found mentions of the case in Abu
Raymond's personal records. All three residents were members of the K family, which is well connected to AmaL
6 Interview held on June 5, 2003 in Hasan's apartment in the 'Abbis Complex in Hayy el Sellom, in the presence of
his wife. All quotes in this paragraph are from this interview.
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he was in worse financial standing. "He is a Syrian, and he knows many people in the Syrian
secret services (Mop babmnit). [...] While all my neighbors paid US $25,000- $30,000 for their
apartments, he was only charged US $12,000". Hasan explained that his landlord knew the local
representative of the Syrian secret services in the Hayy, and that the latter intervened on his
behalf. "Darwish [the developer of the Abbis Complex] had no choice, he wanted to keep
working in the area, so he had to make do with what the Syrias were telling him to do", Hasan
said, a statement later confirmed by Darwsh's assistant, Hasan's neighbor, and a municipal
officer who had followed the case. Hasan's landlord had not occupied his apartment yet because
he lived in OuziO, a war-era squatter setdement in the sea-front area of Beirt's south-western
suburb, which is stated for removal, where he was hoping to get compensation for displacement
Given his "backing", Hasan expected the landlord to get a large pay and not to come back to
Hayy el Sellom at all.
Several other narratives corroborated these stories, indicating that many residents in the
neighborhood had relied on political parties in order to force the developer to reduce the
apartment's price, to refrain from demanding payments for a few months, or other similar
facilities in a context where the developer, forced to work in the area, had no choice but to
accept. In appealing to political parties to gain leverage with developers, the residents turned the
developers' strategies against them.
To close this section on "backing", I should note that "being backed" in Hayy el Sellom
is different from having good "social capital" in the sense that it is a defensive, protective
measure aimed at improving one's bargaining power in transactions and retaliating in case of
default, rather than improving one's social standing, the way Bourdien uses it. Furthennore,
since political powers are not viewed favorably in society, being "backed" does not necessarily
provide "respect" or "admiration" in the community, the way Bourdieu defined "social capital".
To the contrary, it is often viewed with denigration, to indicate that the "backed" actor is
somewhat involved in corrupt practices. However, as we showed before, gossip (provided
through other forms of backing) can ease such negative impacts.
5.E SUMMARY AND DIscussIoN
The changes that marked the Hayy el Sellom housing market over the fifty years and the
diversity of resident groups who arrived in the area illustrate, to a large extent, the scope and
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richness of these newcomers' strategies, the multiplicity of information channels, and the
diversity of solutions devised to improve housing acquisition. Thus, the same residents relied on
family, geographic, and religious securities but did not dismiss connections with state agents and
political representatives and valued the few symbols and pieces of legality they could gather.
Through this mix of "securities", they were able to insure their transactions. The analysis of the
process of housing acquisition however indicates that social networks played the most central
role for the low-income urban dwellers that arrived to Hayy el Sellom in all three phases.
However, the types of social relations that were needed changed across time; while
family relations were extremely valuable in early days, their importance declined in favor of
connections to political parties or state agents that occupied the central place in the array of
"securities" and "retaliation capacities" that a resident could accumulate. The review of the three
processes of information gathering, security, and retaliation indicates a number of important
points about the process of housing acquisition in the neighborhood.
(a) Differential Access to Housing
Reliance on social networks points to a highly differential process of housing acquisition
in which individuals looking for housing are not in equal standing vis-i-vis each other or vis-i-
vis the developer. By introducing the concept of social capital (developed by Bourdieu) in the
introduction in order to develop an understanding of housing networks, I attempted to show
that the understanding of the impact of such networks should be broadened to include their
consequences on the ability of an actor to negotiate a role in the production of housing in a
particular social context. This understanding of social networks and social capital illustrates
eloquently residents' positions in the process of housing acquisition. Those who were able to
appeal, through their own efforts or their endowment to broader networks had better access to
information, higher transaction security, and higher retaliation capacity. Those who weren't had
to settle for dissatisfying options for the lack of better opportunities, even though they knew
they had been abused.
In order to develop this point, I will go back to the concept of "good backing"
developed above. Clearly, not all residents of Hayy el Sellom have "good backing" vis-i-vis
developers or state agents. To the contrary, "good backing" depends on the "position" of an
actor, which can be summarized by the type of networks s/he possesses and/or has been able to
develop, given particular macro-parameters that empower certain groups with respect to others,
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in particular circumstances (e.g. neighborhood controlled by militias or by state agencies,
strength and density of family and village ties).
For example, Hasan, who I quoted above describing his "well backed" landlord, also
recounted how his family had been forced out of their previous apartment: "Unlike the migrants
who came from Ba'albak, we came with relatively few and poor networks, because we fled the
South, when the war began. [...] We arrived to Hayy el Sellom in 1978, and immediately rented
an apartment with all its facilities from one of the families who built and owned several buildings
in the neighborhood. [...] However, they kept raising the rent, and coercing us to pay more. [...]
When the old man died, his children began to threaten us. [...] Families are way less powerful
than they were before, but this one can still coerce people like us, so when the children
threatened us physically, we left the house, [...] with no renter's indemnities, although we lived
there for over 20 years and we were entitled to them"." Hasan's two narratives illustrate how
differential backing, whether family or militia backing, creates differential positions among
residents in the neighborhood, between those who can appeal to their social networks and
activate their "good backing" and those who cannot. The former have generally secured better
prices, insured they obtained apartments, and coerced developers to accept late payments. The
latter, on the other hand, might have well subsidized the former with more expensive apartments
and sometimes no apartments at all
Differential access to social networks (or social capital) also impacts one's ability to
access and /or circulate information about a developer. It thus directly impacts one's ability to
activate a gossip network, or the ability of the gossip network to actually alter a developer's
reputation, the strongest among them (such as Abu Raymond) being virtually untouchable
because of their solid networks with landowners.
(b) A General Decline in the Conditions of Housing Provision
Based on this chapter's findings, one can argue that there was an overall decline in the
conditions in which low-income urban dwellers acquired housing in Hayy el Sellom over the
past fifty years, despite the fact that the later phase market relied more on formal market
mechanisms. We can recall from chapter 3 that the last generation of developers had secured
building permits and enrolled architects and engineers in the design and execution of their
6 Interview held on June 5, 2003 in Hasan's apartment in the 'Abbis Complex in Hayy el Sellom, in the presence of
his wife. All quotes in this paragraph are from this interview.
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projects. They had also relied on more "open" or "democratic" channels of information, such as
advertisement channels, on "formal" financing mechanisms, such as banks credits, and on
formal agreements, such as contracts prepared by lawyers and often certified by notaries.
However, during this third and final phase of the development of Hayy el Sellom, new comers
faced harsher market conditions: access to accurate information had become more difficult,
securities were poorer, and when developers defaulted (which had become more frequent), they
had little space to retaliate. As I described above, very few members of large families could still
claim they were "well backed" by their family and a limited number of others were able to appeal
to other forms of good backing to protect them. Most residents had to rely on paper work
provided by the developer as their main source of information and security, and they found
themselves in difficult standing, dragged into commitments that did not please them because
they otherwise would risk loosing their apartments and their savings. Many also signed contracts
although they didn't understand their conditions and were thus placed in a weak position vis-i-
vis the developer.
Conversely, the inability of formal procedures, such as contracts, or formal institutions
such as courts of law, to secure residents' rights or improve their retaliation power increased the
vulnerability of the last generation of clients. Rather than allowing a better process of housing
provision, these mechanisms placed residents in an awkward legal standing, allowing developers
to force them into agreement they had limited abilities to question or reshape. Ten years later,
the complexes built by these developers ironically leave their residents in a legal standing at least
as flimsy and awkward as the one provided during earlier phases, in fact, sometimes worse. The
multiplicity of illegalities and the scale of the project disempowered residents (and sometimes
even banks) in the face of problems such as outstanding legal issues, inadequate property titles,
and multiple claims over a single apartment.
Residents have to rely on weakened social institutions, or, alteratively, on political
parties, strengthening the hold of the latter on the local population. It is therefore with political
parties that most residents tried to resist unfair market settlements. It is also through political
parties that they challenged, when they could, the public ban on construction or that they
resisted the threats of eviction generated by public projects, such as highways, or insured that
proper compensations were paid.
Furthermore, all interviewed residents in the third phase explained that they were
dissatisfied with the quality of the housing product. Many complained about their poor
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knowledge of the structures of the buildings in which they lived and several described
themselves as "seriously worried or distressed" because they thought the developer might have
unscrupulously reduced costs by compromising on the quality of the construction. All of them
also complained that water piping in the buildings was mediocre and that they had paid or were
planning to pay several thousand dollars in order to reduce water leakage. Residents also
expressed dismay at the false promises of the developer, at the incomplete finish (building
common facilities were rarely completed). They also disliked the spatial quality of their
apartments, the congestion, the proximity of buildings to one another, and many other aspects
of living in large housing complexes.
Simultaneously, it is evident that low-income dwellers looking for housing in Beirut had
little choice to move elsewhere, given the prohibitive costs of land sales in the city. They
therefore have to put up with a higher level of insecurity. While most residents of the early phase
had arrived to Hayy el Sellom with high hopes for a better future, most of the later phase
residents explained that they had come reluctantly with no other alternatives given their financial
means.
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Chapter 6
Summary &
Conclusions
This dissertation proposed an investigation of housing markets based on analyzing over
time relationships between the attributes of the social agents hbo intenne on this market (social
standing, religious affiliation, gender55, etc.), developed and/or activated rues-instutions ystems,
and the macro poliial-economic context that govern their development. The thesis developed a case
study on one neighborhood located in the suburbs of Beirut, Hayy el Sellom, where it followed
three groups of actors: developers, public agents, and homeowners who participated in the
establishment and organization of the neighborhood's land and housing markets. The thesis
extended its investigation over a fifty-year period, tracing how (actor-institutions) relations were
affected by shifting historical conditions, including the political mobilization of the 1960s, the
outbreak of the civil war in the 1970s, post-war reconstruction policies in the 1990s, and others.
This chapter brings together the analyses of the actors, the rules-institutions systems, and
the changing macro political economic context put forth in the preceding chapters in order to
elucidate how changes in these three parameters influenced the character of the land and housing
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markut (e.g. facility of access, number of players, ability to retaliate, types of securities, prevalence
of default, etc.) and therefore the relative ability of low income urban dwellers to access housing.
The chapter then contrasts these findings to current paradigms of the planning literature that
describe how land and housing markets function in third world countries. The thesis concludes
with a number of policy recommendations.
6A THREE PHASES OF IAND MAREMTS
It is possible to distinguish three types of housing markets, in the fifty-years
investigation:
6.A.1 Phase 1 (1950-1970): A Negotiated Informal Market
The first phase corresponds to the establishment of the Hayy el Sellom housing market
and to its most tightly regulated period. This was in no means an "easy entry" market, as one
might expect an early informal settlement market to be. To the contrary, the market, during this
twenty-year period, was a monopoly of one land developer, Abu Raymond. Abu Raymond was
an original resident of the area who worked in close contact with landowners. He sold small
parcels of land (100-200m2) to newcomers (mostly rural migrants) and organized the
construction of their houses. He operated, first alone, and later with the help of intermediaries
or wrasitr, early comers to the area who played the role of mediators between him and members
of their family, village, or religious group. By the end of his carrier, this developer, along with his
children and a number of •ritr, monopolized he entire process of housing production, including
access to land and building materials and construction, so much so that it was virtually
impossible to access housing in this neighborhood without going through him.
Abu Raymond's ability to monopolize the production of housing for twenty years rested,
as we have seen, on his capacity to build and maintain a tight web of social networks that
connected him to public agents (e.g. state accredited agents, clerks in planning agencies,
policemen, etc.), political figures (e.g. elected officials), landowners, and mediators. Abu
Raymond's relations with landowners were perhaps the most valuable social relations he
possessed because they insured access to land, which was the most difficult aspect of the
business. The developer managed to mediate the relation between clients and landowners who
would otherwise not have met, and to create a secure space for the two to exchange land. His
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connections to the public sector also allowed his clients to follow-through with construction,
with or without building permits. His control of this land market however also rested on his
ability to appeal to a number of public institutions and rely on their accreditation or market
securities (e.g. Land Registry) in order to sustain minimum levels of safety for the market to
operate.
This phase coincides with the time when most modem planning agencies were
established in Lebanon, when the dichotomy between "legal" and "illegal" building was created,
since new land use and zoning regulations made it more difficult to build.' However, records
indicate many public agents were directly involved in the production of "exceptional" planning
regulations that would allow the settlement to continue to grow, despite its newly legislated
"illegal" status. As a result, this informal settlement was built in negotiation with planning
agencies that were well aware of its growth. It also benefited from the "protection" or "favors"
of political figures.
These public practices had important implications in the development of the market.
First, they insured a containment of the level of illegality, such as the absence of squatting from
the area, a necessary pre-requisite for public sector indulgence (since there is no fundamental
questioning of the public order, which was based on the protection of private property). They
also allowed the transfer of property and its proper registration, which maintained relatively up
to-date public land registries and therefore clear property titles and the ability to appeal to public
records in cases of disagreement. They also contained physical construction to what residents
then perceived as "potentially regularizable". Indeed, at the time, many residents highly valued
their legal status and repeatedly sought its adjustment, in view of facilitating their access to
services and/or clarifying inheritance. Their attitude towards the law was in part the result of the
type of political mobilization of the era: the political leaders speaking in the name of low-income
urban dwellers (especially the Muslim Shi'ite among them) were then lobbying for the right to be
included as full-fledge citizens within state structures, they were not just looking for "protection"
to bypass the law.2
I This is not to say that there were no earlier building law guidelines, or other construction pre-requisite. However,
the imposition for example of zoning and land use regulations in 1964 and a mandatory building permit in 1961 to
everyone, as described in Chapter 2, only dates back to this phase.
2 This was especially the case of Imtni Musa al-Sadr and HarMeit edMabrvrunm (Chapter 2, see also Ajami 1986,
Norton 1985).
242
Taken from the residents' perspective, this period is the most organized and secure
phase of the neighborhood's development, since relatively few disagreements on sale or default
were noted. For low-income urban dwellers (mostly rural migrants) looking for shelter in the
city, the process of housing acquisition was relatively simple and safe, once they had gained the
trust of the developer, through the mediation of a family member or fellow village man. Abu
Raymond's arrangements were also relatively flexible and well adapted to their needs. True, there
was little flexibility in the options available, once they had committed to acquiring land from this
developer. However, the transaction itself was relatively safe, with several guarantees from public
agents as well as their own social networks, and they knew the developer was accountable if they
felt cheated.
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Figure 6-1: Phase 1, Hayy el Sellom Housing Market
Figure 6-1 summarizes the set of relations that governed the Hayy el Sellom housing
market at the time. The figure shows three types of actors: The developer and his assistants (in
full thick lines), clients (in gray) and public agencies (in dashed lines). Political parties and
religious authorities also play a minor role and are shown as marginal (in dotted lines) on the
corner of the figure. The diagram maps the thick web of social networks (in arrows) that
connected the actors in the neighborhood. As the recipient of the largest and heaviest set of
social networks (or social capital), Abu Raymond is in the center of the diagram with solid
networks (thick arrows) connecting him, on the one hand to the public agencies and public
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officials, and, on the other, to the communities of clients via wasits. The weight of these arrows
also reflects the hierarchy between and among actors, indicating for example the importance of
the Land Registry over all other public institutions because of its ability to guarantee the validity
of the transactions (for buyers) and security (for the developer). It also shows the overlap
between local wan't or mediators, public sector "entrepreneurs," and the developer. Finally, the
figure shows the type of social networks within the community of homebuyers, predominantly
rural migrants tied together through family and geographic associations.
6.A.2 Phase 2 (1970-1992): De-facto Management
The second phase was characterized by relatively open market opportunities where a
larger number of developers engaged in housing production. This is not to say that the market
became a "typical" informal market with "easy entry" and "flexible" financial arrangements.
However, I was able to count at least ten developers who, during this phase, participated in the
production of housing. They still sold small lots (100-200 mi) to rural migrants and populations
displaced by military conflicts in the country and organized access to material and construction.
All these developers had worked as mediators or wasit with Abu Raymond and they had learned
the practices and accumulated the necessary social networks through this experience. These
developers also established the basis for their institutional control over the land market. Most of
them were founding members of the neighborhood committee and many of them had been
associated with the local political party, Amal, when it was first established in Hayy el Sellom. As
a result, these developers did not really compete with each other. To the contrary, they
continued to coordinate activities in order to protect their business and prevent outsider
competition, the way the first developer did (Chapter 3).
The ability of these developers to participate in the production of housing rested on
several factors. First, there were changing circumstances in the city, such as the weakening of
public authorities (and hence greater ability to skirt public regulations) and the proliferation and
control of militias over the area. As a result, the developers of the second generation needed to
be well-connected with political parties, rather than public institutions. In addition, there were
changes in power relations among actors, notably landowners who then faced the risk of
squatting and were therefore eager to sell their land. Conversely, lower levels of security in the
city meant that many clients needed a mediator they could trust with their life savings, shifting
the control of the market (from those who can access land) to those who can insure a relative
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level of "trust" through their own reputation and through social networks. Given these
circumstances, it is not surprising that the developers of this phase had to be internal members
of the community who relied in their practice on backing from militias and direct family and
social relations with clients.
During this phase, the housing market developed with substantially greater violations of
public regulations. This was the outcome of the weakness of the public planning agencies, but
also of their changing dispositions vis-i-vis informal settlements. As described in Chapter 4,
threats of displacement (e.g. highway projects) and more stringent regulations for land
registration (especially after the 1983 building code that prevented the registration of sales in the
Public Land Registry when there were illegal constructions on a lot) gradually reduced the space
for negotiation between state agencies and residents and eventually lead to further undermining
of the public "order" in the neighborhood. Moreover, unlike pre-war mobilization, the militias
that controlled Hayy el Sellom (and the southern suburbs of Beirut) during this period
encouraged residents to defy state authority and offered their protection in the process. As a
result of these changes, violations of construction and urban codes became more blatant:
services were obtained through illegal hook-up, residents added several stories to their old
structures, and riverbanks and other public lands were squatted upon.
The multiplicity of developers, the creation of new institutions such as the
Neighborhood Committee, and the intervention of militias in the housing market began to
establish a new type of market, controlled by a group of developers connected through tight
social relations. This market was relatively less secure than earlier ones, especially that the
number of developers cheating on measurements or selling land earmarked for public projects
was on the rise. However, such swindles remained limited and controlled, and, given the social
and geographic proximity of residents and developers, it was possible for residents to retaliate
with gossip or social pressure on the developer. Rather than an open market, one can talk of a
tight network of developers who colluded to close the market to their advantage and protect
each other's practices, but who nonetheless saw in their publicly perceived honesty a necessary
pre-requisite for continuing their practices.
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Figure 6-2: Phase 2, Hayy el Sellom housing market
Figure 6-2 illustrates these changes. Compared to the precedent market scheme (figure 6-
1), one first notices the disappearance of Abu Raymond (in very light lines) and instead, the
emergence of a thick web of social networks within the residents' group (in gray), binding wasits-
turned developers to clients and, through the newly created Neighborhood Association and
public sector "entrepreneurs," to public agencies and actors as well as the political parties. The
latter had appeared marginally in the precedent diagram (figure 6-1) while their role has
expanded and penetrated the web of the neighborhood's residents in this figure, showing an
important shift in power away from the public sector. Finally, the hierarchy among public
agencies has shifted, notably with the Land Registry losing its role to the Notary Public who was
still able to register (informally) land sales transactions.
6.A.3 Phase 3: The Reconstruction Phase (1992-2003)
This third phase coincides with the present penetration of a new market dynamics to the
neighborhood. This housing market relies considerably on formal market mechanisms (i.e. bank
loans and formal channels of advertising) and institutions (e.g. formal contracts), without
completely supplanting earlier channels (social networks, political parties, etc.). It is controlled by
a limited number of developers, those who can marshal the necessary funds to organize
construction in a prohibitively expensive post-war context. Given these pre-requisites for
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operating on this market, it is a new class of urban developers, de-facto outsiders to the
neighborhood, who operate at the scale of the city's suburbs, with networks in banks or other
money lending agencies, rather than within the community, who have taken control of the
market. They are selling apartments, mostly to impoverished urban lower middle classes (who
often grew up within the city) with no previous connections to the neighborhood or populations
displaced by post-war reconstruction, two groups who could not afford to purchase housing
anywhere else in the city, rather than to rural migrants. The latter have now resorted to rental,
because they cannot afford purchasing housing in the city anymore.
The nature of the housing product has considerably changed during this period. Rather
than purchasing land parcels (now too expensive), the last generation of Hayy el Sellom
homebuyers is purchasing apartments in large-scale, multi-story housing complexes. Most of
these compounds began as legal projects, with formal building permits and the accreditation of a
number of architects, engineers, and notaries. However, hindered by their clients' delinquent
payments and their lack of professional experience, all these developers have defaulted on the
sales they organized, selling more apartments than they had built, building more apartments than
their permits allowed, and using poor quality materials in construction. Furthermore, they have
all been unable to return the money they borrowed from banks and, as a result, all of them have
been jailed for a period. This situation is in large part the result of the times in which these
developers operate. Indeed, in the post-civil war reconstruction phase, the scarcity of land and
its prohibitive prices as well as vigilant state policing to curtail further informal developments
imposed different modes of production and hence stricter market entry.3
Taken from these new residents' perspective, this phase marks the worse market
conditions in all fifty years. Indeed, weakened social networks and inaccessible formal market or
public agencies (e.g. courts) have together reduced their capacity to gather sufficient information
prior to purchasing a house, insure sufficient transaction security (e.g. favorable contracts),
obtain flexible payment facilities that fit their tight economic conditions, or retaliate in case the
developer defaults. To the contrary, based on their friends' and relatives' experiences, many of
these new residents have lowered their expectations and settled for poor and expensive housing,
often with no legal registration of their new apartments. Those among them who have sufficient
3 It is possible to argue along neo-liberal lines that the problem is to have more credible institutions and
mechanisms to allow the market to function better. However, these market institutions have not materialized, here
and elsewhere.
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backing from political or public agencies can still negotiate better deals (e.g. lower prices), or
benefit from the "blurred legality" of the complex to occupy more space (e.g. elevator shaft,
close balconies) or default on payments, but for many residents, it is a highly insecure market
that they are forced to accept.
Moreover, this phase marks the lowest level of public-private or state-resident
negotiation. Indeed, the threats of displacement (e.g. execution of public projects) and the
absence of communication channels with public agencies have increased residents' reliance on
political parties who now constitute the only liaison between public agencies and residents of
informal settlements. The latter seem to have lost interest in the legalization of their buildings,
because they are more concerned with deteriorating living conditions and the neighborhood 's
poor physical environment.
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Figure 6-3: Hayy el Sellom housing market, phase 3
Figure 6-3 illustrates these changes. It shows the shift from a thick social web of
relations within the neighborhood to the creation of a new network of formal relations,
exemplified by the (developers-buank-advertisement) channels relations. It also shows how the
channels of housing production now center outside the neighborhood that has received several
groups of new homebuyers (families displaced by post-war reconstruction projects and newly
married couples), while rural and foreign migrants are renting rooms or apartments (dashed
arrows) from impoverished (earlier) neighborhood residents. Figure 6-3 also illustrates the
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absence of reciprocal channels connecting developer to clients: while the old residents-
developers relations were legislated by social networks that insured a minimum level of
reciprocity, the new developer-resident relations are legislated by advertisers, lawyers, and agents
hired by the developer to protect his interests from the clients.
6.B LEARNING FROM THE HAYY EL SELLOM HOUSING MARKET
The previous section described three types of "markets" that operated in different
periods in Hayy el Sellom. It would be possible to lump all markets under a category called
"informal". However, within this category, these markets showed dissimilar characteristics: they
relied on different institutional schemes, empowered different kinds of developers, and served
the housing needs of different population groups. Furthermore, different levels of accessibility,
flexibility, and levels of security for low-income urban dwellers looking for shelter characterized
these markets. This study therefore suggests the necessity to step away from the
formal/informal categories, not only because they are inaccurately dualistic, but also because
these categories conceal other market characteristics, such as varying levels of openness,
flexibility, and security, that are more important to investigate for those interested in
understanding low-income housing markets and, ultimately, improving their operations. As a
result, the thesis findings differ from widely held views about "informal markets" on several
levels.
6.B.1 On Social Networks and the Housing Markets Characteristic
The three phases of the Hayy el Sellom housing market functioned on an array of formal
and informal institutions that always co-existed in the organization of the neighborhood and that
were simultaneously requisite for its functioning. However, it is undeniable that social networks
consistently played a central role in the organization and management of this market.
Social (housing) networks were of many different natures in Hayy el Sellom: some of
them connected families, tribes, and co-villagers in the neighborhood together. Others enabled
developers and residents to connect to public agencies, political parties, or market agencies.
Some of these networks were based on old kin or geographic relations, while others were
consciously built to organize and manage the processes of housing production and acquisition.
However, as the neighborhood grew in size and as linkages with the citywide land and housing
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markets increased, local social networks lost importance relative to other networks that
connected actors in this neighborhood to others outside it, such as political parties, public
authorities, and banks.
The thesis documented two interconnected ways in which social networks operated.
First, social networks acted as housing networks (Smith 2003), providing actors with access to
the necessary resources to produce or access housing. Thus, homebuyers relied on social
networks in order to gather the necessary information about the housing product and secure
their market transactions, while developers relied on social networks in order to access land and
financing, or to secure transactions. Second, these social networks could be accumulated as a
form of capital, enabling actors to reposition themselves within the social hierarchies of the
neighborhood, and hence build a better reputation, acquire higher credentials, or build solid
"backing" on the basis of which they secured better deals (price or payment period) or retaliated
in case of default.
Based on these changes, it is possible to trace a correspondence between housing market
characteristics and the type of social networks (and institutions more generally) that were
operating in every phase of the neighborhood's development. One can already conclude from
this research that the unique dusters of social relations that result from particular historical
circumstances and specific actors' strategies produce particular housing outcomes (type of
housing product, type of developer-client relation, level of security). In this case, the three types
of social network arrangements that were sketched in the preceding section (figures 6-1, 6-2, and
6-3) heavily influenced the market conditions (closed/open markets, flexible/inflexible payment
arrangements). More specifically, when the social networks governing market relations were
rooted within the neighborhood, a limited entry market was in place, with a relatively high level
of transaction security and an acceptable housing product that was controlled by homebuyers.
However, once the neighborhood expanded, widening the web of social networks to the scale of
the city and bringing in actors to Hayy el Sellom whose operations relied on networks outside
the neighborhood, market entry became easier to outsiders, while, conversely, the possibilities of
default became larger, transaction security dwindled, and the housing product deteriorated.
These findings appear to be corroborated elsewhere. Lawson (2001) has suggested
similar findings in European housing networks, arguing that differences between the traditional
Dutch social rental housing and the Australian liberal laissez-faire housing sector could be
explained in large part by the unique duster of social networks underlying housing arrangements
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in each country (i.e. property, finance, welfare relations). They suggest the necessity to look
further into the correspondence between social institutions and market conditions, and to
predict the impact of city-wide factors and public policy on the development of particular
institutional schemes and hence, market conditions.
6.B.2 On the Informal Public Sector
My dissertation documents the tight connections linking various public institutions and
agents to the production, organization, and distribution of (illegal) housing in Hayy el Sellom. It
also shows that the different forms that were taken by this "illegal" or "informal" housing
development over the course of the investigated fifty years were always mediated by the public
sector.
First, my findings show that "informal" developers and their clients relied on public
institutions and rules, at least in part, to organize their activities and secure their exchanges. In
Hayy el Sellom, all "informal" developers relied on public and professional sectors' symbols in
order to build a credible image to potential buyers. They also borrowed and transformed public
urban regulations in order to develop a pseudo-legal set of rules that were crucial in preserving
an adequate living environment for residents. Those who organized land sales and construction
(1950-1990) directly applied public building and urban regulations, such as set backs or
maximum floor areas ratios, in order to dictate the construction guidelines that formed the basis
for an "acceptable", "potentially regulariable" settlement. Many of these developers also relied
on public institutions and formal market agencies in order to secure their transactions from
buyers defaulting in cases of land dispute settlement or loan repayments. Similarly, homebuyers
in this neighborhood relied on public agencies in order to assess the reputation and credibility of
a developer and secure their purchases. Many residents also depended on public agents as a
source of "strong backing" that empowered them to challenge public regulations or to reset the
terms of an agreement with a developer.
Second, my thesis findings indicate that many "pieces of the state", to borrow Heyman's
terminology (Heyman 1999), directly participated in the production of informality. To begin
with, well-meaning public agents, unable to let go of their dreams of designing the "good city"
with its European standards, but faced with political and social pressures as well as their need to
retain some control over urban growth, allowed for exceptional, so called one-time measures,
that circumvented the regulations they had themselves written. In fact, they ruled the city
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through "exceptional measures" that ultimately generated a repertoire of state sanctioned
informal regulations. Furthermore, low-level public agents directly participated in the operations
of the illegal/informal market, by trading "legality" -as a commodity, in the form of building or
service permits, property titles, or simply protection from police forces. While they could be
dismissed as "corrupt", these public agents also directly contributed to the implementation of
state rules in the neighborhood, and therefore knowledge and sometimes respect of public
regulations. They also assisted low-income urban dwellers who were otherwise unable to enjoy
home ownership altogether.
Such findings inform our understanding of the role of the 'public sector" in informal
settlements. To begin with, the influence of publicly sanctioned urban regulations on developers'
and residents' practices and strategies reveals the centrality of state legal structures and their
importance in regulating informal trmnsactions. Furthermore, while controversial in some sense,
the cooperative attitude of state actors indicates some level of flexibility and a capacity to
accommodate informal transactions in ways that contradict the rigid perceptions we have of
state agencies. However, this flexibility, the thesis showed, was limited in this case study to
concessions and exceptions and never translated into making urban regulations more inclusive
from the outset, or intervening to adjust market conditions, as the policy recommendations
below suggest.
6.B3 Formalization, Market Conditions, & Opportunities for Capital Accumulation
Based on current institutional theories, it is expected that the formalization of market
institutions is the automatic outcome of these markets' need to grow, improve their performance
(e.g. higher security), and increase their potential for capital accumulation (World Bank 2002, De
Soto 2000). My findings differ from this school of thought on several grounds.
To begin with, this study indicates that formal institutions are not a necessary condition
for capital accumulation. Even though well-defined formal property rights were not in place in
Hayy el Sellom, the area developed continuously because it offered many alternative
opportunities for capital accumulation. It suggests that there may even be an inverse relationship
between formal rules and capital accumulation lack of formal rules regarding property rights
may create opportunities for private capital accumulation while generating adverse social costs,
such as high density, pollution, and other negative externalities, which are today the greatest
concern for Hayy el Sellom's residents. Hence, residents built additional floors, rented rooms
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and apartments, and in fact benefited from the low-end market niche afforded by the lack of
formality. In addition, residents' narratives indicate that at least some of them managed to
accumulate additional capital and facilitate their access to housing from the "blurred" legal status
that granted them additional payment flexibility because the developers could not enforce their
contract legally.
Furthermnore, while it is true that the Hayy el Sellom housing market increased its
reliance on formal market institutions (e.g. formal contracts, bank loans, advertisement channels,
etc.) over the past fifty years,4 this study shows that this shift did not stem from the necessity for
this market to grow, as proponents of regulatization and tiding policies tell us. Higher reliance
on formal market institutions, the thesis showed, was triggered by changing parameters in the
costs of housing production, especially rapid increases in the price of land, and a larger and more
pressing volume of housing demand. These changes created new conditions for the production
of housing, such as the necessity for large financial investments (and hence bank loans) or wider
advertisement channels. Higher reliance on formal market institutions resulted therefore from
changes in the conditions of housing production (triggered, most certainly, by urban processes
outside the neighborhood), not an inherent necessity for this market to grow.
Does this formalization of market exchanges nonetheless improve market conditions
(e.g. higher transaction security, better financial arrangements) for low-income urban dwellers
looking for housing? This case study indicates that rather than providing a higher level of
security, reliance on formal market institutions such as contracts (that they could not negotiate)
or advertisement panels (they could not verify) placed low income homebuyers in more
vulnerable standing vis-i-vis the developer (Chapter 5), while weakened social networks (given
that they had no prior relations to developers) and the inability of public agencies (especially
courts of law) to provide recourse for aggrieved parties when default occurred (Chapter 5)
worsened their market conditions. In comparison to early comers who were trapped in tight
social networks that dictated the conditions for their housing provision, these latecomers had
perhaps more options to choose from. However, they ultimately had less recourse and control
over the process of housing acquisition.
Does formalization automatically increase the opportunities for capital accumulation?
Proponents of titling policies predict that the formalization of market transactions necessarily
4 Higher reliance on format market channels does not however cancel out social networks or political parties that
continued to play an important role in the production of housing and acquisition for both developers and residents.
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improves economic opportunities (World Bank 2002, De Soto 2000). According to De Soto,
people cannot create capital because they are confined in their transactions to "circles" of
"people they know", they cannot access loans and cannot capitalize on their assets (De Soto
2000: 8). This prediction is somewhat accurate in Hayy el Sellom where new conditions for
housing production in post-war Beirut pushed out of the housing market the second generation
of developers who were confined to their circles of friends and relatives in the neighborhood
and had limited knowledge and relations in the public sector and within market institutions.
However, the new generation of developers that replaced them by virtue of their connections to
public and market institutions did not find lucrative market conditions. To the contrary, the
thesis has shown that most developers in the 1990s ended up bankrupt, something that had not
happened to earlier generations. Furthermore, my findings suggest that further deterioration of
market opportunities can be expected, since many interviewed homeowners, embittered by their
experience, confessed that they would advise others to rent rather than purchase housing
because rental provided a safer option under current market conditions.
What about the effect of formal property rights titles on tenure security? Despite a wide
body of research showing that tenure security and formal property rights are not necessarily a
pre-requisite for tenure security (Razzaz 1993), UN-Habitat's campaigns have continued to focus
on titling as the necessary policy option. This case study confirms that it is not clear that well-
defined private property rights provide homeowners with a higher sense of security. Indeed, the
main risk faced by the residents of Hayy el Sellom today are highway and road projects that
threaten to displace a large section of the neighborhood' population. However, these road
projects equally threaten residents with different forms of property claims and entitlements.
This is not to say that property titles are irrelevant. For example, I have seen several old
women in the neighborhood flaunt their title as a sign of social distinction vis-i-vis a quarreling
neighbor. Several residents have also complained that they would like to have their children
inherit "proper titles" rather than the contested shares they now possess. Thus, private property
in this traditionally rural and agrarian society still carries an important social value. It is thus
primarily as a set of social relations that property rights are evoked in this neighborhood, as
scholars of Law and Society have informed us previously, and public interventions in favor of
titling -even if desirable- need to understand that this is the goal they are serving.
In sum, higher reliance on formal market institutions in Hayy el Sellom cannot be
expected to automatically improve opportunities for capital accumulation, increase transaction
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security for low income urban dwellers looking to access housing, or improve tenure security.
This is not to say that informal institutions automatically render the market more efficient or
that the creation of new public institutions serves that goal either. It is rather to show that the
efficiency of a housing market (its ability to secure transactions and insure some level of capital
accumulation) is the result of particular historical and circumstantial factors and particular
groups of actors who together produce the appropriate institutional conditions for market
transactions to occur. In this case, social networks, geographic and family institutions, public
agencies (e.g. Land Registry), and other political and communal institutions provided the
grounds for the development of a market that functioned relatively well over the course of forty
years and allowed for a modest process of capital accumulation throughout that period. During
the last phase, and although the opportunities for capital accumulation continued, the scale of
default and the dissatisfaction of clients and developers indicate that this institutional set-up had
not resisted growing urban pressures, while a new institutional framework did not develop to
support these new market conditions.
These findings question the basis of the current housing paradigm and the centrality of
improving market mechanisms and formalizing transactions as necessary steps for improving
housing provision. Indeed, the integration of these markets as segments of broader housing
markets seems already well under way, and its impacts are far from proving positive for low-
income urban dwellers.
6.B.4 On Differential Power Relations in Housing Markets
The institutional analysis of the Hayy el Sellom land and housing market showed a
dialectic actor/institution relationship where the ability of particular actors to participate in this
market (in producing or purchasing housing) depended on their capacity to tap on existing
institutions and position themselves favorably in the social hierarchies of this neighborhood,
while the institutional map that was built over time was largely influenced by these actors'
strategies.
In Chapter 3, I argued that the ability of developers, in all three generations, to
participate in the production of housing depended on building and maintaining the necessary
social networks that enabled them to penetrate key institutions (public or private) in these
markets. The accumulation of such networks, I showed, building on Pierre Bourdieu's theory of
social capital, altered a developer's position in the community, formed the basis of his "good
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reputation", and facilitated his market activities. Social networks and the resources they provide
are thus only one part of the story. They need to be seen in light of how the accumulation of
social capital can alter actors' social positioning and facilitate their practices.
In Chapter 5, the concept of "good backing" that determines a buyer's ability to
negotiate a more favorable deal, such as lower price or longer installment duration, or influences
a buyer's ability to retaliate in case of default, recalled the concept of social capital again. It
showed that developers and residents constantly sought to reposition themselves relative to each
other in order to obtain favorable terms for their deaL "Good backing" in the neighborhood
depended on the "position" of an actor, which can be summarized by the type of networks s/he
possessed and/or had been able to develop, given particular conditions (e.g. neighborhood
controlled by militias or by state agencies, strength and density of family and village ties) that
empowered certain groups over others. Other forms of capital, such as one's symbolic capital
(still following Bourdieu 1986), had less influence on the outcome of these transactions, unless
such capital could be transfored into a source of backing (e.g. credit in the eyes of a political
party).
These descriptions underline the complex and unequal nature of this housing market and
the uneven opportunities it opens for buyers and sellers. On the one hand, not everyone can be
a developer, since only those who managed to acquire sufficient social and financial capital
positioned themselves adequately and controlled the key institutions that enabled them to play
this role (Chapter 3). On the other hand, not all buyers are equal vis-i-vis developers. Those
who are able to appeal to broader networks, through their own efforts or endowment, have
better access to information, higher transaction security, and higher retaliation capacity. Others
have to settle for dissatisfying options for the lack of better opportunities, even though they
know they have been abused. As a result, some secured favorable deals (e.g. lower prices, longer
repayment periods), sometimes at the expense of the developer, while others lost their lifetime
savings, with little hope for recourse (Chapter 5).
These findings bring to the analysis of land and housing markets the issue of differential
power relations between actors and their impact on the outcome of market transactions. This
issue was raised by Durand-Lasserve (1994) in francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, where he
showed that land prices depended on who one is dealing with, rather than the strict mechanical
intersection of supply and demand curves. However, this aspect of markets' operations is
generally neglected, despite ample evidence that market transactions entail inherently power-
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ridden negotiations. This is not surprising since the planning literature itself has often failed to
account for power as a main component of project design and implementation (Flyvbjerg 2002,
Yiftachel and Huxley 2000). Similarly, analyses of housing and land markets in Third World
countries (mostly conducted by planners) have rarely accounted for "power" or "differential
social positions" embedded in market choices. Evidence from my fieldwork however revealed
that this form of power plays an important role in determining who can intervene in the market.
It is, for example, not coincidental that all developers were men, throughout the 50 years of
Hayy el Sellom's development, s and that most of them either belonged to large influential
families and tribes, or were affiliated to central political parties (Chapter 3). Power also plays an
important role in detennining the outcome of market negotiations, including prices. It was not
exceptional in this market to see that prices differed sometimes by 100%, for equivalent
opportunities, depending on the client's ability to force price discounts- (Chapter 5). These
findings reiterate the necessity to acknowledge and account for differential power relations in
housing markets. Furthermore, and given the nature of housing as a social good, it requires
public intervention in order to adjust market conditions and reduce the vulnerability of weaker
groups.
6.B.5 On Informal Settlements & Changing Urban Conditions
Over the course of the fifty years of investigation, it is possible to observe important
modifications in the social and physical map of Hayy el Sellom, as well as the place of this
neighborhood in the city. Indeed, given the sprawling growth of Beirut, Hayy el Sellom has gone
from being a remote neighborhood in the far suburbs of the capital city to being another
neighborhood of its (relatively close) southern suburbs. During this phase, the pool of
homebuyers has also considerably changed, going from rural migrants with no prior experience
in the city to an impoverished class of urban lower middle income families who are unable to
afford housing elsewhere in the city. In the meantime, rural migrants have been pushed towards
the rental market, since home ownership has become unaffordable to them, while migrant
foreign workers were pushed towards renting rooms instead of apartments, in even worse
physical conditions. The nature of the housing product in Hayy el Sellom has also considerably
5 To be accurate, one woman, Fatimah, played the role of mediator in Hayy el Nahr. Her work was however limited
to one or two lots in the neighborhood and she never became a "developer" later.
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changed during these fifty years, going from self-help, small-scale and limited enterprises to large
scale, industrially produced apartment complexes.
In this process, control over the market and the ability to develop land, build housing,
and provide construction material and credit, which was originally controlled by the
neighborhood's residents, has shifted towards city-wide developers who are outsiders to the
neighborhood and rely in their operations on formal market mechanisms. In sum, the attributes
of what made "informal housing" a viable self-help housing option until the 1980s, or what
made housing a "verb" in Turner's (1972) words, have been replaced by an industrially produced
neighborhood in the sense that local initiative and control have been considerably reduced.
Finally, living conditions have considerably worsened in this neighborhood. Almost all
interviewed residents complained about the very high density, the absence of sunlight and
proper ventilation in houses, the lack of public spaces, water, noise, and air pollution, and traffic
congestion. Many wish a highway would actually be implemented and demolish their houses,
provided they could be paid indemnities and helped to move elsewhere (Deboulet and Fawaz
2004). In fact, some of them even organized a delegation that visited the Prime Minister and
requested the implementation of this highway.' In short, most of these residents do not think
that the neighborhood provides them with an adequate housing solution anymore.
These changes point to the interconnectedness of so-called informal settlements and city
wide changes, and, perhaps more importantly, to the vulnerability of informal rangements to
city-wide changes. Indeed, the changes traced in Hayy el Sellom over the past fifty years
(providing different opportunities for housing acquisition and production, different types of
housing products, etc.) are paralleled by a gradual impoverishment of urban populations over the
past decades observed in Lebanon (Haddad 1996) and elsewhere (UN-Habitat 2003, Davis
2004). They are also paralleled by an (unregulated) increase of land prices everywhere in Beirut
(Aveline 2000, InfoPro 2003), as well as wide waves of population displacements as a result of
urban renewal or squatter evacuation projects (under the banned or post-war reconstruction).
The arrival of many of these displaced population groups to Hayy el Sellom suggests that this
informal settlement has become attractive to those who, twenty years ago, would have never
accepted to live in it While my findings cannot demonstrate a direct connection between neo-
liberal urban policy, changing urban conditions, and worse living conditions in Hayy el Sellom,
' Interview held with Ahmad, activist resident of Hayy cl Sellom in July 20,1999.
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this strong correlation suggests the necessity to look into relations between such city-wide urban
changes, exclusive urban policies, and the impacts they can have on low-income urban
neighborhoods.
These dynamics also raise important questions about current changes in informal
settlements in Lebanon and elsewhere, and the abilities of low-income urban dwellers to control
and manage the process of housing production and acquisition. They first challenge the validity
of earlier assumptions that informal settlements are a potential housing "solution". Hayy el
Sellom could indeed have been an adequate housing solution when Turner and others were
making their claims in the 1960s (Turner 1967, 1972). The neighborhood seemed then to be set
on a "positive" trajectory in which low-income urban dwellers were accessing adequate shelter,
with limited physical densities, and services were provided through political interventions (e.g.
water) or self-help projects (e.g. sewers). However, the picture looks different today, with the
steady deterioration of conditions, a gradual densification of the neighborhood, and the
residents' loss of control over the production and organization of their living spaces. They point
to the need for urban policies that can protect informal arrangements, address the deficiencies
observed in the physical environment, and improve securities, as the last section of this thesis
will argue.
6.C LESSONS FOR PLANNERS
How can these findings help in the formulation of better urban planning and housing
policies?
There are at least two different forms of necessary public interventions. On the one
hand, it is important for public agencies to intervene today in Hayy el Sellom in order to
improve living conditions in this neighborhood. On the other hand, it is necessary to learn from
the processes through which this neighborhood developed in order to strengthen existing and
viable arrangements for housing production.
6.C.1 Formalizing Informal Markets and the Current Policy Paradigm
The current policy paradigm calls for "integrating" informal housing markets within
formal ones and increasing their reliance on formal market institutions (e.g. property rights,
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contracts, etc.). This policy recommendation seems somewhat redundant in Hayy el Sellom
where the process of housing production was directly affected by citywide factors and the
housing market heavily relied on formal market institutions. Thus, whether policymakers
advocate it or not, integration within the citywide housing market is unavoidable for low-income
housing markets subjected to the types of urban pressures described in Hayy el Sellom.
Furthermore, my dissertation showed that higher reliance on market institutions does not
necessarily improve access to housing or opportunities for capital accumulation for low income
urban dwellers. To the contrary, higher reliance on formal market institutions in Hayy el Sellom
pushed an entire generation of developers and clients (e.g. rural migrants) out of the
neighborhood's housing market that was rendered unaffordable to them. It also created new
forms of vulnerability to market default for both homebuyers and developers because, as
described above, formally drafted contracts were unable to provide the necessary security and
trust in market exchanges and public agencies (especially courts) were unable to provide the
possibility for appeal, once developers defaulted.
Given these findings, the first recommendation that comes out of this dissertation is for
policymakers to look at the details of how particular housing markets operate, the form and level
of reliance on formal market institutions, and the consequences of particular institutional set-ups
on different groups of actors (homebuyers and developers) in order to design the necessary
interventions that respond to the weaknesses of particular market arrangements (e.g. closeness,
affordability, flexibility, etc.). Within this perspective, several types of interventions can be
suggested in Hayy el Sellom, in light of the market investigation this thesis has conducted.
To begin with, my research showed the absence of accessible, affordable, and rapid
public recourse for homebuyers when a developers defaulted on a transaction. Chapter 5
highlighted the difference between two groups of homebuyers, those who had "retaliation
capacity" and were therefore able to secure better market settlements and respond in case of
default, and those who didn't The latter either settled for unsatisfactory housing options or lost
their lifetime savings with little or no hope to recover them. Guided by this understanding of
market defaults, a well-informed public intervention could provide accessible and rapid legal
recourse for homebuyers in order to compensate for their weak knowledge of contractual
agreements and provide them with accessible legal recourse. It is thus possible to imagine a local
court of appeal that appeals to local developers, topographers, public sector entrepreneurs, and
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residents in this neighborhood and settles conflicts on multiple sales and payment default,
without addressing the legal status of housing.
Second, my research showed developers' vulnerability to payment defaults, given that
they rely on regular monthly installments in order to finance construction and repay their bank
loans. It also highlighted homebuyers' vulnerability vis-i-vis developers once they commit
contractually to regular installments despite their irregular incomes. These findings point out the
need for a flexible system of credit provision that compensate for irregular incomes and insure a
regular flow of money to developers. This financing mechanism should not seek to replace the
developer's credit provision, only to supplement it with additional security in case of default.
The planning literature has described successful housing credit schemes elsewhere, such as in the
Philippines where housing micro-finance proved to be an adequate public housing intervention
for low income groups (Berner 2001b). It is possible to imagine similar, locally adapted schemes
in this context.
Finally, the case study showed that market default could be reduced if building and
zoning regulations were designed to limit the scale of housing projects to more manageable
sizes.' Indeed, the number of multiple sales or the rate of dissatisfied homebuyers increased with
the size of housing projects in Hayy el Sellom. So did the complexity of legal entanglements and
the difficulty to legalize tenure status. For example, since they are all tied to one housing project,
all 535 households in the 'Abbis Complex are required to regularize their legal status
simultaneously, despite the fact that their apartments do not violate building regulations equally
and that these homebuyers have different stands vis-I-vis legalization policies. The very scale of
this endeavor and the difficulty of settling on a satisfying option for all 535 households rendered
the regularization of the Complex close to impossible. In these circumstances, it would be
appropriate to adopt building standards that limit the scale of housing projects (such as
maximum rather than minimum lot size) and reduce the number of households who are tied
together within one legal procedure, in order to limit legal.
6.C.2 Physical Upgrading and Appropriate Standards
Based on the dissertation's findings, another policy recommendation is to implement a
physical upgrading project in the neighborhood in order to address its poor living conditions.
7 Current construction and zoning standards, as shown in Chapter 4, limit minimum -not maximum- construction
sizes.
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The dissertation described how living conditions in Hayy el Sellom have considerably
deteriorated over the past decade, as a result of the very high density (1,200 persons/ha), the
lack of open space, the poor quality of urban services (water and sewerage), and the high street
level (air and noise) pollution. These changes point to the necessity for a public intervention that
could limit the neighborhood's density (e.g. punctual demolitions, displacements), reduce the
level of pollution (e.g. regulating uses, reducing car access), and improve infrastructure networks.
This recommendation echoes other policy recommendations in the planning literature that have
recently argued for the need to address deteriorating living conditions in many informal
settlements around the world through physical upgrading projects, rather than limiting public
interventions to improving market conditions (Mukhija 2001). These recommendations raise,
once again, questions about how to set the "minimum. standards" according to which an
upgrading project can be implemented in this neighborhood (Durand-Lasserve and Tribillon
1995), and how to eventually maintain and enforce them.
The history of Hayy el Sellom suggests that although they did not correspond to the
aspirations of educated planners or to formally sanctioned urban regulations, "minimum
enforceable standards" were well in place during the first thirty years of the development of
Hayy el Sellom. For example, setbacks were observed in order to provide adequate passageways,
openings were designed in ways that could preserve neighbor's privacy, and building heights
were relatively limited. Furthermore, these standards (and the context from which they
developed) limited lot sizes to very small parcels that enabled future urban dwellers to organize
and control the construction process (Chapter 3).
These "minimum enforceable standards" were the result of a set of public-private
partnerships that generated the necessary institutional basis for the local generation of standards
and their successful enforcement. These standards were thus put in place by developers, in
partnership with public sector entrepreneurs, in dialogue with public planning agencies, and with
the cooperation of residents. They were thus developed and enforced by actors who had direct
relations, knowledge, and experiences in the neighborhood and who were involved in its
production. They were also elaborated in relation to and knowledge of public authorities and
sometimes the direct involvement of public planning agencies. The latter had a strong hand in
planning, since their provision of urban services was conditional on a minimum legal
enforcement and their authority over the city had not yet been challenged in the same ways it
would later be.
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However, these standards were not sufficient to maintain adequate living conditions in
Hayy el Sellom once the arrival of new groups of developers and clients created new conditions
for housing production in the neighborhood. Thus, by the mid 1980s, these standards were
neither sufficient to leave way, for example, for open spaces, nor did they possess the necessary
institutional basis to be adequately implemented. At this critical juncture when the construction
of large scale developments was just beginning, a public intervention that could have engaged
actors in this neighborhood to develop a new set of regulations could have prevented the later
day scenario that was described in Hayy el Sellom. Public regulations could have imposed, for
example, a ceiling on the number of constructed housing units in one complexs or within one
area, preserved some open spaces by purchasing lots in the neighborhood, and prevented
polluting workshops from settling in the neighborhood (e.g. noise and air pollution), in
consultation with different types of developers and resident committees in the neighborhood.
In the absence of such a coordination process, the new generation of developers appealed
selectively to state sanctioned construction guidelines that enabled them to build very large-scale
housing complexes, bring in new populations, with no concern for open spaces or the
neighborhood's density. As a result, the neighborhood today requires a larger scale public
intervention that could rehabilitate its physical and living conditions.
Furthermore, standards have very important implications on the ability of different
groups of actors to intervene in the process of housing production. It is worth recalling here one
of the main debates of the 1960s, which centered on the relation between building standards and
the ability of "users" to control the process of housing production (Turner 1972). Almost fifty
years later, this debate still carries important implications on the process of housing production
in Hayy el Sellom, which has gone from user-controlled, self-help housing to industrially
produced, large-scale housing complexes in which local initiative and control have been
considerably reduced. My research showed that publicly sanctioned urban regulations
encouraged this process by imposing large lot sizes (2000mn) and no upper ceilings on project
sizes (e.g. 535 housing units in the 'Abbis Complex). However, weaker control over the process
of housing production, the dissertation showed, had negative impacts for low-income urban
dwellers looking for housing, especially in terms of poorer market conditions (e.g. more default,
8 It is worth recalling here that Mr. Darwish who built 535 housing units in Hayy el Sellom in one complex between
1994 and 1996 brought in during these two years the same number of families that were brought by Abu Raymond
during his twenty years of practice.
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less recourse), higher user dissatisfaction with the housing product (e.g. leaks, layout, etc.), and
ultimately, poorer living conditions in the neighborhood. Instead, one could have foreseen a set
of regulations that encourage the local regulation of space and enable groups of 2-3 families to
pool together in 200-300m2 lots, the way developers organized them in the 1970s, and allow for
50-100m2 construction permits in this and other areas. Such standards would also have higher
chances of being implemented since their end-users, the residents of the neighborhood, are
themselves empowered in their application.
These factors point_ to the necessity to develop, in conjunction with actors, a set of
flexible and enforceable regulations that define the minimum acceptable housing standards,
empower low-income urban dwellers to take charge of the process of housing production, and
act as a premise for any type of upgrading project in this neighborhood. The dissertation has
shown that such standards can only be developed through a public-private partnership that
generates the necessary incentives for developers, residents, and public sector agents to
cooperate and re-create the institutional basis that would be necessary to determine what such
standards could be and who/how they would be enforced. In this context, the most difficult
challenge facing the development of standards is the possibility for instituting public-private
partnership at a time when state-society relations are strictly mediated by political parties and
state legality has been severely challenged. The growing dissatisfaction of low-income urban
dwellers with their living conditions could provide an opportunity for planning agencies to
engage them in a new form of partnership, in view of setting standards and improving living
conditions. It would be important for planning agencies, through their local actors, to invest in
this process.
6.C3 Learning from the Informal Public Sector
Perhaps, one of the most important lessons for planners seeking to learn fium this
neighborhood's development is the relative success of "illegal public practices" in controlling
and managing the city in comparison to formal public regulations.
Since the 1950s, planning regulations imposed first by the Ministry of Plan and later by
the Directorate General of Urbanism do not reflect an adequate understanding of social urban
realities. Most of these regulations were borrowed from the French tradition and, hence, rely on
assumptions regarding the appropriate role of the state, markets and communities that are from
a different period and social context (Chapter 4). These regulations, especially those dictated by
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successive master plans in this area, sought to impose particular visions of what constitutes an
acceptable urban environment (low density, individual houses on large lots) that do not reflect
an adequate understanding of the housing needs of low income urban dwellers in the given
urban, social and economic conditions in which they were seeking housing.
Conversely, the thesis showed that many of the "exceptional" or "one-time" measures
that were adopted by public sector agents as a result of the demands of low income urban
dwellers were more successful in organizing the urban space and encouraging residents to abide
by public regulations, or at least in maintaining a "regularizable" situation. The overview of sonic
of these "exceptional" measures (Chapter 4), notably the 50m2 building permit and the informal
land subdivision organized by a semi-public agency in the neighborhood (Hayy el Jami'ah),
showed that these regulations encouraged urban dwellers to restrict the volume of their
constructions and to seek regularization.
The relative success and respect of "exceptional" measures over publicly sanctioned
plans indicate that we need to learn from these planning processes. Indeed, these regulations
stemmed from a direct dialogue between political parties representing local populations, public
agents forced to engage with the realities of urban development and urban pressures, and
populations who were convinced that their abidance by urban regulations could improve their
living conditions (e.g. provision of services). Such a process depended however foremost on the
willingness of these agents to recognize the need for other types of urban developments and to
negotiate their form.
This is not to say that such exceptional measures were ideal. First, these exceptional
measures fell short of acknowledging this form of planning as legitimate and modifying formal
urban regulations to account for the needs of low-income urban dwellers and their needs. They
therefore did not establish an institutionalized process of partnership between planning agencies
and low-income urban dwellers (or developers) that could sustain the challenges put forth by
later forms of political mobilization that were antagonistic to the state as well as the weakness of
public planning agencies during the war. Second, these exceptional measures raise again the
challenge posed by the discretionary power of bureaucrats and the necessity to simultaneously
benefit from the flexibility provided by this discretion while maintaining the systems of checks
and balances that could avoid the types of scenarios that eventually developed in Hayy el Sellom,
trading forms of legality at the expense of low-income urban dwellers. Is it possible to imagine
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that a public recognition of this form of urban development or hence a formal process of checks
and balances could reduced the opportunities for abusing the trust of residents?
It is not clear at this point what type of system should be put in place and which public
arrangements could create such as "ideal" scenario. However, my findings indicate that the
valuable experiences of informal developers, which several studies are now hailing (McAuslin
2003, Bemer 2001a&b), need to be complemented by the accumulated experience of public
planning agencies and actors who have engaged in informal practices. Further research needs
therefore to be: done in order to see how and where, if any, such systems of checks and balances
were successfully implemented, especially in the event that social networks, which in this case
study rendered public agents accountable, were very unequal in their effects and gradually lost
their effectiveness when the neighborhood grew in size.
Along these lines, several researchers have recently pointed to the "positive effects" of
"corruption". For instance, Evans (1997) has alluded to the possibility that "embedded" state-
society relations be the repository of development rather than corruption, by improving
communication between these two groups. Similarly, through his investigation of bribery in
China, Smart (1999) suggested that the involvement of public agents in "corrupt" practices could
be read as involving "Schumpeterian entrepreneutial officers" who would be creating "new
market opportunities" and maybe helping in "the formation of a different kind of developmental
state" that is based on the "unfolding new political economy of competition between different
systems of property rights at the local level" in which "corrupt practices have useful unintended
consequences" (Smart 1999: 117). These observations point to new channels of conceptualizing
state-society relations and imagining ways in which public sector interventions could integrate
and capitalize on informal processes of housing production.
Before closing the policy section, and despite the important lessons we can derive from
the practices of these (and other) public actors, it is worth acknowledging the limited role that
public sector planners have had in the making of this neighborhood. The history of Hayy el
Sellom suggests that city planners were only one set of actors, and rather weak ones, amidst a
thick web of social and political relationships with many other actors, including several types of
developers who played more direct and central roles over the past fifty years. The last two policy
recommendations highlight these factors.
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6.C.4 Dealing with the City Factors
The dissertation documented many of the effects that citywide changes had on the
development and workings of the Hayy el Sellom housing market over the past fifty years. It
showed that a number of citywide changes, such as land prices increases or waves of population
displacement caused by urban renewal projects, directly influenced the type and quality of
housing that was produced as well as who was producing it.
These findings indicate that the improvement of living conditions in Hayy el Sellom is
not independent from citywide factors and would require primarily easing the housing pressure
off this neighborhood by creating opportunities for adequate, affordable, small scale housing
elsewhere in the city. It also requires limiting the types of projects that influence negatively low
income housing, such as urban renewal projects trigger large waves of population displacement
over short periods of time. It is thus not sufficient to limit public interventions in informal
settlements to the improvement of market mechanisms or upgrading physical conditions. Unless
the forces that destroyed otherwise well-working mechanisms of housing production are limited,
it is unlikely that any intervention within this or other low-income neighborhoods subjected to
similar forces can succeed.
6.C.5 Rethinking the formal/informal divide
This dissertation illustrated the multiplicity of scenarios or processes of housing
production that are lumped in the "informal category", showing, for example, that there are
many types of "informal" developments that vary from small-scale, self-help projects to large
scale, industrially produced complexes. The dissertation has also shown that there are several
types of developers who responded to different forms of market opportunities and ultimately
represented distinct styles. These developers had different resources and social networks; they
also followed, implicitly, different codes of conduct regarding the extent to which they were
willing to break formal regulations.
These variations within "informal" processes of housing production must be understood
by professional planners who are interested in building on informal market institutions and
forging new forms of "private-public partnerships", especially with developers working in
informal settlements. To tap the entrepreneurial energies of the developers of various kinds
without subjecting their operations to close scrutiny will not be an easy task. Understanding how
best to manage and control "informal" developers without unduly inhibiting their energy and
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resourcefulness will require a strong and smart local authority. They will need to understand that
to achieve public-private cooperation they have to address the conflicts among the multiple
stakeholders (Sanyal and Mukhija 2001). The thesis showed some of these conflicts, for example,
between local authority and political militias. Such conflicts have to be addressed innovatively,
acknowledging the political landscape of the area.
Furthermore, professional planners need to transcend the current conceptual dichotomy
between formal and informal markets, or social and public institutions and regulations, as if they
belong to two different domains of social action. The dissertation clearly demonstrated their
entanglement and mutual influence. This dynamic interaction between social norms and formal
rules and between actors within and without the public sector has to be understood before
effective planning policies building on the existing capacities of these neighborhoods can be
formulated. It is important, for example, to understand why some types of interaction between
formal and informal rules and institutions may be more beneficial for urban low-income dwellers
than others. Based on this dissertation, it is clear that early market arrangements provided more
secure market transactions and better housing products from their users. Such analysis will
demonstrate how interactions between public and private actors evolve over time, influenced as
they are by both micro variables particular to specific geographic areas, such as the religious and
social backgrounds of actors in this area, and macro issues, such as Lebanon's wars or
reconstruction policies.
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APPENDIX 1:
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY CONDUCTED FOR UN-HABITAT IN JUNE 2002
The following household survey was conducted as part of the UN-Habitat Slums of Beirut Report in
June 2002. It covered in total 25 households. It was conducted with the help of Hiba Bou Akar and
Sirine Kalash.
a. Household Indicators
S. Household type and their percentage (including women headed households)
a.2 Income by quintile and household type
a.3 Household size
a.4 Birth/fertility rates
&.5 Type of tenure and household ownership (status of the land, tenants/owners)
a.6 Literacy rates by age and group and sex
a.7 Occupancy ratios (means persons per household)
a.8 Length of household residency
b. Costs of Living
b.1 Commuting to work (time, distance and money)
b.2 Price of water and other services
b.3 Rental rates (informal and formal)
b.4 Availability of housing finance'
b.5 Health problems
b.6 Discrimination (employment, education)
b.7 Victimization and insecurity (including individual and neighborhood mass evictions)
b.8 Psychological trauma (suicide, violence)
b.9 Financial expenditures for the typical slum household: housing, food, transport
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APPENDIX 2:
SURVEY OF ACCESS TO LAND, LEGAL STATUS, AND PERCEPTIONS OF
LEGALITY
The following questionnaire was conducted with 300 head of households, all property owners,
mostly form the first two generations of Hayy el Sellom residents in August 1999. Following 7
months of qualitative survey, this questionnaire was meant to corroborate and verify the collected
information. It was conducted with the help of Mohammad Shihadeh, then a student at the Lebanese
Public University School of Architecture and to date a resident of Hayy el Sellom.
a. Survey Form
Date Surry Sheet
Purchase Information
Lot Number Building on lot Number of floor
Date of Land Purbase Form (Shares Total)
Mediator/ Developer involved in the transaction
Date fBuilding Phase 1 Phase 2 Builder?
Rent/ Ownerhbip ratio in building:
Legal Information
Doyou have a bildingpermit? What ype (Normal/ 50m2, Displaced)
What type oj'irmgularites doyou think exist in your building?
* No building pennit
* Disrespect of the permit
* Vioabions of Building Law (Which?)
S Probklems with respeting lot boundaries
* Pq~weey disputes
* Building in the location of approvedpublic projfec
* Other
Regularization
Ar you aware of a ngulariZation law (Past orpresnt)?
What does it do?
Have you thought of submitting an application for regularikation?
IfNo:
* Unaware
* Costs
* Unable to legali•• because of *pe of violation
* Hope>for an amnesty
* Other
If Yes:
* Didayoufollow up? Has it been legalized?
What do you think are advantages of legalization?
* Get a loan
* Abilit to sell
S Services (water and electridy)
* Secnri*y
* Other
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